臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

金融大海嘯後，美國金融機構高階經理人過高的薪酬開始引發社會的關注，部分學者抨擊金融機構薪酬的制度是引發金融大海嘯主因，這也促使美國政府與監理單位開始限制並監控高階經理人的薪酬，因此本篇研究針對美國的金融機構高階經理人為主要研究對象，探討哪些因素會影響美國金融機構高階經理人的薪酬(現金、非現金薪酬與總薪酬)。

我們將影響經理人薪酬的因子分為企業內部營運因素(企業規模、企業績效、董事會規模、年資等)與外部環境因子(總體經濟情況、競爭程度等)探討1992年至2009年金融機構內、外部因子與高階經理人薪酬之間的關係。此外，我們懷疑經理人薪酬並非一般的常態分配，我們也想探討高薪酬與低薪酬之間否存在不同的決定因子。所以本篇研究先使用固定效果模型檢視內、外部因子與薪酬之間的關係，並探討過去文獻的實證研究在金融機構是否也有一樣的結果，再使用分量迴歸來檢視金融機構高階經理人高薪酬與低薪酬下內、外部因子的分布，並比較固定效果模型與分量迴歸之間的差異性。最後本篇研究利用分量迴歸檢視現金薪酬與非現金薪酬佔總薪酬的百分比程度下內、外部因子分布的情況。

研究結果發現固定效果模型下的決定因子與過去文獻(對象為一般企業高階經理人)薪酬的決定因子有部分不一致的情況，在美國金融機構中，高階經理人的薪酬會受到企業規模影響，但企業績效與薪酬卻沒有完全的正相關，部分企業績效(ROE)與薪酬甚至呈現負相關的情況，實證結果也發現薪酬會受到年資的影響，但董事會規模與薪酬之間卻沒有任何關連。至於外部因素方面，結果顯示總體經濟會影響到現金薪酬的發放，競爭程度也會造成非現金薪酬的改變。在分量迴歸方面，實證研究發現在高薪酬與低薪酬的決定因子部分呈現不顯著的情況，高薪酬、低薪酬的決定因子與中薪酬的決定因子有所不同。最後，百分比分量迴歸的結果顯示百分比高與百分比低的決定因子並不相同。

The determinants of executive compensation in corporate firm has been discussed and debated among existing literature. Especially after the financial crisis, the high level of CEO compensation in financial sector draws the attention of the public. People are curious about the determinants of executive compensation in U.S. financial sector. Therefore, this study wants to find the determinants of the executive compensation in the U.S. financial sector.

We build the framework of internal (firm size, firm performance, tenure and board size) and external factors (macroeconomic and industries competition) to examine the determinants of executive compensation. We use the Compustat ExecuComp database from U.S. financial sector between 1992 and 2009. This study uses fixed-effects model and quantile regression to estimate the relationship between determinants and executive compensation. First, we use the fixed-effects model to understand the determinants of compensation. Second, we use quantile regression to understand the determinants between high quantile and low quantile and we also compare the quantile regression results with fixed-effects model results. Finally, this study tests the percentage of each compensation to total compensations by employing quantile regression.

The empirical results of cross-companies panel data, not all support our hypotheses. The executive compensation is positive related to firm size. But the executive compensations are not always positively related to firm performance, even the ROE is negatively related to executive pay. The empirical results show that the compensation is positively related to tenure but the executive pay is not related to board size. Most importantly, the results of quantile regression show that the determinants are not significant in low quantile and high quantile. Finally, the result of compensation percentage quantile regression show the determinants of compensation are not consistent when the each pays (cash and non cash) is large part of total compensation and small part of total compensation.

Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Research Background
1.2 Research Motivations and Purposes
Chapter 2 Literature Review
2.1 The Components of Executive Compensation
2.1.1 Cash Compensation
2.1.2 Non-Cash Compensation
2.2 The Determinants of Executive Compensation
2.3 The Internal Determinants of Executive Compensation 2.3.1 Firms Size
2.3.2 Firm Performance
2.3.3 Corporate Governance
2.3.4 Tenure
2.4 The External Determinants of Executive Compensation
2.4.1 Macroeconomic
2.4.2 Industries Competition
2.5 Quantile Regression
Chapter 3 Methodology
3.1 Quantile Regression
3.2 Database
3.3 Variables Description
3.3.1 Cash, Non-Cash and Total Compensation
3.3.2 Internal and External Variables
3.3.3 Dummy Variables
3.4 Models
Chapter 4 Empirical Results
4.1 Fixed-Effects Model Results and Discussion
4.2 Normality Tests
4.3 The Results of Quantile Regression
Chapter 5 Conclusions
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