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研究生:郭柏宏
研究生(外文):Po-Hung Kuo
論文名稱:標準嚴格程度、薪酬制度及工作績效間關係:風險規避程度及工作複雜度的調節作用
論文名稱(外文):The Effects of Standard Tightness and Compensation Scheme on Job Performance: The Moderating Effect of Risk-aversion and Task Complexity
指導教授:杜榮瑞杜榮瑞引用關係
指導教授(外文):Rong-Ruey Duh
口試委員:許文馨李佳玲
口試日期:2011-05-27
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:會計學研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2011
畢業學年度:99
語文別:中文
論文頁數:58
中文關鍵詞:標準嚴格程度薪酬制度工作績效風險規避程度契合性自行選擇
外文關鍵詞:standard tightnesscompensation schemejob performancerisk-aversioncongruenceself-select
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本研究主題有三,(1)檢驗標準嚴格程度、薪酬制度與工作績效間的關係。(2)探討風險規避程度是否在上述關係中扮演調節的角色。(3)探討不同工作複雜度下,風險規避程度對於薪酬制度選擇之影響。
本研究採實驗室實驗的方式,共招募232位大學生擔任受試者,分別進行轉碼工作(中度複雜)及算術問題(高度複雜)。研究結果顯示: (1)在中度複雜的轉碼工作下,僅有標準嚴格程度與風險規避程度之交互作用顯著;而在高度複雜的算術問題下,則僅有標準嚴格程度、薪酬制度及薪酬制度與風險規避程度之交互作用顯著,未完全符合研究假說之預期。(2)風險規避程度對於薪酬制度選擇之影響會受到工作複雜度之調節,唯有在高度複雜的工作下,其對於薪酬制度選擇之影響方會顯現。


This study examines (1) the independent and joint effects of standard tightness and compensation scheme on job performance, (2) the role of risk-aversion in the above effects, and (3) whether the effect of risk-aversion on compensation scheme selection is moderated by task complexity. Recruiting 232 undergraduate students as the participants in an experiment in which some participants perform the decoding task (moderate complexity) while the others solve the arithmetic problem (high complexity), this study obtains the following findings.
First, for the decoding task, only the interaction between standard tightness and risk-aversion has a significant effect on job performance. For the arithmetic problem, standard tightness, compensation scheme, and the interaction between compensation scheme and risk-aversion have significant effects on job performance. Further, after controlling for the effect of capability, risk-aversion affects compensation scheme selection in the arithmetic problem, but not the decoding task, suggesting that the effect of risk-aversion on compensation scheme selection varies with task complexity.


第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究貢獻 2
第二節 論文結構與研究流程 3
一、論文結構 3
二、研究流程 3
第二章 文獻探討與研究假說 5
第一節 標準嚴格程度、薪酬制度對工作績效之影響 5
第二節 薪酬制度性質與個人特性契合程度對工作績效之影響 12
第三節 自行選擇薪酬制度之依據 15
第四節 工作複雜度對自行選擇薪酬制度之影響 18
第三章 研究方法 20
第一節 實驗設計 20
第二節 實驗程序 25
第三節 受試者 31
第四節 變數之定義 32
第五節 統計分析方法 34
第四章 研究結果與分析 35
第一節 操弄檢查 35
第二節 敘述統計 39
第三節 標準嚴格程度、薪酬制度對績效之影響及風險規避程度之調節作用 42
一、統計分析結果 43
二、敏感度分析 46
三、討論 46
第四節 自我選擇薪酬制度之依據及工作複雜度之影響 48
一、統計分析結果 48
二、敏感度分析 52
三、討論 52
第五章 研究結論、限制與建議 54
第一節 研究結論 54
第二節 研究限制 55
第三節 研究建議 55
參考文獻 56


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