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研究生:簡聖芬
論文名稱:公司治理與產業競爭程度間的交互關係
論文名稱(外文):The interaction between corporate governance and the degree of market competition
指導教授:王克陸王克陸引用關係
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立交通大學
系所名稱:財務金融研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2012
畢業學年度:100
語文別:中文
論文頁數:35
中文關鍵詞:公司治理公司治理指標產業集中度
外文關鍵詞:Corporate GovernanceCorporate Governance IndexHHI
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:2
  • 點閱點閱:241
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  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
本研究探討產業競爭程度對公司治理效果之影響,驗證在比較不競爭的產業中,改善公司治理程度對公司之獲益,比競爭產業中的公司大。實證結果顯示:市場集中度小的產業,好的公司治理使股價享有較高報酬,形成之投資組合可獲得超額報酬。此外,較好的公司治理下,公司會有較佳的營運績效、較高的公司價值以及較低的資本支出,而這現象在比較不競爭的產業中也較明顯。研究公司不效率的原因,發現在較差的公司治理下,公司會有較低的勞動生產力及較高的要素成本,這現象一樣是在比較不競爭的產業中較顯著。
In the study, we discuss the result in degree of market competition impact on corporate governance. And then, verify firms in noncompetitive industries benefit more from improving corporate governance than do firms in competitive industries. The empirical result suggests that in the low market concentration industries, firms with better governance have higher equity return and are able to earn abnormal return by constructing portfolios.
Moreover, firms with better governance show better operating performance, which leads to higher firm value and lower capital expenditures. This tendency, however, is obvious only for firms in noncompetitive industries. In exploring the causes of the inefficiency, we find that firms with poorer governance have lower labor productivity and higher input costs, which is also obvious only for firms in noncompetitive industries

中文摘要 ------------------------------------------------------ i
英文摘要 ------------------------------------------------------ ii
誌謝 ---------------------------------------------------------- iii
目錄 ---------------------------------------------------------- iv
表目錄 -------------------------------------------------------- v

第一章、 緒論
1.1 研究背景及動機 ---------------------------------------------- 1
1.2 研究架構 ---------------------------------------------------- 3

第二章、文獻回顧與假說
2.1公司治理變數探討 --------------------------------------------- 4
2.2影響總經理薪酬的相關變數探討 --------------------------------- 6
2.3公司治理與市場競爭程度 --------------------------------------- 7

第三章、研究方法及指標檢測
3.1變數說明 ----------------------------------------------------- 10
3.2樣本選取 ----------------------------------------------------- 12
3.3研究期間 ----------------------------------------------------- 12
3.4研究方法 ----------------------------------------------------- 13
3.5公司治理指標的敘述統計量 ------------------------------------- 15
3.6公司治理指標有效性的檢測 ------------------------------------- 17

第四章、實證結果與分析
4.1產業分類 ----------------------------------------------------- 22
4.2公司治理及權益報酬關係 -------------------------------------- 23
4.3公司治理、廠商價值及營運績效
1.公司治理和廠商價值 ---------------------------------------- 25
2.公司治理和營運績效 ---------------------------------------- 26
3.公司治理與投資活動 ---------------------------------------- 28
4.公司治理與生產效率 ---------------------------------------- 29

第五章、結論及建議 --------------------------------------------- 31

參考文獻 -------------------------------------------------------- 33

陳明園與石雅慧,高階經理人薪酬—代理理論與競賽理論之實證研究,臺大管理論叢,15(1),民93:131-166 。
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