臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文主要以歐豬五國的公司為研究對象，探討2001至2010年間企業發行ADR型態的動機，並將公司治理分為董事會組成、CEO相關與內部人持股等三個面向來探討公司治理與發行ADR型態之間的關連，並驗證發行型態與公司績效表現之間的關係。此外本研究採用事件研究法，討論發行前後、沙賓法案以及歐洲公司治理行動計劃實施後公司治理變數的變化。

實證結果發現，發行非上市型態ADR的公司具有獨立董事比例較少、CEO與董事長職權較不分明、內部人與機構投資人持股比高的特性，顯示公司治理較差的企業會傾向發行非上市型的ADR。然而公司績效與公司治理表現為非正相關，反而發行非上市型態ADR的企業TobinQ較高，探究原因其與發行非上市型態的公司在上市之後所得到的利益較高，以及所屬的產業別較有關係。另外根據本研究觀察，大部分歐豬五國的公司偏好發行L1型態的ADR，歸咎其原因可能為拓展海外市場銷售額與增加企業知名度，以及歐豬五國的企業通常為大股東所把持，其不願在上市後股權被稀釋而選擇發行無法籌資的L1型態ADR。

另外根據事件研究法的結果，公司赴海外發行存託憑證後無論何種型態的ADR Tobin Q及獨立董事比例皆提升，顯示公司赴海外上市發行ADR確實有提升公司治理與公司績效的效果，在法規方面沙賓法案實施後公司績效與公司治理皆上升，而歐洲公司治理行動計劃卻對企業提升公司治理的效果有限，其原因可能為該法案為非強制性，對企業的約束力較小所致。

This research focuses on companies of European five PIIGS which issued American Depositary Receipts from 2001 to 2010 and examines the motivation behind the issuance. This study divides the corporate governance variables into three categories (board composition, CEO characteristics, insider ownership) and explores the relationship between corporate governance and ADR listing choices. In addition, we also use American SOX act and Action Plan for Modernizing European Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance to test the validity of these events on firm performance and listing choices.

The empirical results show that companies which have worse corporate governance tend to issue Level I and R144A ADR; however, we find that these companies have higher Tobin Q. The reason why the firm performance is not positively related to corporate governance is probably because these companies gain higher interest after the issuance, and the industry these companies belong to is also one of the reason contributing to this result. Moreover, we also find that most of the European five PIIGS’s companies tend to issue Level I ADR. This is more related to the fact that the investors of European five PIIGS’s companies are highly concentrated and large shareholders aren’t willing to dilute their shares after the issuance. The motivation of expanding the foreign market and enhance the reputation is probably one of the reason why companies issued L1 ADR.

According to event analysis, firm performance and corporate governance are enhanced after the issuance of ADR, and the effect is the same for American SOX act. However, the result is not valid after the implementation of Action Plan for Modernizing European Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance because European companies are not forced to obey this act.

中文摘要........................................................... ⅰ
Abstract ............................................................ ⅱ
誌謝............................................................... ⅲ
目錄............................................................... ⅳ
表目錄........................................................................................................................... ⅴ
第一章、緒論................................................................................................................. 1
第二章、文獻回顧......................................................................................................... 4
第一節、美國存託憑證(ADR) ............................................................................4
第二節、沙賓法案 ...............................................................................................6
第三節、歐洲公司治理 .......................................................................................7
第四節、研究假說 ........................................................................................... 114
第三章、資料說明與研究方法................................................................................... 20
第一節、樣本選取 .............................................................................................20
第二節、資料來源 .............................................................................................20
第三節、變數說明 .............................................................................................20
第四節、研究方法 .............................................................................................22
第四章、實證結果與研究........................................................................................... 25
第一節、敘述統計 .............................................................................................25
第二節、羅吉斯迴歸結果 .................................................................................27
第三節、事件研究法 .........................................................................................30
第四節、Chow test檢定結果 ............................................................................32
第五節、企業選擇ADR發行型態之動機 .....................................................334
第五章、結論與建議................................................................................................... 36
參考文獻....................................................................................................................... 50

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