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研究生:王倩文
研究生(外文):Cian-WunWang
論文名稱:於兩階供應鏈中製造商之檢驗率決策及維修站設置之研究
論文名稱(外文):Manufacturer's decisions of inspection policy and repair facilities in a two-stage supply chain
指導教授:謝中奇謝中奇引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chung-Chi Hsieh
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立成功大學
系所名稱:工業與資訊管理學系碩博士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:其他商業及管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2012
畢業學年度:100
語文別:中文
論文頁數:68
中文關鍵詞:供應鏈檢驗政策賽局理論協商機制
外文關鍵詞:Supply chainInspection policyGame theoryCoordination mechanism
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由於許多產業之供應鏈成員多且生產過程複雜,需要供應鏈成員們的配合生產與供應零件,供應鏈成員間競爭相當激烈,為了生存與同時顧慮整體供應鏈利益的考量,逐漸開始有了與供應鏈成員共同生存的想法,在共同生存原則之下,品質重要性是不可或缺的,如何找尋出能使品質維持在一定水準又能使成本降低的最佳方法已經是現今實務上重要的課題,故許多產業開始有進駐自己供應鏈成員的廠內設置維修站的想法,進駐供應鏈成員之廠區必須要與成員有良好互動配合與激勵,才能使供應鏈成員願意提供空間設置維修站。為此,供應鏈成員之間該如何取得平衡來達到雙贏局面是我們值得去探討的議題。

本研究在一個以製造廠與系統廠之間的供應鏈中,針對製造廠於下游系統廠內設置維修站對供應鏈成員的影響,分別建構製造廠與系統廠的成本函式模式,並加入一個利益分享機制之協商合約去探討製造廠如何以檢驗成本與維修成本的調整來誘使系統廠做出對整體供應鏈最佳的決策。最後透過求解模式並帶入數值去做分析與驗證此協商合約能使供應鏈獲得集中式系統之最大利益,使分散式系統之成員皆受益。
This thesis examines a serial supply chain that consists of one system integration company and one manufacturer who make efforts to produce conforming products to customers, and makes the decision whether the manufacturer has to set a repair stations in the system integration company. It assumes that the manufacturer engages in outbound inspection with imperfect inspection reliability before sending the components to the system integration company, and the system integration company employs inspection, before assembling the components from the manufacturer.

The thesis explores the strategic interactions between the manufacturer and the system integration company in a noncooperative game, in which outbound inspection policy and repair facility policy are taken into account.

The thesis further examines the contract with revenue-sharing mechanism in a centralized chain which allows a decentralized chain to perform as well as the centralized chain, where the contract parameters include the share of the unit inspection cost and the price of the component. It further provides numerical analysis to study the equilibrium strategies and the supply chain members' profits.
目錄
摘要. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II
誌謝. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III
1 緒論. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 研究背景與動機. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 研究目的. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 研究流程. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3.1 確定研究主題. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3.2 文獻回顧彙整與探討. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3.3 建立模型並求解. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3.4 模型分析與比較. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3.5 結論與未來研究方向. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 文獻探討. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1 檢驗政策. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 品質改善. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 賽局理論. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.1 賽局理論之類型. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4 協商機制. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4.1 協商機制的重要性. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4.2 協商機制之策略. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3 模式建構與發展. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1 模式環境. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.1.1 模式假設. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.1.2 符號定義. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.2 分散式系統. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2.1 利潤函式建構. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2.2 分散式系統下之均衡策略. . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2.3 決策變數範圍之探討. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.3 集中式系統. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.4 協商合約. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.4.1 加入協商之分散式系統. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.4.2 協商合約制訂. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.5 決策與利益改善分析. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.6 小結. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4 數值分析與敏感度分析. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.1 數值分析. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.1.1 參數設定. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.1.2 各模式決策與獲利比較. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.2 參數敏感度分析. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.2.1 檢驗成本函數之係數分析. . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.2.2 零件運送成本. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2.3 等待零件維修之時間成本分析. . . . . . . . . 53
4.2.4 生產良率分析. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.3 小結. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5 結論與未來研究方向. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.1 結論. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.2 未來研究方向. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
參考文獻. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
圖目錄
1.1 研究流程圖. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Stackelberg 模式. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1 供應鏈流程圖. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2 流程樹狀圖―在下游設置維修站. . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.3 流程樹狀圖―不在下游設置維修站. . . . . . . . . . 25
4.1 a 對於製造廠檢驗可靠度決策的影響. . . . . . . . . 47
4.2 a 對於分散式系統成員獲利的影響. . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.3 a 對於協商前後供應鏈成員獲利的影響-下游有設置
維修站之情況. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.4 a 對於協商前後供應鏈成員獲利的影響-下游沒有設
置維修站之情況. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.5 a 對於協商合約變數的影響-下游有設置維修站之情況48
4.6 a 對於協商合約變數的影響-下游沒有設置維修站之
情況. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.7 c1 對於製造廠與系統廠決策的影響. . . . . . . . . . 50
4.8 c1 對於分散式系統成員獲利的影響. . . . . . . . . . 50
4.9 在下游有設置維修站情況下c1 對於整體獲利之影響51
4.10 c2 對於製造廠與系統廠決策的影響. . . . . . . . . . 51
4.11 c2 對於分散式系統成員獲利的影響. . . . . . . . . . 52
4.12 在下游沒有設置維修站情況下c2 對於整體獲利之影響52
4.13 Ct1 對於製造廠與系統廠決策的影響. . . . . . . . . . 53
4.14 Ct1 對於分散式系統成員獲利的影響. . . . . . . . . . 54
4.15 在下游有設置維修站情況下Ct1 對於整體獲利之影響54
4.16 Ct2 對於製造廠與系統廠決策的影響. . . . . . . . . . 55
4.17 Ct2 對於分散式系統成員獲利的影響. . . . . . . . . . 55
4.18 在下游沒有設置維修站情況下Ct2 對於整體獲利之
影響. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.19 qm 對於製造廠與系統廠決策的影響. . . . . . . . . . 57
4.20 qm 對於協商前後供應鏈成員獲利的影響-下游有設
置維修站之情況. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.21 qm 對於協商前後供應鏈成員獲利的影響-下游沒有
設置維修站之情況. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.22 qm 對於協商前後整體獲利的影響. . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.23 qm 對於協商合約變數的影響-下游有設置維修站之
情況. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.24 qm 對於協商合約變數的影響-下游沒有設置維修站
之情況. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
表目錄
3.1 製造廠於下游系統廠設置維修站時供應鏈成員於各
狀況之獲利表. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.2 製造廠不在下游系統廠設置維修站時供應鏈成員於
各狀況之獲利表. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.1 基本參數設定. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.2 參數設定之主要考量決策與函式值. . . . . . . . . . 44
4.3 各模式成員獲利與決策表. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.4 合理的參數範圍. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
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