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研究生:蔡姿珊
研究生(外文):Zi-Shan Tsai
論文名稱:台灣茶飲料產業加盟連鎖契約之研究
論文名稱(外文):A Franchising Contract Research About The Hand-Made Tea Beverage Industry In Taiwan
指導教授:曲祉寧曲祉寧引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chih-Ning Chu
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:中原大學
系所名稱:企業管理研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2015
畢業學年度:100
語文別:中文
論文頁數:40
中文關鍵詞:兩階段定價第三需求法則代理理論加盟連鎖
外文關鍵詞:Two-Part TariffsAgency theoryAlchian &; Allen theoremFranchising
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傳統文獻探討加盟連鎖制度的契約多以代理理論討論權利金及加盟金是為了解決雙邊道德風險,剝奪代理人與主理人雙方的租值,權利金與加盟金呈反向關係。本研究利用加盟關係中含有兩階段定價(Two-Part Tariffs)的關係,將加盟連鎖體系的契約制度與連鎖體系的品質加以探討,闡述制度的建立及組織擴張的決策對連鎖體系運作的相互影響關係。

本研究研究對象為外帶茶飲料市場,蒐集了30家3年以上的台灣茶飲料連鎖品牌契約相關內容,實證結果發現雙方契約及決策的制定,有別於傳統文獻的研究結果。加盟總部必須經營直營店建立管理制度及了解市場需求,建構完善的連鎖制度,直營店與連鎖體系的管理成本有關;加盟主繳交權利金為了取得總部能夠創造績效的生產要素服務;加盟金是連鎖體系產品最終績效的價值衡量,因此加盟金額制定的高低取決於連鎖體系整體的品質,連鎖體系整體的品質高低創造雙方租值的大小。實證結果發現加盟連鎖體系不同品質的廠商與加盟金加上權利金有顯著差異,顯示出茶飲料市場的競爭特質及連體體系組織結構的關係。

Traditional Document explore franchising system contract with agency theory discussed more royalties and franchise fee in order to solve the bilateral moral hazard, denied the rental value of both the agent and the main reason people, royalty and franchise fee inverse relationship. In this study, the relationship between the two phases containing join relationship pricing (Two-Part Tariffs) will join the quality contract system chain system and chain system to be explored, explained the establishment of mutual influence decision-making system and organizational expansion of the chain system operation relationship.

In this study, subjects were packed tea beverage market, collected 30 more than three years of Taiwan tea chain brand contracts related content, empirical results show that the development of bilateral contracts and decisions, unlike the results of traditional literature. Franchisors must establish a management system and business outlets to understand the market demand, the construction of a sound chain system, management costs related to direct sales stores and chain system; franchisees pay royalties in order to achieve the headquarters of the factors of production to create performance services; join Gold is a chain system to measure the value of the final product performance, thus joining the amount depends on the overall level of development of the quality chain system, the overall level of quality chain system to create the size of the rental value of the two sides. The empirical results show the chain joining the different quality systems manufacturers and franchise fee plus the premium have significant differences, showing the relationship between competition and Siamese traits system structure tea beverage market.

目錄
中文摘要 I
Abstract II
目錄 III
表目錄 IV
圖目錄 V
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景 1
第二節 研究動機 4
第三節 研究問題 5
第二章 文獻探討 6
第一節 外帶茶飲料的現況 6
第二節 連鎖體系的定義 8
一、 美國對加盟連鎖的定義 8
二、 日本對加盟連鎖的定義 9
三、 我國對加盟連鎖的定義 9
第三節 對加盟連鎖經營決策進行分類研究 11
第四節 第三需求法則 16
第三章 研究方法 21
第一節 研究架構與方法 21
第二節 研究對象與調查方法 21
第三節 研究假設 22
第四章 實證分析 24
第一節 變數描述與敘述統計 24
第二節 實證結果 26
第五章 結論 30
第一節 研究結論 30
第二節 研究限制及後續研究建議 31
參考文獻 32

表目錄
表1.1.1:台灣地區連鎖業發展階段 3
表1.3.1:加盟契約主要內容 5
表2.1.1:生產流程的優缺點 7
表2.1.2:2011年台灣茶飲料廠商 7
表4.1.1:變數描述 24
表4.1.2:變數之敘述型統計 25
表4.2.1:H1線性迴歸結果 26
表4.2.2:H1線性迴歸結果 26
表4.2.3:H2線性迴歸結果 27
表4.2.4:3線性迴歸結果 27
表4.2.5:H4線性迴歸結果 28
表4.2.6:5獨立樣本t檢定結果 28
表4.2.7:假設分析結果 29



圖目錄
圖2.2.1:盟契約關係 10
圖2.4.1:lchian-Allen theorem 17
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