本研究運用logit的研究模型，採用 OECD等22個國家在1974-2004年間的年度資料，驗證滙率制度的選擇，造成中央銀行總裁在任期未屆滿前遭撤換。
根據過去學術研究顯示，右翼政黨偏好較低的通貨膨脹率，為了維持經濟穩定可能會選擇固定滙率制度；另一方面，左翼政黨傾向維持低的失業率和提高產出水準，可能會偏向支持採用獨立性較高的彈性滙率制度以達成總體經濟目標。基於政黨對於滙率制度不同的偏好，中央銀行總裁是否會因滙率制度的選擇違逆政黨的意識型態而失業?本研究的結果認為，在OECD等22個國家的中央銀行總裁在1974-2004年間可以獨立的選擇滙率制度。

This paper deploy the logit approach model and collect annual data from 1974 to 2004 in 22 OECD countries. It can examine that the option of exchange rate regime may cause the replacements of the governor of central banks during his tenure of office.
According to prior empirical studies shows that the rightist parties favor low inflation, they may choose fixed exchange rate regime for holding monetary stability; otherwise, the leftist parties prefer low unemployment and high production, they may adopt the flexible exchange rate regime to maintain independent monetary policy and to achieve their macroeconomic objectives. Due to diverse political preferences, Does the choice of exchange rate regime disobeyed the political ideology of ruling party will cause that the central bank governors lose their job? Our results manifest that these chairmen of central banks can independently insist and defend their exchange rate regimes in OECD countries.

目 錄
論文審定書……………………………………………………………i
謝誌………………………………………………………………………ii
中文摘要…………………………………………………………………iii
英文摘要…………………………………………………………………iv
壹、前言………………………………………………………………………………1
一、研究動機…………………………………………………………………………2
二、研究目的…………………………………………………………………………4
三、研究範圍…………………………………………………………………………6
貳、相關文獻…………………………………………………………………………7
一、政府意識型態……………………………………………………………………7
二、滙率制度………………………………………………………………………9
三、中央銀行的獨立性……………………………………………………………11
四、政黨的意識型態、滙率制度和中央銀行的獨立性……………………………13
參、資料來源、變數定義與研究方法 ………………………………………17
一、資料來源與變數定義………………………………………‥………………17
二、變數定義………………………………………………………………………18
三、研究模型………………………………………………………………………26
肆、研究結果分析…………………………………………………………………29
伍、結論………………………………………………………………………………33
參考文獻……………………………………………………………………………35
附錄…………………………………………………………………………………44

圖 次
圖一 諾藍光譜……………………..…………………………………………………...7

表 次
表一 本研究所採用各項變數的資料來源整理如下………………...…………….…17
表二 OECD等21個國家於樣本期間中央銀行總裁的更替情形……………………20
表三 央行滙率制度的選擇與政黨偏好是否一致的分析……..…………………….22
表四 滙率制度違逆的次數統計分析……..………………………………………….23
表五 中央銀行的匯率制度與政黨偏好不一致與央行總裁正長庚替之對應關係....30
表六 中央銀行的匯率制度與政黨偏好不一致與央行總裁不正常更替之對應關係.32

Acemoglu, Daron. Johnson, Simon. Qrerubin, Pablo. Robinson, James. (2008) .When Does Policy Reform Work ? The Case of Cental Bank Independence. NBER Working paper 14033.
Alesina, Alberto. (1987). Macroeconomic policy in a two-party system as a repeated game.Quarterly Journal of Economics 102 (3) : 651-678.
Alesina, Alberto. (1988). Macroeconomics and Politics. In NBER Macroeconomics Annual , edited by Stanley Fischer,Cambridge, MIT Press :17-52.
Alesina, Alberto. (1989). Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies . Economic Policy. Vol 4 (8) : 58-98.
Alesina, Alberto. (2003). Optimal Currency Areas. NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Vol 17:302-356.
Andrews, David, M.(1994). Capital Mobility and State Automomy. Toward a Structural Theory of International Monetary Relations.Vol 38 (2): 193-218.
Arnone, Marco. Laurens, Bernard. Segalotto, Jean-farncois. Sommer, Martin. (2007) . Central Bank Autoomy: Lessons from Global Trends. IMF Working Paper WP/07/88.
Bade, Robert. Michael, Parkin. (1977). Central Bank Laws and Monetary Policies: a Preliminary Investigation, London: University of Western Ontario, mimeo.
