臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

盈餘持續性乃評估盈餘品質的重大指標，若盈餘持續性較高，則盈餘品質較好，盈餘組成又可拆解為現金盈餘組成要素與應計項目盈餘組成要素，一般而言，現金盈餘較不易受人為因素干擾與會計準則提供之彈性所影響，持續性通常較應計盈餘組成項目為高，然而公司若進行盈餘管理，則會使盈餘品質受到破壞，並影響盈餘持續性，本研究將盈餘持續性與兩種盈餘管理模式做結合，實證結果發現，使用應計盈餘管理程度越高的公司，應計盈餘組成項目之持續性越低；另外，相較於其他公司，若使用實質盈餘管理模式來操縱盈餘，則會使盈餘持續性增加，進一步研究結果發現，實質盈餘管理導致盈餘持續性較高之主因乃削減裁決性費用之部分，若公司採用削減裁決性費用不僅可以提升會計盈餘，亦可使營運活動現金流量增加，且對下一期之績效不會產生顯著影響，對於意圖調控盈餘之公司，此實質操縱之手法似乎最為便捷。

Earnings persistence is a major indicator to assess earnings quality, so the higher earnings persistence, the better earnings quality. The earnings can be distributed into CFO components of earnings and accrual components of earnings. Generally, CFO components of earnings are less prone to interference by manipulative factors and the flexibility provided by accounting standards, so the persistent usually higher than accrual components of earnings. However, if firms do earnings management, earnings quality will be damaged and affect the earnings persistence. In this study, we combine earnings persistence with two kinds of earnings management. The study results indicate that the firms with higher earnings management have lower earnings persistence of accrual components. Moreover, compare with other firms, if we use real earnings management pattern to manipulate earnings, the earnings persistence will increase. Further research found that real earnings management leading to higher earnings persistence is mainly caused by reduction of discretionary expenditures.
Further research found that the main cause of real earnings management leading to higher earnings persistence is by making use of the reduction of discretionary expenditures.
If firms use the reduction of discretionary expenditures not only enhance accounting earnings but also increase operating cash flow, and have no significant effect to the performance of next period
It seems this is the most convenient way to manipulate for firms which intended to control earnings.

第一章 緒論
第一節研究背景與動機
第二節研究目的
第三節研究架構
第二章 文獻回顧
第一節盈餘持續性
第二節應計盈餘管理
第三節實質盈餘管理
第四節小結
第三章研究方法
第一節研究架構
第二節研究假說之發展
第三節變數定義與衡量
第四節實證設計與模型
第五節資料來源與樣本選取
第四章實證結果與分析
第一節樣本描述及敘述性統計分析
第二節基本假設檢定
第三節實證結果與分析
第四節小結
第五章結論與建議
第一節結論
第二節研究限制
第三節未來研究建議
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