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研究生:簡碧麗
研究生(外文):Bi-Li Chien
論文名稱:董事會監督品質與績效關係之研究- 以台灣上市櫃電子業為例
論文名稱(外文):The Relationship between Board Audit Quality and Company Performances –Evidence of Taiwanese OTC Electrical Industry
指導教授:俞海琴俞海琴引用關係
指導教授(外文):Hai-Chin Yu
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:中原大學
系所名稱:國際貿易研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:貿易學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2011
畢業學年度:99
語文別:中文
論文頁數:56
中文關鍵詞:分量迴歸經營績效三大法人最小平方法
外文關鍵詞:Operation PerformanceOLSInstitutional InvestorQuantile Regression
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本文是以公司影響經營績效為主要研究議題,其研究主要變數區分為公司治理及公司特質二大區塊,採用以往相關研究文獻所選取變數予以實證分析,以最小平方法及分量迥歸等研究方法來探討影響經營績效的因素,並提出四項研究目的:(一)台灣電子業各類型產業董事監察人員監督機制的強弱對公司績效之影響。(二)三大法人監督情形對公司經營績效之影響。(三)瞭解影響董監事之監督能力的重要變數之間的差異。(四)電子總產業下不同產業之間的監督機制的差異。
本研究的實證分析結果,證實電子業在經營績效部分存在差異;外資仍為電子產業股權最大的外在持有者,因此當外資大量買賣股票時,將造成股價隨之波動。另外發現電子產業投入研發費用金額相較先進國外電子產業仍顯偏低,符合台灣電子產業仍以代工為主的供應鏈型態。另確認三大法人均以產業經營績效為選股重要標的;董事人數增加時,內部意見會相對增多,影響公司決策效率,但擁有獨立董事,卻可以創造公司更大績效;研發費用顯示將部分營業收益轉入研發費用,可提高企業競爭力;財務槓桿對經營績效分析確認,公司償債能力愈高相對經營績效愈好,財務槓桿比率愈低則經營績效愈好等二大結論,符合公司治理的管理財務意涵。
2008年金融風暴顯著影響企業經營績效,代表電子產業仍屬高度外生性出口導向類型,故全球不景氣時,不論公司經營體質多完善,仍因外生性植入因子而重挫,此一結果符合島國類型企業模式,故建議政府在風險分散管理概念下,應改變目前集中行銷大陸單一市場,來創造台灣短期經濟榮景的作為,輔導企業在全球布局廣置銷售服務,以多點經營模式來有效解低區域經濟造成的經營風險。



This paper is to research the issues which company effect its management performance. Main variables separated to be two categories of corporate and governance corporate characters. Using former literature variable to finish empirical analysis and to study the factors affected management performance by OLS and Quantile Regression and suggest the following four research purpose :
1). Director supervisor supervise mechanism tension to affect company performance.
2). Institutional investors supervise mechanism affect to company management performance.
3). To understand the difference between main variables of director’s supervise ability.
4). Differences of supervise mechanism between different kind of electronic industry.
The empirical results fund there are existing parted difference among electronic industry management performance, foreign investors are still be the biggest outside stockholder of electronic industry, when foreign investors buy/sell a large number of stocks, it will cause the stock price variation, the other result shows that electronic industry devoted R&D cost is lower which compared with that of advanced country electronic industry did, it is consistent to Taiwan electronic industry OEM supply chain, it can be sure that the criteria for institutional investors to select stock target is by industry management performance; when the number of directo4s added, the internal comments will increase and affect it’s decision-making efficiency, but independent director number increased, it can create more company performance. R&D cost result shows that parts of operation revenue posted to R&D expense can raise company competition. Financial leverage to management performance analysis was affirmed that better company liquidity will correspond to better management performance relatively. Lower ratio of financial leverage is better to management performance, these two financial leverage study conclusions are consistence to corporate governance and financial management meaning.
Year 2008 financial crisis affected company operation performance significantly, it means electronic industry belongs to highly exogenous export oriented type. When global economic recession, whether company operating status is good or not, it is tumbled by exogenous factors, this case meet the island type business model. We hereby suggest that our government should modify the policy of focus in single China market under the ideal of risk dispersion management to create Taiwan economic boom of the short run and assist enterprise in global sales services and using multi-spot business model to decrease the management risk which caused by regional economics.



目錄
摘要.............................................I
Abstract.......................................II
誌謝辭.........................................III
目錄............................................IV
表目錄...........................................V
圖目錄..........................................VI
第一章 緒論.....................................1
第一節 研究背景與動機............................1
第二節 研究目的.................................3
第三節 論文架構.................................4
第二章 文獻回顧.................................5
第一節 公司治理相關文獻..........................5
第二節 董事會相關文獻............................8
第三節 董監持股比例與獨立董監相關文獻............11
第四節 法人機構相關文獻探討.....................14
第三章 研究方法................................17
第一節 樣本選取與資料來源.......................17
第二節 研究變數之定義...........................18
第三節 研究方法................................22
第四章 實證結果與分析...........................24
第一節 敘述性統計結果...........................24
第二節 最小平方法分析結果.......................39
第三節 分量迴歸分析結果.........................41
第五章 結論與建議..............................43
第一節 研究結論................................43
第二節 研究建議................................45
參考文獻........................................46
附錄............................................49
表目錄
表4-1 各變數敘述統計分析........................26
表4-2 電腦及周邊產業變數敘述統計分析..............27
表4-3 通訊網路產業變數敘述統計分析...............28
表4-4 電子零組件產業變數敘述統計分析..............29
表4-5 電子通路產業變數敘述統計分析...............30
表4-6 資訊服務產業變數敘述統計分析...............31
表4-7 其他電子產業變數敘述統計分析...............32
表4-8 光電業產業變數敘述統計分析.................33
表4-9 半導體產業變數敘述統計分析.................34
表4-10 各產業變數平均數分析.......................36
表4-11 各年度變數平均數分析.......................37
表4-12 Tobin’s Q分量結構分析....................38
表4-13 最小平方法實證結果.......................40
表4-14 Tobin’s Q分量迴歸.......................42
附表一 產業虛擬變數實證結果......................49
附表二 年度虛擬變數實證結果......................50


圖目錄
圖1-1研究流程圖.................................4
圖4-1 各產業敍述統計圖..........................35



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