因為漁業資源有共有財之特質，管理當局若不管理，漁民會因為稀少性而過度捕撈，導致漁業資源趨向滅絕。故本研究利用動態最適控制理論，提出管理當局設定海洋保護區(Marine Protected Area，MPA)，將該區域內之漁業共有財產權轉成準私有財，與獲准捕撈之漁公司簽訂維護生態規章，以漁公司利潤極大化為目標，探討其該投入之最適漁獲努力量及最適捕撈時機。
本研究設定管理當局對MPA內之漁群數量管制，必須達到最大永續生產量(maximum sustainable yield，簡稱msy)或魚群數量為極大化之生態目標，要求該漁撈公司必須配合政府之漁業生態保育管制目標；但是一種情境為該漁撈公司完全遵守漁群數量管制規範，絕不違法過漁，故管理當局無須投入管制監控成本，漁撈公司也不會面臨違法過漁的處分；另一種情境則是該漁撈公司認為管理當局一定會有管制不力之不確定性，而會產生違法過漁誘因，故管理當局必須投入管制監控成本，且漁撈公司也須面對違法過漁之預期罰金處分的可能性；研究結果發現，以msy為生態保育目標時，漁撈公司可以獲得正值之經濟利潤，且可達到生態保育目標；反之，若以極大化魚群量作為保育目標時，雖然可以達到生態保育目標，但是漁撈公司可能無法獲得經濟利潤。而管制監控成本對於政策之成效，則須視罰金或偵測到漁民違法機率之大小，才得以衡量，在目前政治與社會現況下，亦值得進一步討論的。

Due to the common property characteristics of fishery, fishermen usually overfish and cause the serious distinguish problem of fishery. This study employs dynamic optimal control theory to discuss the optimal fishing-efforts and optimal harvesting period for a fisherman.
It is assumed that the fishery administration office set up a specific marine protected area (MPA) to allow some fishermen to harvest. However, they must follow the regulation to maintain the certain level of fish population in MPA. Otherwise, the right of harvest in MPA will be terminated. Two different levels of fish population are set up, maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and maximum environmental carrying capacity (max). This study also assumes two scenarios as follows. Firstly, all fishermen totally obey the fish-population regulation without any penalty. Secondly, all fishermen even may be charged by a great amount of expected penalty, they still have incentive to over-fishing due to the regulation uncertainty.
For the first scenario, this study concludes that the fish-population regulated in “MSY” level can generate positive economic benefit for fishermen. But, if the fish-population regulated in “max” level, the fishermen has no incentive to harvest. However, there is no exact conclusion for second scenario. It is determined by the impacts of the amounts of enforcement costs input and penalty charged by the administration office.

謝詞 Ⅰ
論文題要 Ⅱ
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究方法 3
第三節 章節安排 3
第二章 文獻回顧 5
第一節 台灣漁業資源發展 5
第二節 共有財財產權 8
第三節 漁業資源管理 11
第三章 理論模型 15
第一節 基本模型闡述 15
第二節 情境說明與模型建置 23
第三節 符號說明 28
第四章 理論模型推演 31
第一節 模型求解 31
第二節 不同情境分析結果之比較 47
第五章 結論與建議 53
第一節 主要研究結果 53
第二節 政策建議 55
參考文獻 15
附錄一 60

圖目錄

圖3.1漁業持續生產量效率圖 20
圖3.2漁獲努力量與魚群數量變動示意圖 21
圖3.3 MPA內魚群存量與時間之關係圖 25
圖4.1魚群成長率與魚群數量之關係圖 32
圖4.2魚群數量與捕撈時點之關係圖 48
圖4.3漁獲努力量與收益關係圖 50

表目錄

表4.1情境一與情境二於不同管理目標下，最適漁獲努力量 、最適捕撈時間長度 、及最適魚群數量x的相關性 51

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