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研究生:劉瀚榆
研究生(外文):Liu, Hanyu
論文名稱:貿易援助與外人直接投資之經濟分析
論文名稱(外文):The Analysis of Aid for Trade and FDI
指導教授:陳芳岳陳芳岳引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chen, Fang-Yueh
口試委員:陳芳岳陳和全崔曉倩唐孟祺謝修林億明
口試委員(外文):Chen, Fang-YuehChen, Ho-ChyuanTsui, Hsiao-ChienTang, Meng-ChiShieh, ShiouLin, Yih-Ming
口試日期:2011-06-13
學位類別:博士
校院名稱:國立中正大學
系所名稱:國際經濟研究所
學門:社會及行為科學學門
學類:經濟學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2011
畢業學年度:99
語文別:中文
論文頁數:79
中文關鍵詞:貿易援助援助矛盾Barbell modelFDI
外文關鍵詞:AFTparadox of aidBarbell modelFDI
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  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
本論文是由三篇文章所組成。第二章主要探討貿易援助(Aid for Trade, AFT)在貿易便捷化過程中所產生的經濟效果,包含援助矛盾(paradox of aid)發生的條件與策略性貿易下,兩國貿易政策的相關性。其主要結論為:1.當援助國相對市場規模較大較容易產生援助矛盾的現象。2.在貿易政策的相關性上,貿易援助無助於貿易自由化的推動。反之,貿易自由化則有助於貿易援助的推展。第三章主要以Hwang and Mai (1990)之Barbell model為架構,探討品質訊息不完全下,獨占廠商如何透區位選擇向消費者傳達品質訊息,以及由此所產生的市場進入模式。其主要結論為:當市場進入模式為出口,低品質廠商選擇在本國設廠;當市場進入模式為FDI,低品質廠商選擇在外國市場設廠。廠商的市場進入模式取決於FDI的固定成本大小。高品質廠商基於傳訊的理由,無論在出口模式或FDI模式,與完全訊息相比其最適區位會往國界靠近。此外,對高品質廠商而言,完全訊息下的出口模式在不完全訊息下會因為廠商的傳訊動機而改採FDI模式。第四章探討獨占廠商如何利用價格和外人投資區位向消費者傳遞產品品質的訊息和最適關稅的問題。我們得到唯一的分離均衡,高(低)品質廠商選擇高(低)生產成本的國家從事外人投資;高(低)品質產品的價格大(等)於完全訊息下的價格;進口國對來自低生產成本國家產品的最適關稅與完全訊息下相同,但對來自高生產成本國家產品的最適關稅則為角解。高、低品質產品的關稅大小需視成本與品質相對差異化程度而定。最後,我們也得證,在某些條件下完全訊息下的社會福利高於不完全訊息下的社會福利。


This thesis is composed of three articles. In Chapter 2, we investigate economic effects of Aid for Trade (AFT) in the process of trade facilitation, including the condition when a paradox of aid occurs and the relevance of strategic trade policy of countries in trade. The main results are as follow. (1) If a donor country has a larger home market, the paradox of aid is more likely to occur. (2) An AFT helps to enhance trade liberalization. However, the trade liberalization does not help to promote the AFT. In Chapter 3, we adopt a framework of “Barbell model” proposed by Hwang and Mai (1991) and discuss how a monopoly firm can signal the quality of products to consumers through location choice and through entry modes. The entry mode for the low quality firm depends on the fixed cost of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). A low quality firm in the incomplete information regime chooses the location to set up its factory as that in the full information regime. Regardless of entry modes, the high quality firm chooses a location near the border to signal itself under incomplete information. In addition, a high quality firm, choosing the export mode in the case of full information, will switch to the FDI mode in the case of incomplete information. In Chapter 4, we study how a monopoly firm can signal the quality of product by the price and location of FDI. We also examine the optimal tariff of the importing country. We obtain a unique separating equilibrium, in which the high (low) quality firm chooses the country with high (low) production cost as a production base. The price of high (low) quality in incomplete information is higher than (as the same as) that in the full information. The tariff of products from countries of low production costs is the same as that in the full information. The optimal tariff of products from the high production cost country is a suboptimal corner solution. The optimal tariff of both high and low quality depends on the relative differentiation of cost and quality. Finally, we demonstrate the social welfare in the full information is higher than in the incomplete information.
第一章 緒論…………………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究動機與目的……………………………………………………1
第二節 研究方法與論文架構………………………………………………3
第二章 貿易援助之經濟分析………………………………………………5
第一節 前言…………………………………………………………………5
第二節 貿易援助基本模型…………………………………………………8
第三節 最適關稅與貿易援助………………………………………………20
第四節 結論…………………………………………………………………26
第三章 產品品質訊息不對稱之出口與外人投資…………………………27
第一節 前言…………………………………………………………………27
第二節 基本模型……………………………………………………………28
第三節 市場進入模式………………………………………………………49
第四節 結論…………………………………………………………………51
第四章 產品品質訊息不對稱之外人投資與最適關稅……………………52
第一節 前言…………………………………………………………………52
第二節 基本模型……………………………………………………………55
第三節 最適關稅……………………………………………………………67
第四節 結論…………………………………………………………………71
第五章 結論…………………………………………………………………72
參考文獻 ………………………………………………………………………74
附錄 ………………………………………………………………………79

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