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研究生:陳欣汝
研究生(外文):Hsin-JuChen
論文名稱:企業產品回收策略與機構投資者組成關係
論文名稱(外文):Product Recall Strategy and Institutional Investors Ownership Composition
指導教授:張紹基張紹基引用關係
指導教授(外文):Shao-Chi Chang
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立成功大學
系所名稱:國際企業研究所碩博士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2012
畢業學年度:100
語文別:英文
論文頁數:42
中文關鍵詞:機構投資者長期投資型機構投資者短期投資型機構投資者產品回收
外文關鍵詞:recall strategyproduct-harm crisisinstitutional investors
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  • 下載下載:11
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本文研究機構投資者組成結構是否會影響公司回收產品的策略。過去文獻顯示,通常產品回收事件對公司帶股票市場負面影響。考慮回收策略,公司可選擇積極主動或被動地回收瑕疵產品。雖然研究顯示主動回收可降低此產品瑕疵造成的負面影響。但積極回收卻使公司面臨更大的價值損失(Chen, Ganesan et al. 2009),顯示股東不能接受公司積極回收產品的策略。我們注意到機構投資者在股票市場上的重要性,發現機構投資者可以長期(dedicated)與短期(transient)投資者,於是我們分析回收公司長期與短期機構投資者的組成,觀察他們在公司回收期間的反應,實證上我們發現1)長期投資型機構投資者持股比例較高的公司傾向積極回收不良產品。2) 宣告回收時,長期投資型機構投資者持股比例較高的公司有較正向的異常報酬。
This paper examined whether institutional ownership composition affected firms’ choice on product recall strategy. Survey of product recall literature revealed that product recall in generally had negative effect on stock market. During the crisis, firm could decide to proactively or passively respond to the defective product. Proactively recall strategy softened the negative impact of product-harm crisis. But firms with proactive recall strategy suffered greater financial loss in stock market than those acted passively (Chen, Ganesan et al. 2009). We were to know why shareholders did not appreciate adoption of proactive recall strategy. Therefore we brought institutional investors into the study of product harm crisis management. Institutional investors could be categorized in transient, dedicated and quasi-indexers based on their varying inter-temporal preference. Considering firms’ composition of institutional ownership and their reaction on stock market, we reached that first during the product-harm crisis, firms with more long-time focus investors (dedicated investors) experienced more positive abnormal return. Second a firm’s choice of product-recall strategy possessed coherence with the preference of their investor base. Firms with more dedicated investors tended to recall products proactively.
Index
Chapter One Introduction 1
Chapter Two Literature Review 6
2.1 Recalling Strategy and Market Reaction on Product Recall 6
2.2 Institutional Investors 8
2.3 Difference among Institutional Investors 11
2.4 Institution Investors and Recall Strategy 13
Chapter Three Sample and Methodology 16
3.1 Sample 16
3.2 Measurement 18
3.3 Event Study Approach 22
Chapter Four Empirical Results 26
4.1 Market Reaction to Recall Strategies 28
4.2 Recall Strategy and Institutional Ownership 29
Chapter Five Conclusion 33
5.1 Discussion 33
5.2 Managerial Implication 34
5.3 Limitation and Future Research 34
Appendix 36
Reference 38


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