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研究生:利炳勳
研究生(外文):Li, Bingshiun
論文名稱:市場策略、研發投入與專利認定的法律制度
論文名稱(外文):Marketing, R&D and the Rule of Awarding Patent
指導教授:賴法才賴法才引用關係
指導教授(外文):Lai, Favtsoin
口試委員:欉清全吳世英
口試委員(外文):Tsong, ChingchuanWu, Shihying
口試日期:2012-07-05
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立暨南國際大學
系所名稱:經濟學系
學門:社會及行為科學學門
學類:經濟學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2012
畢業學年度:100
語文別:中文
論文頁數:46
中文關鍵詞:經典策略序列策略優先備案優先發明R&D
外文關鍵詞:ClassicalSequelFirst to fileFirst to inventR&D
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:203
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:74
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
創新商品公開特有技術註冊專利上市,雖可賺取獨占利潤,但也可能造成
技術外溢降低未來接續創新商品的獨占利潤。廠商推出其新商品時可以隱匿部
分的創新技術避免技術外溢,而在日後推出利潤更高的經典商品。廠商也可以
不避諱技術外溢,在每一項技術創新序列地推出新商品。技術外溢與專利獨占
利潤互為衝突,廠商估量其得與失來訂定市場策略。市場策略決定廠商的研發
投入的多寡。專利認定的法律制度影響市場策略進而影響廠商的研發資源投入。
本文證明技術外溢效果很明顯及雛形技術與主流技術兩者的專利利得差距甚
大時,廠商會採取經典策略;否則,序列策略成為常見的廠商的市場策略。
Filing for a patent, firms need to publicize the recipe of its innovation. This
makes firms earn monopolistic profit, but may cause a technology spillover and
reduce it future monopolistic profit of extensive innovation. On the one hand, to
reduce the spillover of their technology, firms can cover some of their minor
innovations until its innovation has a major breakthrough and then earn future
higher profit by selling their product which is with classical flavor. On the other
hand, risking the loss due to technology spillover, firm can market every innovation
in sequels and earn a serial of profits. There is a tradeoff between technology
spillover and monopolistic advantage. Firms consider the cost and benefit of filing
a patent and market their products, and determine how much resource they need to
invest in R&D. The rules of awarding applicants patents have their effect on firm’s
marketing strategy and in turn shape their R&D input. Our paper shows that if the
spillover effect of technology is significant and there is a large gap between the
profits of immature innovative and main stream innovation, firm will market its
innovation in one hit; otherwise, selling its innovations in sequels will be the
strategy that firm often takes.
目錄
第一章 緒論........................................................ 1
第一節 研究動機................................................ 1
第二節 研究目的................................................ 3
第三節 研究架構................................................ 4
第二章 文獻回顧.................................................... 5
第三章 基本模型設定............................................... 10
第四章 專利法的優先備案與研發競爭................................. 12
第一節 經典策略與寡占同質數量競爭或異質價格競爭............... 12
第二節 序列策略與寡占同質數量競爭或異質價格競爭............... 25
第三節 經典策略與同質價格競爭................................. 29
第四節 序列策略與同質價格競爭................................. 31
第五章 專利法的優先發明與研發競爭................................. 33
第一節 經典策略與寡占同質數量競爭或異質價格競爭............... 34
第二節 序列策略與寡占同質數量競爭或異質價格競爭............... 40
第三節 經典策略與同質價格競爭................................. 43
第四節 序列策略與同質價格競爭................................. 44
第六章 結論....................................................... 45
參考文獻........................................................... 46

圖目錄
圖A-1 ........................................................... 14
圖A-2 ........................................................... 15
圖A-3 ........................................................... 17
圖A-4 ........................................................... 18
圖A-5 ........................................................... 18
圖A-6 ........................................................... 19
圖A-7 ........................................................... 19
圖A-8 ........................................................... 19
圖A-9 ........................................................... 27
圖A-10 .......................................................... 34
中華民國專利法
Boldrin, Michele and David, Levine (2010), “Appropriation and Intellectual Property.”
Working Paper.
Fishman, A. and R. Rob (2000), “Product Innovation by a Durable-Good Monopoly.”
Rand Journal of Economics 31, 237–252.
Henry, Emeric and Carlos, J. Ponce (2011), “Waiting to Imitate: On the Dynamic Pricing
of Knowledge.” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 119(5), 959–981.
Miyagiwa, Kaz (2009), “First-to-invent versus first-to-file: Invention, and international
patent law harmonization.” Working Paper.
Nahm, Jae (2004), “Durable-Goods Monopoly with Endogenous Innovation.” Journal of
Economics & Management Strategy Volume 13, 303–319.
Ponce, C. J. (2011), “Knowledge disclosure as intellectual property rights protection.”
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 80, 418–434.
Polanski, Arnold ( 2007), “Is the General Public Licence A Rational Choice?” The Journal
of Industrial Economics, 691–714.
Pollock, Rufus (2008), “Cumulative Innovation, Experimentation and the Hold-Up
Problem.” Working Paper.
Sieberta, Ralph and Georg, Von Graevenitz (2010), “Jostling for advantage or not:
Choosing between patent portfolio races and ex ante licensing.” Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization 73, 225–245.
Scotchmer, Suzanne (1999), “On the optimality of the patent renewal system.” Rand
Journal of Economics 36, 181–196.
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