臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

由於各國經濟體系的相互依存度提高與央行干預的外溢效果，傳統Krugman (1991) 雙邊匯率目標區模型無法合理的解釋經濟體系多邊共存的狀態，故本研究延續Serrat (2000) 多邊匯率目標區模型，考量政府的政策方向與中央銀行的干預行為，將兩者視為影響未來經濟發展的重要因素，並假設基要變數為一預期未來通貨膨脹的過程，利用最適控制化說明政府支出與央行干預對匯率目標區的賽局行為。
藉由推導結果指出，選擇合作對象的第三國家，為決定匯率未來路徑的關鍵因素，其合作性的干預對象轉換，以及央行的可信度為不完全與政府的政策不明確時，易導致匯率出現跳躍的非線性走勢。此外，當央行的干預與政府的政策方向相互依存時，匯率目標區與經濟不穩定的可能性增加，即蜜月效果受到質疑。因此，央行干預的訊息傳遞管道與協調合作管道，對穩定匯率之波動扮演重要的角色。

Due to the high interdependence among countries and the spill-over effects of central bank’s intervention, the traditional exchange rate target zone model, proposed by Krugman (1991), cannot explain the co-existence of multilateral economic relationships reasonably. To resolve the problem this paper extends the multilateral exchange rate target zones model, constructed by Serrat (2000), by considering government’s expenditure policy and the intervention behavior of central bank which are two important factors in economic development. Regarding fundamentals as the process of the expected inflation rate, this study applies the optimal control and the game theory to derive the effects of government expenditures and central bank’s intervention on exchange rate target zones.
The theoretical derivation shows that the key factor affecting the dynamic path of exchange rate is the choice of coordination with the third country. In addition, the change of cooperative partners, the incompleteness of central bank’s creditability, and the ambiguousness of governmental policy, may make exchange rate display a jump and nonlinear path straightforwardly. However, when the interdependence between central bank’s intervention and governmental policy exists, the possibility of unstable exchange rate target zones and economic system will increase, i.e., the honeymoon effect is controversial. In other words, the signal channel and the coordination channel of central bank’s intervention play an important role in stabilizing exchange rate volatility in multilateral exchange rate target zones model.

摘要…………………………………………………………………………………………………Ⅰ
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………Ⅱ
誌謝辭………………………………………………………………………………………………Ⅲ
目錄…………………………………………………………………………………………………Ⅳ
第一章 緒論………………………………………………………………………………………1
第一節 前言……………………………………………………………………………………1
第二節 研究動機與目的………………………………………………………………………2
第二章 文獻回顧…………………………………………………………………………………4
第三章 理論模型的設定…………………………………………………………………………6
第一節 匯率決定式……………………………………………………………………………6
第二節 中間目標之設定………………………………………………………………………9
第三節 匯率的動態路徑解……………………………………………………………………10
第四節 雙邊與多邊目標區……………………………………………………………………11
第五節 匯率目標區的賽局分析………………………………………………………………13
第四章 模型分析…………………………………………………………………………………16
第一節 目標區的行為設定……………………………………………………………………16
第二節 干預行為對目標區的分析……………………………………………………………18
第三節 目標區的最適決策……………………………………………………………………24
第四節 多邊目標區的應用……………………………………………………………………27
第五章 結論與建議………………………………………………………………………………32
第一章 結論……………………………………………………………………………………32
第二章 建議與未來延伸………………………………………………………………………34
附錄(一)：【推論1】………………………………………………………………………………35
附錄(二)：【推論2】………………………………………………………………………………37
附錄(三)：【命題3】………………………………………………………………………………39
參考文獻……………………………………………………………………………………………46

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