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研究生:李玟霈
研究生(外文):Wen-PeiLi
論文名稱:政商關係、部門別財報品質與投資效率之關聯
論文名稱(外文):The relationship between Political Connection, Segment Reporting Quality and Investment Efficiency
指導教授:楊朝旭楊朝旭引用關係黃炳勳黃炳勳引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chaur-Shiuh YoungChaur-Shiuh Young
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立成功大學
系所名稱:會計學系碩博士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2012
畢業學年度:100
語文別:英文
論文頁數:54
中文關鍵詞:部門別財報品質政商關係投資效率
外文關鍵詞:segment reporting qualitypolitically connected firmsinvestment efficiency
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:1
  • 點閱點閱:307
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
本研究目的是探討政商關係、部門別財報品質與投資效率間關係。部門別資訊的揭露使得報表使用者能夠更清楚瞭解公司營運狀況、公司過去經營績效、公司風險所在以及公司正確的報酬,利用這些資訊可以使報表使用者對公司做更完整的了解。有鑑於此,本研究以部門別財報品質作為根基,並且以政商關係和投資效率作為主要研究議題,探討政商關係使否影響部門別財報品質以及部門別財報品質是否影響公司投資效率。本研究採用19個國家在2001年的財務資料做樣本,發現具政商關係公司傾向減少部門報導之相關資訊使得部門別財報品質較低;而較低的部門別財報品質則會導致較差的投資效率。
The objective of this study is to explore whether political connections have effects on a firm’s segment reporting quality and investment efficiency. Through the disclosure of segment information, financial statement users can get a deeper insight into the business operations of firms, can help themselves to better understand a firm’s past performance, can better assess a firm’s risks and returns and can make more informed judgments about firms as a whole. In order to investigate the issue underlying segment reporting quality, a sample of 19 countries in 2001 is used, and it is found that when firms with political connections conceal segment reporting information on purpose, this leads to lower segment reporting quality. It is also found that higher segment reporting quality will improve investment efficiency by decreasing information asymmetry.
摘要 I
Abstract II
謝誌 III
Content IV
TABLES VI
1. INTRODUCTION 1
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 5
2.1 Segment Reporting Quality 5
2.1.1 Proprietary Cost 5
2.1.2 Agency Cost 6
2.1.3 External Financing Incentive 7
2.2 Political Connection 8
2.2.1 The Definition of Politically Connected 8
2.2.2 How Political Connections Affects Firms 13
2.3 Segment Reporting Quality and Investment Efficiency 16
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 19
3.1 First Hypothesis 19
3.1.1 Research Model 19
3.1.2 Variable Definitions 20
3.2 Second Hypothesis 27
3.2.1 Research Model 27
3.2.2 Variable Definitions 28
3.3 Sample Selection 30
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 36
4.1 Descriptive Statics 36
4.2 The Differences in Firm Characteristics Between Politically and Non-politically Connected Firms 38
4.3 Correlation Analysis 40
4.4 Empirical Results 43
4.5 Additional Tests 46
4.5.1 The Mediating Role of SRQ 46
4.5.2 The Impact of SRQ That Caused by Political Connection 48
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 50
6. REFERENCES 52

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