Belke, Ansgar. Potrafke, Niklad. (2009). Does Government Ideology Matter in nibetart Oikuct? A Panel data Analysis for OECD Countries. Paper presented at the annual Meeting of the European Public Coice Society (EPCS), April 2-5, 2009, Athens.
Berger, Helge. Woitek, Ulrich. (1997). Searching for Political Business Cycles in Germ- any Public Choice. JEL 91 (1) :179-197.
Bernhard, William. David, Leblang. (1999).Democratic Institutions and Exchange Rate Commitments .International Organization. Winter 1999.53(1) :71-97.
Bjornskov, Christian. (2005). Political Ideology and Economic Freedom . Department of Economics .Aarhus School of Business. Working Paper :5-8 .
Bodea, Cristina. (2009). Exchang Rate Regimes and Independent Central Bank. Acorr- elated Choice of Imperfectly Cedible Institutions. International Orgaization Vol 64 (3) : 411-442.
Bodea, Cristina. (2010). The Reversal of Political Parties'' Support for Overvalued Exchange Rates. APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper. P:44.
Bortolotte, B. Fantini, M. Siniscalco, D. (2003). Privatisation Around the World . Evidence from Panel Data. Journal of Public Economics, Vol 88 (1-2): 305-332.
Broz, J,Lawrence. Frieden, Jeffry , A. (2001) .The Political Economy Of International Monetary Relations.Annual.Review of Political Science.Vol 4:317-343.
Canavan, Chris. Tommasi, Mariano.(1997).On the Credibility of Alternative Exchange Rate Regimes . Journal of Development Economics Vol 54(1):101-122.
Chamberlain, Gary. (1980). Analysis of covariance with qualitative data.Review of Eco- nomic Studies. Vol 1, No (146) : 225-238.
Chappell Jr, Henry W. Thomas, M.Havrilesky. Rob . Roy, McGregor. (1993). Partisan Monetary Policies . The Quarterly Journal Of Economics. Vol 108 (1) : 185-218.
Clark, William, Robert. Hallerberg, Mark. (2000) . Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutio- ns, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy. American Political Science Review. Vol 94(2) : 323-346.
Collins, S. Giavazzi, F. (1993) . Attitudes toward inflation and the viability of fixed excha nge rates. Chicago University .Chicago press. p : 547-77
Cooper, Richard. (1971) . Currency Devaluations in Developing Countries . Essays in International Finance, P7 No, 86 . Princeton University.
Cukierman, Alex. (1992) . Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence Theory and Evidence. MIT Press.
Cukierman, Alex. Steven, B, Webb. Bilin, Neyapti.(1992). Measuring the independence of central banks and its effects on policy outcomes.The World Bank Economic Review, Vol 6 (3) : 353-398.
Cukierman, Alex.（1994）. Central Bank Independence and Monetary Control. The Economic Journal. Vol 104 (427) :1437-1448.
Cukierman, Alex. Steven, B, Webb.（1995）. Political Influence on the Central Bank: Internatioal Evidence. World Bank Economic Review ,Vol 9 (3) :397-423.
Cukierman, Alex. Tommasi, Mariano.（1998）.When dose it take a Nixon to go to China: American Economic Review 88:180-197.
Cukierman, Alex. Geoffrey , P, Miller. Bilin, Neyapti.（2001）. Central bank reform, Liberaization and Inflation in transition economiesan international perpective. Journal of monetary economics. Vol 49 (2):237-264.
Cukierman, Alex.（2006）. Central Bank Independence and Monetary and Monetary Policymaking Institutions: Past, Present, and Future. Central bank of Chile press.
Dreher, Axel. Sturm, Jan-Egbert. De, Haan, Jakob. (2008). Does high inflation cause central bankers to lose therir Job ? Evidence based on a new date set . Euro- pean Journal of Political Econome . Vol 24(4) : 778-787.
Dreher, Axel. Sturm, Jan-Egbert. De, Haan, Jakob. (2010). When is a central bank governor replaced ? Evidence based on a new date set. Journal of Macroec- onomics, Vol 32 (3) :766-781.
Edwads, Sebastian. (1998).Capital Flows, Real Exchange Rates, and Capital Controls: Some Latin American Experiences. NBER Working Paper 6800.
Farvaque, Etienne. (2002). Political Determinants of Central Bank Independence. Economics Letter, Vol 77 (1) :131-135.
