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研究生:林心印
研究生(外文):Lin, Hsinyin
論文名稱:競爭法上價格擠壓違法性之再省思:美歐新近案例發展與理論探討
論文名稱(外文):The Illegality of Price Squeeze in Antitrust Law: The Analysis of Price Squeeze Theory from the View of Recent Cases in the U.S. and the EU
指導教授:王立達王立達引用關係
指導教授(外文):Wang, Li-Dar
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立交通大學
系所名稱:科技法律研究所
學門:法律學門
學類:專業法律學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2012
畢業學年度:100
語文別:中文
論文頁數:44
中文關鍵詞:價格擠壓利潤擠壓拒絕交易德國電信案
外文關鍵詞:price squeezemargin squeezerefusal to dealDeutsche TelekomlinkLine
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:3
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  • 下載下載:110
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
價格擠壓(price squeeze, margin squeeze)係指一個同時經營上下游兩市場之垂直整合事業,其於上游市場具有獨占地位,而當下游市場其他競爭者要求與其交易時,垂直整合事業所訂定之批發價格相較於其零售價格,將使競爭對手無利可圖而退出市場,因而可能達到削弱下游市場競爭之效果。
本文擬由維持下游競爭秩序之角度出發,分析禁止價格擠壓之規範是否將對垂直整合獨占事業造成長短期不利影響,再輔以各國案例發展及文獻討論,觀察價格擠壓規範與獨占事業、競爭者、產業發展及消費者之間的互動關係。
本文認為,若技術上、經濟上的發展已實現下游競爭之可能,亦即上下游之服務或產品不限於由同一事業供應或經營,則保障下游競爭將有助於提升下游市場之經營效率,甚至有助於間接促進整體產業發展。因此競爭法上價格擠壓之判斷應建立合理原則(rule of reason),以符合明確性、可行性的判斷標準,充分評估限制獨占事業交易自由後,所隱含限制及促進競爭效果。

A “price squeeze” (or margin squeeze) is a behavior conducted by a vertically integrated firm, which has the monopoly power at the upstream level, and sells the downstream products and the upstream input to firms that compete with the vertically integrated firm at the downstream level. The effect of price squeeze is debated that the vertically integrated frim may diminish the competition in the downstream market by “squeeze” the margin between the wholesale price and the retail price, so the “equally efficient competitors” cannot survive in the downstream market.
The main objective of this article is to analyze the long-term and short-term impacts of the antitrust duty of price squeeze. The article will start from the controversial cases in the U.S. and the EU, and observe the interactions among the stakeholders in the market – the monopolist, the competitors, and the consumers – to examine the legal and industrial policies behind those cases.
In the point of view of the protection of the downstream market, when the upstream input and the downstream products could be technologically and economically used and produced by downstream competitors, the competition of the downstream market would trigger the promotion of the efficiency of the downstream production and the long-term development in the industry. Due to the complicated pro-competitive and anti-competitive impacts inherited in the price squeeze behaviors, a proper standard based on the rule of reason is needed to provide a justification on the antitrust law.
中文摘要 i
英文摘要(Abstract) ii
誌謝 iii
目錄 iv
第一章 緒論 1
1.1 研究動機 1
1.2 研究目的及問題意識 2
1.3 研究方法及研究架構 2
1.3.1 研究方法 2
1.3.2 研究架構 3
第二章 競爭法上價格擠壓之實務規範:美歐兩地之發展 4
2.1 美國法──以linkLine判決為中心 4
2.1.1 拒絕交易的合法邊界──Aspen Skiing判決及Trinko判決 4
2.1.1.1 Aspen Skiing判決 4
2.1.1.2 Trinko判決 5
2.1.1.3 小結 6
2.1.2 價格擠壓的案例法發展──Alcoa判決及Town of Concord判決 6
2.1.2.1 Alcoa判決 6
2.1.2.2 Town of Concord判決 7
2.1.2.3 小結 8
2.1.3 掠奪性定價案例及發展 8
2.1.3.1 Brooke Group案 8
2.1.3.2 掠奪性定價理論發展 9
2.1.4 價格擠壓最新重要案例──linkLine 10
2.2 歐洲──以德國電信案為中心 11
2.2.1 價格擠壓理論在歐盟競爭法之案例發展 12
2.2.1.1 National Carbonizing 12
2.2.1.2 British Sugar/Napier Brown 13
2.2.2 價格擠壓理論在電信產業之案例發展 14
2.2.2.1 英國Freeserve案 14
2.2.2.2 英國BT Together Option案 15
2.2.2.3 法國France Telecom、Cegetal案 15
2.2.2.4 小結 16
2.2.3 德國電信案(Deutsche Telekom) 16
2.3 比較與評析 17
第三章 價格擠壓違法性檢驗公式之學理分析 21
3.1 EEO/REO公式 21
3.2 PPB公式 23
3.3 小結:價格擠壓公式得確保事業回收研發成本及最大獲利 24
第四章 價格擠壓行為對創新動力之影響 27
4.1 垂直整合是否較有利於創新? 27
4.2 創新動機與競爭之關連 28
4.3 小結:價格擠壓並未不當影響事業之創新動機 29
第五章 建立競爭法上價格擠壓違法類型之必要性 31
5.1 從Aspen Skiing再出發 31
5.2 有反競爭疑慮之談判力量 32
5.3 獨占地位係佔用公共資源而取得: 33
5.4 保障下游市場競爭之必要 34
5.5 競爭法與產業管制法之調和: 35
第六章 代結論:以合理原則檢視價格擠壓行為 38
6.1 獨占地位與持續性獨占力量: 38
6.2 有違法疑慮之拒絕交易或價格擠壓行為與檢驗公式: 39
6.3 正當性抗辯:效能抗辯與正當商業理由 39
參考文獻 41
相關判決 43
中文文獻
期刊論文(依據作者姓氏筆劃排列)
1. 林國彬,「美國聯邦電力事業經濟管制之研究」,公平交易季刊,第九卷第一期,頁55、107,2001年1月。
2. 林雅惠,「論寬頻接取市場之批發價格管制制度-兼論垂直價格擠壓理論」,萬國法律,第150期,頁29-51,2006年。
3. 陳志民,「反托拉斯法規範掠奪行為之現在與未來-新經濟制度下之省思(二)」,政大法學評論,第八十一期,頁220-222,2004年。

