臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

提高資訊透明度一直是主管機關努力的目標，但金融弊案還是接連爆發，其成因多是由於公司高層不願真實表達公司之狀況所致。這也使全球企業開始注意到公司獨立董事及財務長之財會專業以及資訊揭露的重要性。為了防止類似事件再度發生，主管機關一方面引入了獨立董事制度，要求其成員須擁有財會專業；另一方面，加重了財務報表簽章人之法律責任，以期達到強化公司治理，提高資訊透明度之目的。因此，本文欲由財會專業為基礎，探討公司之財務報表簽章人之財會專業，是否能達到提升公司資訊透明度之目的。
研究結果證實，財務、會計之經歷對於資訊揭露之影響優於財務、會計之學歷。董事會之財務專長及會計主管之會計專長皆有提升資訊透明度之作用，另外，總經理在誘因獎酬的領導下，確實會有誘因提高資訊揭露的程度。

Increase information transparency has been the competent authority’s goal, but the financial scandal happened frequently. The reason is companies’ top manager reluctant to announce the real circumstances. Notice that information transparency, independent directors’ and chief financial officer’s financial accounting expertise is important for companies. To prevent the similar scandal outbreak again, the competent authority induce the independent directors, at least one with financial accounting expertise, and increase the financial statements' signature’s legal liability. To achieve the purpose of enhance corporate governance and increase information transparency. Therefore, this paper is based on financial, accounting expertise, researching the relationship between financial accounting expertise of financial statements' signature and information transparency.
The results showed financial and accounting experience is better than the degree of the impact on information disclosure. And board members' financial expertise and chief accounting officer's accounting expertise can promote the information transparency. Then the chief executive officer in rewards' leadership, really have incentives to promoting the information transparency.

目錄
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究問題 4
第三節 研究架構 5
第二章 文獻探討 6
第一節 影響資訊透明度之因素 6
第二節 財務專業之重要性 9
第三章 研究方法 11
第一節 研究假說 11
第二節 實證模型與變數定義 14
第三節 樣本選取與資料來源 18
第四章 實證結果分析 20
第一節 敘述性統計 20
第二節 迴歸結果 26
第五章 結論及建議 35
第一節 討論與結論 35
第二節 研究限制及建議 36
參考文獻 37

 
表目錄
表01 樣本篩選表 18
表02 變數定義與資料來源 19
表03 評鑑等級次數分配表 21
表04 敘述統計量 23
表05 全年度之相關係數矩陣(n=1,650) 25
表06 董事會之迴歸結果 — Order Logistic model 28
表07 獨立董事之迴歸結果 — Order Logistic model 29
表08 總經理之迴歸結果 — Order Logistic model 30
表09 會計主管之迴歸結果 — Order Logistic model 31
表10 董事會、總經理、會計主管之迴歸結果 — Order Logistic model 33
表11 獨立董事、總經理、會計主管之迴歸結果 — Order Logistic model 34

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