臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

　　過去研究指出現金持有與公司價值的關係，在不同理論基礎下會不盡相同，就融資順位理論而言，企業持有現金可保有未來投資機會，因此可增加公司價值；而就代理問題而言，企業持有過多現金時，經理人會有誘因做不適當的投資，因而降低公司價值。由過去研究可知，公司持有現金對公司價值的影響，視不同公司特性而有所差異。本文主要研究現金持有對公司價值影響，並考量淨金融負債型態與超額現金持有對公司價值的影響，由於企業處於不同生命週期階段其企業環境及財務結構有所差異，因此本文更加入企業生命週期要素，探討生命週期與超額現金持有價值之關連性。最後，本研究以公司可使用現金流量低於預期股利及預期投資定義現金缺口公司，欲檢視公司面臨現金缺口時所採取解決缺口的方式，在不同淨金融負債型態公司之間是否存在差異。
　　本研究實證結果發現，台灣上市櫃公司在1991年至2009年現金持有與公司價值成正向關係，並且淨金融負債小於零公司其超額現金持有的價值較高，且以不同方式估計超額現金所得到的結果皆為一致，符合融資順位理論及投資機會理論，顯示淨金融負債小於零公司資金較充裕。另外，探討企業生命週期對公司價值的影響，研究結果發現年輕階段公司持有超額現金的價值較高，顯示生命週期為年輕階段時更可運用內部資金於龐大研發資出上，因此此種公司持有超額現金的價值更高。最後，在公司現金缺口解決對策方面，實證結果顯示平均而言，公司較偏好使用減少預期投資及外部融資來填補缺口，但淨金融負債小於零公司面臨現金缺口時，較有能力使用降低現金部位來填補缺口，較少使用外部融資，顯示淨金融負債小於零公司內部資金較充裕，研究結果與融資順位理論相符合。

There are different relationship between the cash holding and the value of firm in the different theory basis. In pecking order theory, the firm value increases when the company holds the sufficient cash to invest. On the contrary, manager has incentive to invest inappropriately that reduces the firm value as firm hold in excess of cash in agency theory. According to these theories, we know that the effect on firm value from cash holding of company depends on the different firm characristics. The purpose of this study is investigating the relationship between the value of cash holdings and corporate characteristic. Specifically, the value of cash holdings also contains the excess cash. The corporate characteristic is based on the type of net financial obligations. Additionally, life cycle maybe cause differences in the corporate environment and the financial structure. Therefore, the study examines the value of cash holdings vary depending on the type of net financial obligations and the stage of the corporate life cycle. Besides, we indicate that whether firms face with cash flow shortfall, that is, available cash flows are lower than the sum of expected dividend and expected investment level. Finally, we investigate that how firms resolve their cash flow shortfall vary depending on the type of net financial obligations.
The evidence shows that the relationship between cash holding and the value of firm is positive. The evidence also shows that the value of cash holdings for firms with negative net financial obligations is higher than firms with positive net financial obligations. The result remains robust to different measures of excess cash. After classifying the corporate life cycle, the results indicate that the marginal value of cash in young firms is higer then others. Moreover, we find firms do reduce expected investments and increase external financing to deal with cash flow shortfall. Nevertheless, internal funds are abundant for firms with negative net financial obligations, therefore these firms prefer to reduce cash balance rather then increase external financing. The result does approximate correspond with pecking order theory.

目錄 III
圖目錄 IV
表目錄 V
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 5
第三節 研究流程與架構 6
第二章 文獻回顧 7
第一節 現金持有 7
第二節 現金持有價值 8
第三章 研究方法 11
第一節 研究假說 11
第二節 研究設計 13
第三節 研究樣本與研究限制 24
第四章 實證結果與分析 25
第一節 台灣公司淨金融負債型態概況 25
第二節 淨金融負債型態、現金持有與公司價值之關係 31
第三節 超額現金持有與公司價值之關係 36
第四節 淨金融負債型態與公司現金流向之關係 40
第五章 結論與建議 44
第一節 結論 44
第二節 未來研究建議 45
參考文獻 46

