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研究生:林親慈
研究生(外文):Chin-Tzu Lin
論文名稱:公司治理、盈餘管理與銀行績效之關係
論文名稱(外文):A Study of the Relationships between Corporate Governance, Earnings Management, and Bank Performance
指導教授:張幸惠張幸惠引用關係
指導教授(外文):Hsin-Hue Chang
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:銘傳大學
系所名稱:財務金融學系碩士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2012
畢業學年度:100
語文別:中文
論文頁數:53
中文關鍵詞:兩階段最小平方法銀行績效薪酬績效敏感性盈餘管理董事會獨立性
外文關鍵詞:Independence of BoardBank Performance2SLSEarnings ManagementPay-Performance Sensitivity
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過去國內、外因內部治理機制不良所引發的弊案層出不窮,從亞洲金融風暴、美國安隆公司到台灣博達等事件的發生,皆顯示公司治理的重要性。近期,台灣金融業捲入雷曼兄弟風暴後,公司治理更受到管理當局與投資者所重視。觀察多數國內研究,多半僅探討董事會獨立性等公司治理機制與公司績效之關係或盈餘管理受其他公司治理機制的影響程度,極少數將公司治理、盈餘管理與績效一併討論的文獻,且研究多偏重於一般企業。故本研究將建立聯立方程式模型探討盈餘管理與銀行績效相互關係之外,更將公司治理變數包含董事會獨立性、高階經理人薪酬結構加入一併討論。本研究樣本為國內2005年至2010年上市、上櫃銀行,資料來源為台灣經濟新報資料庫。由於考慮到變數間存在內生性關係,因此運用兩階段最小平方法進行估計。研究結果發現,管理階層從事盈餘管理的行為確實能提升經營績效;透過獨立董事會制度可減低管理當局的盈餘管理行為,然而高階經理人薪酬契約卻會促進盈餘管理的操弄。
Poor corporate governance has resulted in a lot of financial scandals, such as Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy. After the 2008 financial crisis, the authorities and investors have paid more attention on the issue of corporate governance. Corporate governance mechanisms briefly include earnings management, top management compensation, and independence of board. The mechanisms are interactive, few domestic studies, however, investigate the relationship between earnings management, top management compensation, independence of board and performance. Thus, the aim of this study is to build a simultaneous equations model to examine the links between earnings management and bank performance. A set of bank sample is obtained from Taiwan Economic Journal(TEJ). Due to the existence of endogenous relationship between earnings management and performance, this study uses a two-stage least square(2SLS) to exercise the estimation procedure. The results find that earnings management have a significantly positive effect on bank performance. Independence of board significantly negatively affects earnings management but top management compensation significantly positively affects earnings management.
目錄
目錄 I
圖目錄 II
表目錄 III
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 5
第三節 論文架構與研究流程 6
第貳章 文獻探討 8
第一節 公司治理與盈餘管理 8
第二節 公司治理與企業績效 10
第三節 盈餘管理與企業績效 12
第參章 研究設計 13
第一節 理論架構及研究假說 13
第二節 樣本選取與資料來源 16
第三節 實證模型 17
第四節 變數定義與衡量方法 18
第五節 研究方法 26
第肆章 實證結果與分析 29
第一節 敘述性統計分析 29
第二節 相關係數分析 31
第三節 迴歸結果分析 33
第伍章 結論與建議 40
第一節 研究結論 40
第二節 研究限制 41
第三節 研究貢獻 41
參考文獻 42
一、中文部分
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3.王國權(2006),「獨立董、監事特性與盈餘管理關聯性之研究」,雲林科技大學財務金融研究所碩士論文。
4.毛治文、卓世昇(2011),「盈餘管理與企業價值-聯立方程模型之應用」,會計審計論叢,1:1,61-99。
5.吳佩勳(2007),「董事會獨立性、盈餘管理及經營績效關聯性之研究」,雲林科技大學財務金融研究所碩士論文。
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10.洪淑莉(2008),「經理人薪酬績效敏感度、公司治理與盈餘管理關聯性之研究」,雲林科技大學財務金融研究所碩士論文。。
11.陳惠如(2006),「管理者薪酬、持股比例與公司價值之研究」,銘傳大學會計研究所碩士論文。
12.郭銘偉(2011),「高階經理人薪酬結構與公司績效之關聯」,國立中央大學人力資源管理研究所碩士論文。
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13.Chung, R., M. Firth, and J. B. Kim (2002), “Institutional monitoring and opportunistic earnings management,” Journal of Corporate Finance, vol.8, pp.29-48.
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