臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文係利用統計科學方法建立集團業信用風險模型(Credit Risk Models)，針對2000年至2010年間，台灣上市櫃公司考慮代理問題(Agency Problems)，找出影響公司績效(Corporate Performance)之顯著變數，期能在公司尚未發生財務風險(Financial Risk)前，預測出可能發生之機率，達事前預警與風險管理之效。實證分析上，採用Logit迴歸模型，區分經營權與所有權是否分開，探討比較其差異。實證結果發現，集團業當董事長兼任總經理，儘早檢視與降低公司之營業成本與相關費用提高獲利能力；控制借款依存度提高現金流量允當比率，以降低信用風險發生之機率。當董事長不兼任總經理，控制負債比率提高現金流量允當比率、現金流量比率、每股盈餘，以降低公司發生信用風險之機率；專業經營應儘早設置獨立董監事、避免更換會計師，增加公司治理能力進而增加公司績效。因此本文之實證價值與管理意涵為集團業重視公司治理，可降低信用風險發生機率。

This study aims to establish a credit risk models for a conglomerate by identifying some important variables that may have influenced a business group’s performance during the period from 2000 to 2010.The primary objective of this credit risk model is to provide a framework that could serve as an early warning system regarding a business group’s potential financial risks.To reduce the credit risk of a business group ,empirical results of this study show that if ownership is combined with management,the business group should examine and reduce operating costs and relevant expenses as soon as possible to raise profitability, and it should control debt-to-equity ratio and cash flow adequacy ratio. If,however,there is separation of ownership from management, the business group should control debt-to-equity ratio so as to raise cash flow adequacy ratio, cash flow ratio and the EPS. A business group operated with professional management should institute independent directors and supervisors as soon as possible, and refrain from replacing CPAs,in order to improve corporate governance and enhance corporate performance. Therefore, the major findings of this research are: a business group that puts emphasis on corporate governance would reduce the incidence of credit risk.

目錄
中文摘要 i
英文摘要 ii
誌謝 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 vi
圖目錄 vii
第一章 緒論 1
1.1研究背景與動機 1
1.2研究目的 2
1.3研究流程 2
第二章 文獻探討 5
2.1集團企業的定義 5
2.2代理理論 8
2.3代理問題 10
2.4股權結構與公司績效 11
2.5公司治理 12
2.6董事長是否兼任總經理與公司績效16
2.7信用風險之定義17
2.8董事長是否兼任總經理與公司發生信用風險關係22
第三章 研究方法與變數處理 23
3.1研究架構 23
3.2研究對象 25
3.2.1信用風險公司之定義 25
3.2.2研究範圍與樣本 26
3.2.3研究樣本產業分類 31
3.3研究變數操作性定義 32
3.4研究方法 39
3.4.1常態性檢定(K-S檢定) 39
3.4.2信用風險公司與正常公司之平均數檢定 40
3.4.3 Logit迴歸分析模型 40
3.4.4逐步迴歸法 41
第四章 實證結果與分析 42
4.1常態性檢定(K-S檢定) 42
4.2信用風險公司與正常公司平均數檢定 45
4.2.1樣本資料描述性統計分析 45
4.2.2信用風險集團公司與正常集團公司平均數檢定結果 52
4.3 Logit迴歸分析模型 54
4.3.1當董事長兼任總經理(無代理問題) 54
4.3.2當董事長不兼任總經理(專業經營) 58
第五章實證價值與管理意涵 62
第六章研究結論 64
參考文獻 66

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