1.張文靜(2000)，「盈餘管理的特性與審計品質之影響」，國立政治大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。
2.Anthony, J. H., and K. Ramesh. (1992), “Association between accounting performance measures and stock prices,” Journal of accounting and Economics, vol.15, p. 203-227.
3.Bates, T.W., K.M. Kahle, and R.M. Stulz (2009), “Why do U.S. firms hold so much more cash than they used to?” Journal of Finance, vol.64, p. 1985–2021.
4.Berle, A. and G. Means (1932), “The modern corporation and private property,” New York, c-Millan.
5.Daniel, N. D., D. J. Denis, and L. Naveen (2008), “Dividends, investment, and financial flexibility,” Working paper, LeBow College of Business Drexel University.
6.Denis, D.J. and V. Sibilkov (2010), “Financial constraints, investment, and the value of cash holdings,” Review of Financial Studies, vol.23, p.247-269.
7.Dittmar, A., and J. Mahrt-Smith, (2007), “Corporate governance and the value of cash,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol.83, p.599-634.
8.Drobetz, W, M.C. Grüninger, and S. Hirschvogl (2010), “Information asymmetry and the value of cash,” Journal of Banking and Finance, vol.34, p.2168–2184.
9.Faulkender, M. and R. Wang (2006), “Corporate financial policy and the value of cash,” Journal of Finance, vol.61, p.1957-1990.
10.Fresard, L. and C. Salva (2010), “The value of excess cash and corporate governance: evidence from US cross-listings,” Journal of Financial Economics.
11.Garcia-Teruel, P. J. and P. Martinez-Solano (2008), “On the determinants of SME cash holdings: evidence from Spain, “Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, vol.35, p.127-149.
12.Haire, M. (1959), “Biological models and empirical history of the growth of organizations,” Modern Organizational Theory, New York: John Wiley and Sons
13.Harford, J. (1999), “Corporate cash reserves and acquisitions, “Journal of Finance, vol.54, p.1969-1977.
14.Harford, J., S. A. Mansi and W. F. Maxwell (2008), “Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol.87, p.535–555.
15.Jensen, M.C. (1986), “Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers,” American Economic Review, vol.76, p.323-329.
16.Jensen, M.C. and W. H. Meckling (1976), “Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency cost and ownership structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol.3, p.305-360.
17.Kalcheva, I. and K.V. Lins (2007), “International evidence on cash holdings and expected managerial agency problems,” Review of Financial Studies, vol.20, p.1087–1112.
18.Keynes, J.M. (1934), “The general theory of employment, interest and money,” London, Harcourt Brace.
19.Modigliani, F. and M. H. Miller (1958), “The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment,” American Economic Review, vol.48, p.261-297.
20.Mulligan, C. B. (1997), “Scale economies, the value of time, and the demand for money: longitudinal evidence for firms,” Journal of Political Economy, vol.105, p.1061–1079.
21.Myers, S.C. (1977), “Determinants of corporate borrowing,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol.5, p.147-175.
22.Myers, S.C. and N. S. Majluf (1984), “Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do nor have,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol.13, p.187-221.
23.Myers, S.C. and R.G. Rajan (1998), “The paradox of liquidity,” Journal of Economics, vol.113, p.733-771.
24.Nissim, D., and S. H. Penman (2001), “Ratio analysis and equity valuation: from research to practice,” Review of Accounting Studies, vol.6, p.109-154.
25.Opler, T., L. Pinkowitz, R. Stulz, and R. Williamson (1997), “The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 52, p.3-46.
26.Owen, S. and A. Yawson (2010), “Corporate life cycle and M&A activity,” Journal of Banking & Finance, vol.34, p. 427-440.
27.Penman, S. H. (2010), “Financial statement analysis and security valuation,” 4th ed., New York, McGraw-Hill.
28.Pinkowitz, L., and R. Williamson (2004), “What is a dollar worth? The market value of cash holdings,” Working paper, Georgetown University.
29.Pinkowitz, L., R. Stulz, and R. Williamson (2006), “Does the contribution of corporate cash holdings and dividends to firm value depend on governance? A Cross-country Analysis,” Journal of Finance, vol.6, p.2725-2751.
30.Riddick, L.A. and T.M. Whited (2009), “The corporate propensity to save,” Journal of Finance, vol.64, p.1729-1766.
31.Shleifer, A. and R.W. Vishny (1992), “Liquidation values and debt capacity: a market equilibrium approach,” Journal of Finance, vol.47, p.1343-1366.
32.Simutin, M. (2010), “Excess cash and stock returns,” Financial Management, vol. 39, p.1197-1222.