英文文獻
書籍(依作者姓氏起首字母排列)
1. Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice (3d ed. 2005)

期刊論文(依據作者姓氏起首字母排列)
1. Areeda, Phillip A. & Donald Tuner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. Rev. 697(1975).
2. Baker Jonathan B., Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575(2007).
3. Krattenmaker, Thomas G. & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L. J. 209 (1986)
4. Krattenmaker, Thomas G. & Steven C. Salop, Competition and Cooperation in the Market for Exclusionary Rights, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 109 (1986).
5. Salop, Steven C., Refusals to Deal and Price Squeezes by an Unregulated, Vertically Integrated Monopolist, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 709(2010).
6. Salop, Steven C. & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 267(1983)


其他參考文獻
1. European Communities, Notice on the Application of the Competition Rules to Access Agreements in the Telecommunications Sector. 98/C, C 265/02.
2. Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings.
3. Commission Recommendation on Interconnection in a Liberalized Telecommunication Market Part2 – Accounting Separation and Cost Accounting, 98/195/EC, April 8, 1998.
4. European Regulators Group, Report on the Discussion on the Application of Margin Squeeze Tests to Bundles, March 2009.
5. Commission Guidelines on Market Analysis and the Assessment of Significant Market Power Under the Community Regulation Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services, O.J. C 165, July 11, 2002.
6. Simon Genevaz, Margin Squeeze after Deutsche Telekom, May 14, 2008, available at https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/margin-squeeze-after-ideutsche-telekomi/
7. Cecilio Madero, Iratxe Gurpegui Ballesteros & Ana Malheiro, Margin Squeeze Abuses: The EU Perspective, Apr. 15, 2009, available at https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/margin-squeeze-abuses-the-eu-perspective/




相關判決
美國判決(依本文中出現順序排列)
1. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 129 S.Ct.1109 (2009).
2. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585(1985).
3. Verizon Communication Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
4. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416(2d, Cir. 1945).
5. Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
6. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
7. Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983).
8. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
9. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366.(1973); Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Kodak, 123 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).

歐盟判決(依本文中出現順序排列)
1. Commission Decision of May 21, 2003, COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579 – Deutsche Telekom AG., 2003 O.J. (L 263) 9.
2. Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission, 2008 E.C.R.II-477.
3. Case C-280/08 P. Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission, 2010 E.C.R. __, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62008CJ0280:EN:HTML
4. Commission’s Interim Measures Decision of October 29, 1975, National Carbonizing, 1976 O.J. (L 35) 6.
5. Commission Decision of Jul.18, 1988, Napier Brown – British Sugar, 1988 O.J. (L 284) 41.
6. Ofcom, Case CW/00760/03/04, Own-initiative investigation against BT about potential anti-competitive exclusionary behaviour. http://www.ofcom.org.uk/bulletins/comp_bull_index/comp_bull_ccases/closed_all/cw007/?lang=default (last visited 2012/6/29)
7. France Telecom、Cegetal http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/pdf/avis/04d48.pdf. (last visited 2012/6/29)

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