Fleming, J, Marcus. (1962) . Domestic Financial Poicies Under Fixed and Floating Exchange Rates. IMF Staff Papers ,Vol 9 (3) : P 369-379.
Frankel, Jeffrey, A. Rose, Andrew, k. (1996). Economic structure and the decision to adopt a common currency. Seminar Paper No.622. Institute for International Economic Studies. Stockholm,Sweden.
Frankel, Jeffrey, A. (1999). No Single Currency Regime Is Right For All Countries or At All Times. Essays in International Finance, No. 215, Princeton University Press.
Frankel, Jeffrey, A. (2005). Contractionary Currency Crashes in Developing Countries. IMF Staff Papers 52（2）.
Franzese, Jr. Robert, J. (1999) . Two Hands on The Wheel : Independent Central Ban- ks, Politically Responsive Governments, and Inflation. American Journal of Political. The University of Michigan. Ann Arbor.
Frieden, Jeffry. Ghezzi, P, Stein, Ernesto,Stein . (2001) . Politics and Exchange Rates: A cross-country approach in Latin America. In the Currency Game: Exchange rate Poitics in Latin America, eds. J Frieden and E Stein. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Frieden, Jeffry. Stein, E . (2001) . The Politics Economy of Exchange Rates Policy in Latin America: An Analytical Overview. In: Frieden, J., Stein, E. (Eds.) The currency Game: Exchange rate Politics in Latin America. Johns Hopkins University Press Baltimore, P :1-20.
Frieden, Jeffry. Leblang, D., Valev, N., (2010) .The political economy of exchnge rate regimes in transition economies.The Reiew of International Organizations 5.1-25.
Friedman, M.(1962). Should there be an Independent Monetary Authority?in L.B. Yeager (ed.), In search of a Monetary Constitution, Cambidge, Massachusetts: Harvard Univesity.
Giavazzi, Francesco. Pagano, M. (1988). The advantage of tying one,s hands: EMs discipline and Central Bank Credibility. Europ Economic Rev. 32 :1055-75.
Gilpin, Robert. (1987).The Political Economy of International Relations. Princ- eton,New Jersey:Pinceton University Press.
Goodman, John, B. Louis. W, Pauly. (1993). The Obsolescence of Capital Controls? Economic Management In an Age of Global Markets. Vol 46 (1) :50-82.
Grilli, Vittorio. Donato, Masciandaro. Guido, Tabellini. (1991). Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Finance Policies in the Industrial Countries . Economic Policy Vol 6 (13) : 341-392.
Hall, Peter, A. Rubert, J. Franzese, J. (1998). Mixed Signals:central Bank Independ- ence Coordinated Wage Bargaining, And European Monetary Union. International Organization . 52(3) :505-536.
Hasse, H. (1990). The European Central Bank: Perspectives for a Further Development of the European Monetary System, in R. Hasse, W. Wei- denfeld and R. Biskup (eds.). The European Central Bank: Perspectives for a Further Development of the European MonetarySystem, Gutersloh.
Hayat, Muhammad, Azmat. (2010). Which Crises Drises Drive Central Bank Indepe- ndence Reforms? International Journal of Auditing, Vol 8 (1) :21-32..
Havrilesky, Thomas. & Gildea, J. (1991 ). The policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking. 23(1) :130-137.
Havrilesky, Thomas.Gildea, J. (1992). Reliable and Unreliable Partisan Appointees to The Board of Governors. ublic Choice, Vol 73 (4) : 397-417.
Havrilesky, Thomas. (1993). The Pressures on American Monetary Policy. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, Dordrecht, and London.
Helge, Berger. De, Haan, Jakob. Sylvester C. W. Ejiffinger. (2000). Central Bank Independence: An Update Of TheoryAnd Evidence. New Political Economy. Stuart Sayer. P:173-175.
Hibbs, Jr. Douglas, A. (1977). Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. The American Political Science Review. 71 (4) : 1467-1487.
Hayo, Bernd. Hefeer, Carsten. (2001) . Do We Really Need Central Bank Independence? ACritical Re-examination. Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research. University of Basel Press.No.01/03.
Issing, O. (1993).Central Bank Independence and Monetary Stability. IEC. Occasional paper, 89, London: Institute of Economic Affairs.

Jams, Forder. (1999). Central Bank Independent: Reassessing the Measurements. Journal of Economic Issues. Vol 33 (1) : P 23.
