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研究生:林曉嵐
研究生(外文):Hsiao-Lan Lin
論文名稱:股權結構與投資
論文名稱(外文):Ownership Structure and Investment
指導教授:周淑卿周淑卿引用關係
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立雲林科技大學
系所名稱:財務金融系碩士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2010
畢業學年度:98
語文別:中文
論文頁數:75
中文關鍵詞:過度投資泰國台灣所有權韓國
外文關鍵詞:OverinvestKoreaTaiwanOwnershipThailand
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:3
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本研究主要探討2000年至2008年台灣、南韓、泰國等上市公司的所有權結構如何影響投資現金流敏感性的關係。根據過去的文獻,內部人的持股可能會減少公司的價值並且帶來過度投資的代理成本。
使用台灣5,550筆、韓國5,290筆以及泰國2,917筆資料加入固定效果來進行多元迴歸的分析。實證結果指出在台灣內部所有權集中越高使得公司可能有過度投資的傾向。然而在韓國及泰國內部所有權集中度越高則公司並沒有過度投資的問題。這個現象的原因可能出自於台灣的現金流量權以及控制權間的差異很大。
This paper investigates how insider ownership influences the sensitivity of investment cash flow for the listed companies in Taiwan、Korea and Thailand over 2000 to 2008. According to literature, insider ownership may decrease company’s value and cause overinvestment agency problem.

By using 3 countries of 5550, 5290 and 2917 observation respectively and controlling industry fixed effects, this study finds that in Taiwan firm with concentrated ownership is more likely to over-invest. In Contrast, Korea firms and Thailand firms with concentrated ownership do not have apparent overinvestment. This phenomenon probably is due to Taiwan firms have higher degree of disparity of cash flow right and control right.
目 錄

摘 要..................................................................................................................................i
Abstract ii
誌 謝 iii
目 錄 iii
表 目 錄 iv
圖 目 錄 v
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第三節 研究架構與研究流程 5
第貳章 文獻探討 7
第一節 代理問題的探討 7
第二節 投資現金流敏感性 10
第三節 股權結構與代理問題 12
第四節 其他控制變數 16
第五節 台灣、韓國、泰國的公司治理結構探討 17
第參章 研究設計 25
第一節 樣本選取標準及樣本來源 25
第二節 變數定義 31
第三節 研究模型 37
第肆章 實證結果與分析 40
第一節 基本敘述性統計 40
第二節 實證結果分析 50
第伍章 結論與建議 59
第一節 研究結論 59
第二節 研究限制 61
參考文獻 62
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