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研究生:廖晏君
研究生(外文):Liao, Yen Chun
論文名稱:仿冒查緝與外國市場之關稅連結
論文名稱(外文):The tariff link between enforcement rate and foreign market size
指導教授:王智賢王智賢引用關係
指導教授(外文):Wang, Jue Shyan
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立政治大學
系所名稱:財政研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財政學類
論文種類:學術論文
畢業學年度:100
語文別:中文
論文頁數:25
中文關鍵詞:智慧財產權關稅
外文關鍵詞:Intellectual PropertyTariff
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在國際貿易日趨活絡的情況下,智慧財產權受侵害之問題,已成為持續關注的問題。本文探討當智慧財產權等無形資產為外國正版商所擁有時,外國政府透過關稅連結下,本國政府將如何制定國內的仿冒查緝率。透過本研究我們發現當外國市場規模較小時,本國政府會將仿冒查緝率定為零;當外國市場規模夠大時,本國政府會將仿冒查緝率定為查緝率上限;而當外國市場規模介於前兩種情形之間時,仿冒查緝率有可能為零或查緝率上限。
Because of intense international trade, infringement of intellectual property has caught the persistent attentions. This paper analyzes how domestic government decides the optimal enforcement rate through tariff link when the intellectual property is held by a foreign company. We find the domestic government would set the enforcement rate to zero when the foreign market size is small. On the contrary, when the foreign market size is large, the domestic government would raise the enforcement rate to the upper limit. Besides, when the foreign market size is moderate, the enforcement rate would be zero or at the upper limit.
第1章 前言 1
第2章 基本模型 6
第3章 本國政府最適查緝率之決策 11
第4章 外國政府最適關稅之決定 17
第5章 結論 22
參考文獻 23
中文部分
王智賢、陳盈竹 (2009),「最適仿冒品查緝率的制定」,財稅研究,第 41 卷 4 期,38-63。
王智賢、楊敦雅 (2008),「仿冒查緝與政治獻金」,經濟研究,第 44 卷 1 期,107-138。
吳芝文、周建富 (2004),「智慧財產權與經濟效率」,經濟論文,第 32 卷 2 期,335-361。
周登陽、楊維娟、黃美卿 (2006),「保護智慧財產權之經濟分析—從南方的需求面探討之」,經濟研究,第 42 卷 2 期,183-207。
蔡明芳、邱俊榮 (2006),「仿冒與政府政策」,未發表論文。
蔡明芳、邱俊榮 (2008),「本國市場存在仿冒下的進口關稅」,經濟論文叢刊,第 36 輯 2 期,271-292。
英文部分
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_______ (1988b), “Counterfeit-Product Trade,” American Economic Review, 78, 59-75.

Helpman, E. (1993), “Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Right,” Econometrica, 61, 1247-1280.
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Noble, G. W., J. Ravenhill and R. F. Doner (2005), “Executioner or Disciplinarian: WTO Accession and the Chinese Auto Industry,” Business and Politics, 7, 1-33.
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Rutstrom, E. E. (1995), “Political Preference Functions, Trade Wars, and Trade Negotiations,” Empirical Economics, 20, 49-73.
Shy, O. and J. F. Thisse (1999), “A Strategic Approach to Software Protection,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 8, 163-190.
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