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研究生:朱建璋
研究生(外文):Chu Chien-Chang
論文名稱:研發支出與經理人薪酬之研究
論文名稱(外文):Research on R&D Expenditures and CEO Compensation
指導教授:譚醒朝譚醒朝引用關係薛健宏薛健宏引用關係
指導教授(外文):TAM, SING-CHEWChien-Hung, Hsueh
口試委員:彭俊揚呂昭顯
口試委員(外文):Peng, Chun YangChao-Hsien Lu
口試日期:2011-07-31
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:長榮大學
系所名稱:經營管理研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2011
畢業學年度:99
語文別:中文
論文頁數:74
中文關鍵詞:經理人薪酬研究發展支出產業別股權結構財務狀況
外文關鍵詞:CEO CompensationR&DIndustryOwnership StructureFinancial Situation
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:1
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  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
經理人為提升自身薪酬,膨脹獲利,而裁減研發支出故為本研究探討,研發支出與經理人薪酬間的關連性,所以,本研究以民國94至98年台灣上市櫃公司為研究對象,探討研發支出與經理人薪酬間的關係,並檢視上述關係於不同環境(即產業別、股權結構、財務狀況)中是否存在差異。
研究結果顯示,研發支出與總經理呈顯著正向關係,但在高科技產業中,上述兩變數(即研發支出、總經理)間的正向關係較小。此外,在經理人控制的企業,經理人較可能為了提升自身薪酬,而裁減研發支出。

This research examines the effect of the R&D expenditures and CEO compensation research. Considering the industry、ownership structure、financial situation between CEO compensation and R&D expenditures in difference environment. We examine a sample of Taiwan listed companies in the period of 2005~2009.
We find that R&D expenditure and the CEO compensation is positive. But, R&D expenditure and the CEO compensation in High-technology industry (R&D、CEO) is positive small. In addition, the managers control the enterprise, managers are more likely to improve their pay, while reducing R & D expenditures.
第一章 緒論--------------------------------------------------1
第一節 研究背景與動機--------------------------------1
第二節 研究目的--------------------------------------4
第三節 研究架構--------------------------------------6
第二章 文獻探討----------------------------------------------7
第一節 研究發展之定義--------------------------------7
第二節 企業研發支出之相關文獻----------------------- 13
第三節 總經理薪酬之決定----------------------------- 16
第四節 研發支出與總經理薪酬之相關文獻--------------- 21
第五節 代理理論------------------------------------- 26
第三章 研究方法--------------------------------------------- 29
第一節 研究假說------------------------------------- 29
第二節 研究模型與變數衡量--------------------------- 36
第三節 資料來源與樣本選取---------------------------- 43
第四章 實證結果與分析--------------------------------------- 44
第一節 敘述性統計分析------------------------------- 44
第二節 實證分析結果--------------------------------- 49
第五章 結論與建議------------------------------------------- 58
第一節 彙總與結論----------------------------------- 58
第二節 研究限制與建議------------------------------- 61
參考文獻---------------------------------------------------- 63
附錄-------------------------------------------------------- 73

圖目錄
圖1 代理理論歸納---------------------------------------------28







表目錄
表1 敘述性統計量------------------------------------------ 46
表2 Pearson相關係數分析----------------------------------- 48
表3 影響經理人薪酬的相關因素------------------------------ 49
表4 影響研發密度的相關因素-------------------------------- 52
表5 影響研發密度的相關因素—消除共線性的干擾-------------- 74



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