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研究生:吳佩勳
研究生(外文):Pei-Hsun Wu
論文名稱:董事出席費與績效關聯性之研究
論文名稱(外文):Meeting fees and directors' performance
指導教授:呂瑞芳呂瑞芳引用關係
指導教授(外文):Jei-Fang Lew
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立高雄應用科技大學
系所名稱:會計系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:101
畢業學年度:100
語文別:中文
論文頁數:35
中文關鍵詞:董事出席率績效會議出席費
外文關鍵詞:Directors’ attendanceperformance
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本研究以董事會會議出席率當作監督效果的代理變數,利用2006年至2010年之董事個人層級的追蹤資料來檢驗董事出席行為。主要實證結果發現會議出席費與董事出席率呈正相關。此外,本研究也討論另一個影響董事出席行為的替代解釋-聲譽效果,董事的高出席率可能是來自重視自己的市場聲譽所致。.
This paper uses an unbalanced panel of director-level data from 2006 to 2010 to examine directors’ attendance behavior. Board meeting attendance served as the proxy of the monitoring effect. The major finding is that meeting fees have a direct positive effect on board attendance. We also discuss an alternative explanation that the attendance records of directors at board meetings might proxy for reputational capital. Furthermore, the behavior responding to these records may arise from the attraction of better directors who value their reputations
目 錄

中文摘要 ------------------------------------------------------ i

英文摘要 ------------------------------------------------------ ii

誌謝 ------------------------------------------------------- iii

目錄 ------------------------------------------------------- iv

表目錄 ---------------------------------------------------- v

圖目錄 ------------------------------------------------------- vi

第一章 緒論------------------------------------------------ 1
第二章 文獻回顧與理論----------------------------------------- 4
第一節 董事會的重要性------------------------------------ 4
第二節 出席率與會議費之假設: 誘因或選擇----------------------- 11
第三節 追蹤資料模型–固定效果與隨機效果---------------------- 14
第三章 實證方法------------------------------------------------ 19
第一節 董事會特定效果與董事特定效果---------------------------- 19
第二節 內生性問題----------------------------------------------- 21
第四章 實證結果------------------------------------------------ 23
第一節 敘述性統計---------------------------------------------- 23
第二節 誘因假說之實證結果------------------------------------- 24
第三節 選擇假說之實證結果--------------------------------------- 25
第四節 兩階段最小平方法(2-Stage-Lease-Square regression)之
實證結果------------------------------------------------------- 26
第五章 穩健性測試--------------------------------------------- 27
第一節 以離職行為作為應變數------------------------------------ 27
第六章 結論---------------------------------------------------- 28
參考文獻 -------------------------------------------------------29
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