CONTENT
1.INTRODUCTION 1
1.1.The Background and Motivation of this Study 1
1.2.The Purpose of this Study 5
1.3.The Framework of this Study 5
2.LITERATURES REVIEW 7
2.1.IFRS 8 7
2.2.The Determinants of Segment Reporting Quality 8
2.2.1.Proprietary Costs of Revealing Segment Information 9
2.2.2.Financing Incentives of Revealing Segment Information 10
2.2.3.Agency Costs of Revealing Segment Information 12
2.3.The Effects of Segment Reporting Quality 14
2.3.1.Evidence from United States 14
2.3.2.Other Countries 19
2.4.Managerial Empire Building 20
2.4.1.Causes of Managerial Empire Building 20
2.4.2.Consequences of Managerial Empire Building 22
2.5.Corporate Governance Mechanism and Reporting Quality 24
2.5.1.Audit Committee and Reporting Quality 24
2.5.2.External Auditors and Reporting Quality 28
2.6.Summary 33
3.HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH DESIGN 34
3.1.Managerial Empire Building and Segment Reporting Quality 34
3.2.The Role of External Auditors on the Relationship between Segment Reporting Quality and Managerial Empire Building 36
3.3.Research Design 39
3.3.1.Research Model 39
3.3.2.Variable Definitions 40
3.4.Sample Selection 49
4.EMPIRICAL RESULTS 56
4.1.Effective Test 56
4.2.Descriptive Statistics 60
4.3.Correlation Analysis 70
4.4.Results of Regression Analysis 74
4.4.1.The Effect of CSVEG 74
4.4.2.The Effect of CSVEGDUM 78
4.4.3.The Effect of LNCSVEG 79
4.4.4.The Effect of CSVSG 80
4.4.5.The Effect of GEDIS 81
4.4.6.Summary of Empirical Results in Different Dependent Variables 82
4.5.Additional Tests 82
4.5.1.Alternative Measures of Managerial Empire Building 82
4.5.2.Alternative Measures of the Dependent Variables 85
4.5.3.The sample audited by Big4 90
5.CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 93
5.1.Conclusions of this Study 93
5.2.Contributions of this Study 96
5.3.Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 97
6.REFERENCES 98
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