臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究探討本國上市公司在2000至 2009年間，公司治理良窳和非公司特有風險間的關係。研究結果發現公司治理良窳與公司特有風險大小呈現顯著的負向關係。進一步將樣本區分為屬於集團企業和非集團企業公司，結果仍一致，隱含良好的公司治理的確實能有效落實風險管理。此外，公司是否屬於集團企業對其公司特有風險無顯著影響，而公司特有風險較小的公司傾向以負債作為資金來源。

This study examines the relationship between corporate governance and idiosyncratic risk of companies listed in Taiwan during the period of 2000－2009. The sample is further classified into two groups, firms controlled by business group and firms not controlled by business group. This paper finds a significant negative association between corporate governance and idiosyncratic risk, implying that corporate governance really serves as a basic risk management practice. In addition, this paper also finds that whether firms are controlled by business group or not does not have significant influence on idiosyncratic risk. And firms with better corporate governance tend to use debt finance.

Contents
Abstract................................................................ii
Contents...............................................................iii
List of Tables..........................................................iv
List of Figures.........................................................iv
Chapter 1. Introduction..................................................1
1.1. Background.......................................................1
1.2. The impact of good corporate governance..........................2
1.3. Motivation and purpose...........................................4
Chapter 2. Literature Review.............................................7
2.1. Corporate governance.............................................7
2.1.1. Leadership structure.......................................7
2.1.2. Ownership structure.......................................11
2.2. Risk issue......................................................13
2.3. Corporate governance and idiosyncratic risk.....................14
Chapter 3. Data and Methodology.........................................17
3.1. Data source.....................................................17
3.2. Idiosyncratic risk estimation...................................17
3.3. Corporate governance index and control variables................18
3.3.1. Corporate governance indicators and index construction....18
3.4. Panel regression construction...................................21
3.5. Model selection.................................................24
Chapter 4. Empirical Evidence...........................................28
Chapter 5. Conclusions..................................................39
References..............................................................41

List of Tables
Table 1. Test statistics of LM test and Hausman test...............................26
Table 2. Definition of variables...................................................27
Table 3. Descriptive statistics....................................................29
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of idiosyncratic risk and idiosyncratic risk ratio.30
Table 5. Descriptive statistics of components of corporate index...................32
Table 6. The distribution of governance index......................................33
Table 7. The relationship between GINDEX and the governance characteristics........34
Table 8. Corporate governance characters of firms controlled by business group.....35
Table 9. Estimations of coefficients of the yearly time-series cross-sectional firm-level regression...................................................................38

List of Figures
Figure 1. Yearly idiosyncratic risk................................................31
Figure 2. Yearly idiosyncratic risk to total risk..................................31

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