Josson, G. (1995). Institutions and Macroecomnomic Outcomes-The Evidence . Swedish Economic Policy Review. 2 :181-212.
Klomp, Jeroen, De Haan. Jakob. (2009) .Central bank independence and financial instability. Journal of Financial Stability .5:321-338.
Leblang, David. (1999) . Democratic Political Institutions and Exchange Rate commi- tments in the developing world . International Studies, Quarterly, 43:599-620.
Levy, Yeyati. Eduardo, Federico, Sturzenegger. (2005). Classfying Exchange Rate Regimes. European Economic Review, Vol 49 (6) :1603-1635.
Levy, Yeyati. Eduardo, Federico, Sturzenegger. lliana, reggio.(2010).On the Endogeneity of Exchange Rate Regimes. European Economic Review . Vol 54(5) : 659-677.
Lohmann,Susanne.(1998). Federalism and Central Bank Independence:The Poitics of German Monetary Policy.1957-92. World Politics,Vol 50 (3) : 401-446.
Lucio, Sarno. Taylor, Mark, P. (2001). Official Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market. JEL 39(3):839-868.
McNamara ,K. (1998). The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Un- ion. Ithaca, New York : Cornell University Press.
Markiewicz, Agnieszka. (2006). Choice of exchange rate regime in transition econom- ies: An empirical analysis: an empirircal analysis. Journal of Comparative Eco- nomics 34.484-498.
Mishkin, Frederic, S. (1999). International experiences with different monetary policy regimes . Journal of Monetary Economics Vol 43 (3) :579-605.
Mundell, Robert, A. (1961) . A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas. American Eco- nomic Review .51 (4) : 657-665.
Mundell, Robert, A. ( 1963) . Captal mobility and Stabilization Policy under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates. Canadian Journal of Economices and Political Scie- nce . Vol 29 (4) :475-485.
Nordhaus, W. (1975). The Political Business Cycle. Review of　Economic Studies. Vol 42(2) : 169-190.
Oatley, Thomas. (1997). Monetary Politics: Exchange Rate Cooperation in the Europ- ean Unio .AnnArbor: University. Michigan Press.
Odell, John, S. (1982). U.S.International Monetary Policy: Markets,Power,and Ideas as Sources of Change. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Pearce. (2006). The Political Economy of an Energy Tax:The United Kingdom Climate Change Levy. Energy Economics. Vol 28 (3) : 149-158.
Pollack, Mark A. (2000). The End of Creeping Competence? EU Poicy-Making since Maastriche. Journal of Common Market Studies.Vol 38 (3) :519-538.
Potrafke, Niklas. (2010). Does Government Ideology Influece Deregulation of Pro- duct Markets ? Emperical Evidence from OECD Countries. Public Choice . Vol 143 (1-2) :135-155.
Rose, Andrew, k. (2000) . One Money,One Market:estimating the Effect of Common cu- rrencies on trade. Economic Policy, A European Forum, April 2000, (30) : 7-33.
Rosenberg, Justin. (2005). Globalization Theory : A post Mortem.International Polit- ics . Vol 42 (1): 2-74 .
Simmons, Beth, A. (1994). Who Adjusts? Economic Policy During the Interwar Princeton. Simmons, Beth, A, Princeton University Press.
Simmons, Beth, A. (1996). Rulers of the game: central bank independence during the interwar year. International Organization ,Vol 50(3) : 407-443.
Setzer, Ralpg. (2004). The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Regime Duration: A Survival Analysis. Germany University of Hoheeim press.
Stasavage, D, keefer , P. (2003). The limits of delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy. American Political Science Review. Vol 97 (3) : 407-424.
Tavlas, George. (1994) . The theory of monetary integration. Open Economies Review . Vol 5 (2) :211-230.
Thomas, Caroline. (1999). Where is the Third World Now? Review of International Studies, Vol 25 (5) : 226-244..
Vaubel, Roland. (1997 a). The Bureaucratic and Partisan Behavior of Independent Central Banks: German and International Evidence. European Journal of Political Economy, Vol 13 (2): 201-224.
Vaubel, Roland. Axel, Dreher. (2009). Foreign Exchange Intervention and the Political Business Cycle: A Panel Data analysis. Vol 28 (5) :755-775.
Weintraub, Robert, E. (1978). Congressional Supervision of Monetary Policy, Jounal of Monetary Economics. Vol 4(2): 341-362.