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研究生:丁思嘉
研究生(外文):Szu-GiaDing
論文名稱:董監酬勞之決定因子與溢領現象—以台灣上市櫃公司為例
論文名稱(外文):Determinants and Overpaid Phenomena of the Compensation: Evidence from Taiwan Listed Companies
指導教授:吳清在吳清在引用關係
指導教授(外文):Tsing-Zai Wu
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立成功大學
系所名稱:會計學系碩博士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2012
畢業學年度:100
語文別:中文
論文頁數:126
中文關鍵詞:公司治理董監事酬勞溢領現象
外文關鍵詞:Corporate governanceexecutives’ compensationoverpaid phenomena
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:13
  • 點閱點閱:365
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:2
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:2
  本研究旨在探討產業性質、公司治理與法令揭露規範對董監事酬勞決定之影響,並藉之判斷企業是否存在董監事薪酬的溢領現象。近年來,國內、外對於高階管理者是否存在薪酬之「肥貓議題」相當重視,主管機關基於保障債權人與小股東的立場,陸續修訂諸多的「反肥貓條款」;然而,當前台灣法令的之規範是否真能發揮嚇阻董監事溢領薪酬之效,及不同產業別中各自董監事薪酬肥貓之存在現象是否有差異等兩項研究議題,於過去研究文獻探討甚少。
  而本研究以1997年至2011年台灣上市(櫃)公司為研究對象,將樣本按產業別區分為傳統產業、電子業、及金融業,並將家族企業變數納入模型進行分析,藉以探討台灣董監事薪酬規範之法令沿革是否能逐步發揮其立修法意旨。實證結果顯示:(1)不同產業之間對於董監事酬勞之發放存在顯著差異,如:傳統產業傾向發放較多之董監事酬勞,電子業則傾向偏低發放;(2)家族企業相較於非家族企業也發現有較高程度董監事酬勞之發放。然而,當電子業又屬家族企業時,其董監事酬勞政策則傾向偏低發放,將電子業為追求長遠發展多將保留盈餘維持較高水準,用以應付未來撥充資本所需之實務現象發揮到極致;(3)當主管機關對於董監事酬勞公告採較寬鬆之揭露規範政策時,將可發現其加劇各產業之董監事酬勞溢領現象;相對地,在推行嚴謹的薪酬揭露政策時,同樣也能顯著達到抑制董監事酬勞發放之效果。進一步分析則又可發現:(1)傳統產業與金融業的董監事相對於電子業有偏高的董監事酬勞溢領比率;(2)發生董監事薪酬溢領的家數會隨著溢領比率升高而降低,但當在溢領超過100%者,其家數不僅遽增且居溢領分布之冠,推測可能帶有類似「洗大澡」之財務操縱意圖;(3)又若以一般投資人經常使用比較企業與產業平均每股盈餘表現作為董監酬勞溢領合理與否之粗判,本研究結果發現此種方法所產生之結論爭議過多。故若能參考本研究所推論之董監事薪酬決定實證模型,預期將可裨益於各界判斷董監事酬勞是否存在溢領現象之合理性。
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of industry natures, corporate governance, and disclosure regulations to the decision of executives’ compensation plans, and so as to determine whether there is an overcompensation phenomenon existing in a firm. In recent years, the “fat cat” issue has become an extremely important topic all over the world. The authorities have come up with several “anti-fat cat act” in order to protect creditors and small shareholders. However, there has little research on whether the laws do deter firms from overcompensation and whether there has difference between “fat cats” in different industry sectors.
The research is based on the data from companies which is listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation during the period from 1997 to 2011, and the companies are classified into 3 industry sectors: conventional, electronic, and financial, with family-owned businesses taken as the variable factors in the analysis model. The result shows that:(1)The differences in industry natures do have an impact on the compensation plans;(2)Family-owned business pays more compensation in comparison with non-family-owned businesses. However, if a family business is in the electronic industry, they pay much less compensation with the aim to keep their retained earnings for future growth needs;(3)The regulations on disclosing executives’ pays do affect the compensation, no matter it is loose or strict. Last but not least, the further research shows that:(1)the conventional industry and financial industry are tend to have higher overpaid rates than in the electronic industry;(2)The number of firms which overcompensate executives decreases as the overcompensation rate increases, but when the rate over 100%, the number become the highest of the overcompensation ones;(3)It is controversial to use average EPS in determining whether a firm’s executives have been overpaid as there are many differences between industry and business natures. It is more reasonable and more recommended to use the model used in the study to determine whether there is an overcompensation phenomenon.
第一章 緒論 9
第一節 研究背景與動機 9
第二節 研究目的 12
第三節 研究貢獻 13
第四節 研究方法與架構 13
第二章 相關文獻探討 15
第一節 董事會及公司治理相關文獻 15
第二節 董監事薪酬制度之法學見解與相關文獻 20
第三節 台灣近年董監事薪酬揭露相關法令沿革 31
第三章 研究方法 37
第一節 研究假說 37
第二節 實證模型之設定 39
第三節 變數衡量 40
第四節 資料來源與樣本選取 50
第四章 實證結果與分析 51
第一節 樣本與變數之基本敘述性統計 51
第二節 主測試結果分析 69
第三節 敏感性分析 101
第五章 結論與建議 113
第一節 研究結論 113
第二節 研究限制 118
第三節 研究建議 118
參考文獻 119
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1. 廖秀梅、李建然、吳祥華(2006),「董事會結構特性與公司績效關係之研究-兼論台灣家族控制企業因素的影響」,東吳經濟商學學報,第 54 期:頁117-160。
2. 楊朝旭、黃潔(2004),「企業生命週期、資產組合與企業未來績效關聯性之研究」,商管科技季刊,第5卷第1期,頁49-71。
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