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研究生:吳盈輝
研究生(外文):Wu, Ying- Hui
論文名稱:多角化公司的股權結構對公司現金價值及投資的影響
論文名稱(外文):The Effects of Firm Diversification and Ownership Structure on Value of Cash and Investment
指導教授:陳乃維
指導教授(外文):Chen, Nai-Wei
口試委員:郭良瑋鎮明常
口試委員(外文):Kuo, Liang-WeiCheng, Ming-Chang
口試日期:2011-07-26
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立中正大學
系所名稱:財務金融研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2011
畢業學年度:99
語文別:中文
論文頁數:71
中文關鍵詞:多角化股權結構現金價值投資
外文關鍵詞:DiversificationOwnership StructureValue of CashInvestment
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:348
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:17
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0

現金為流動性最高的資產,透過現金流量表可了解公司現金使用的情形,公司保留現金能提供投資活動所需資金,亦是營業活動中重要的一環。然而持有過多的現金,公司管理者可能因不當的使用,進而產生代理問題。本研究探討美國多角化上市公司現金持有的狀況,衡量公司現金持有的價值以及對投資的影響,以代理理論為觀點,現金是否被公司有效的使用,進而透過股權結構分析,了解公司治理程度對公司現金價值及投資活動的影響。

根據本篇研究,多角化公司的現金邊際價值高於單一部門公司,持有超額現金對下一期淨投資無顯著的影響。多角化公司的高階執行長(CEO)為高持股比率時,現金邊際價值將顯著的下降,持有超額現金對下一期淨投資有顯著正向的影響。多角化公司中,當管理者股權越是集中,越能掌控公司資金分配的權力,若管理者無效率的使用現金,可能會因投資不當導致現金持有的價值降低。

當多角化公司受到融資限制,由於外部資金成本高,公司將審慎評估現金使用的效率,有助於提升公司的現金邊際價值。另外,由於多角化公司具有效率的內部資本市場,公司較不會因融資限制而降低投資活動。公司治理越好能有效降低代理問題,提高公司的現金邊際價值,對於多角化公司的投資活動無顯著的影響。

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究架構 3
第二章 文獻探討 3
第一節 現金持有理論相關文獻探討 4
第二節 現金持有動機及現金價值文獻 6
第三節 融資限制相關文獻 7
第四節 公司多角化相關文獻 9
第五節 股權結構相關文獻 10
第三章 研究方法與設計 13
第一節 研究假說 13
第二節 資料選取 15
第三節 變數定義 15
第四節 模型設立 19
第五節 限制條件 25
第四章 實證結果分析 27
第一節 基本統計分析 27
第二節 實證結果分析 31
第五章 結論與建議 67
第一節 結論 67
第二節 建議 68



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