臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究以公司治理變數與銀行評等結果之關係為研究對象，並以累積邏輯斯迴歸模型(Cumulative Logistic Regression Model)研究2004年至2010年的31間台灣的上市銀行，探討公司治理對於公司決策的影響，及其是否會進而影響公司的表現，最終並改變公司的評等結果。
本文由股權結構以及董事會的組成這兩大結構來探討公司治理對銀行的評等影響，股權結構的部分主要選擇董監持股、外部法人董監持股、董監持股質押比例、大股東持股、經理人持股、最大外部股東、盈餘席次偏離比、股份席次偏離比等變數，而董事會的組成方面則選擇董事及監事兼任占經理人比例、股監事席次、獨立董監席次等變數來探討。研究發現董監事、大股東及外部法人董監的持股比率越高，對公司的評等結果有正向影響；反之，經理人之持股比率則與公司的評等結果呈負向關係。此外，獨立董監占董事會的席次越高，與公司的評等結果存在正向的關係。

The bank rating system used to only consider the financial variables instead of corporate governance variables, but whether the corporate governance variables can influence the strategies of managers and the performance of the firm, then further change the outcome of the bank rating had never been considered. This thesis is trying to use cumulative logistic model figure out whether there exist any connection between corporate governance variables and bank rating outcome.
This thesis considered 9 difference corporate variables that can be divided into two different sectors, which are ownership structure and boardroom structure. The conclusion of this thesis is that the majority shareholder's holding、Supervisors and Directors' holding and institutional Supervisor and Director's holding、Managers' holding and the number of independent director and supervisor will influence the outcome of the bank rating.

謝辭.......................................................I
中文摘要...................................................II
英文摘要..................................................III
目錄......................................................IV
表次......................................................VI
圖次.....................................................VII
第一章、緒論 .............................................1
第一節、研究動機與背景 ......................................1
第二節、研究架構............................................ 3
第二章、文獻探討.............................................4
第一節、股權結構對公司績效之影響...............................4
第二節、董事會的專業性以及獨立性...............................7
第三章、研究方法.............................................9
第一節、CAMELS ............................................9
第二節、政治大學銀行評等中心 ............................10
第三節、累積LOGISTIC迴歸模型 .............................12
第四節、研究步驟............................................13
第四章、實證結果與分析 ....................................23
第一節、資料來源與敘述性分析 ..............................23
第二節、實證結果與分析 .....................................26
一、敘述性統計資料..........................................26
二. Cumulative Logistic model 的迴歸結果 ................28
第五章、結論 ............................................33
參考文獻...................................................35

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