本研究建構定價模型探討對二階層配銷通路的影響。模型建構在供應商為領導者零售商為追隨者的Stackelberg game底下，供應商想藉由定價策略區隔市場中不同需求量的零售商以最大化自身利潤。供應商會先制定產品的價格，零售商再依據該產品價格的資訊，制定最適需求量以最大化自身利潤。本研究以單一價格制模型為基礎，探討兩段及三段定價法對供應商及零售商造成的影響。

本研究中，二階層配銷通路由單一供應商提供單一產品給多個異質的零售商所組成。配銷通路中的零售商彼此獨立且各自擁有獨佔市場，產品由供應商直接供應而且零售商之間沒有轉賣與競爭行為。各零售商所獨佔的市場規模與價格彈性皆不相同，故市場間的需求量與消費者購買的價格也不相同。零售商採用經濟訂購量(EOQ)存貨政策決定訂購量與訂購週期，故成本包括產品採購之訂購成本與存貨持有成本，多個異質零售商之間的各項成本亦不相同。各零售商的利潤是銷貨收入扣除產品的購買、訂購與存貨持有成本。供應商依據各零售商的需求量向上游採逐批訂購法(Lot-for-Lot)訂購，因此供應商成本是由處理零售商訂單的訂單處理成本與運送成本所組成。供應商的利潤是銷貨收入扣除所有訂單處理成本與運送成本。

本研究以單一價格制為基礎，再考慮供應商採用兩段與三段定價法對配銷通路的影響。單一價格是指產品的每單位價格不會因為需求量多寡而改變。本研究中，兩段定價法是由固定入場費與每單位價格所組成，而三段定價法是由兩個不同銷售量區間中各由一個兩段定價法所組成，零售商可以依其需求選擇供應商的銷售量價格區間。在兩段定價法案例分析中，改變固定入場費探討在不同固定入場費下兩段定價法對供應商與零售商造成的影響。在三段定價法案例分析中，則探討在零售商有選擇銷售量價格區間的情況下對供應商與零售商造成的影響。

對供應商而言，由案例分析可知採用兩段定價法的利潤會高於單一價格制時的利潤，而且三段定價法的利潤亦高於兩段定價法的利潤。對零售商而言，在兩段定價法下，大部份零售商的利潤都會高於單一價格制時的利潤，部份零售商因為需求量太小無法有效降低平均單位成本而導致利潤低於單一價格制時的利潤。三段定價法下，零售商有機會可以選擇不同的費用組合，需求量夠高的零售商會選擇固定入場費較高的費用組合來提升自己的利潤。

以案例之總結，對供應商而言，適宜的多段定價法會提升供應商的利潤。對零售商而言，在不同的多段定價法下，大部份零售商能獲得更高的利潤，然而少數零售商可能因為需求量與銷售量價格區間不協調而導致利潤下滑。本研究在一個二階層配銷通路中，所提出兩段與三段定價法可提供供應商一個較有效率的定價法來整合不同的零售商間之參考。

In this study, we construct a pricing model to analyze the effect of a two-layer distribution channel in a Stackelberg game manner. Under a Stackelberg game in the channel, the supplier is leader and retailers are followers, and the supplier is tend to maximize his own profits by adopting a pricing strategy to coordinate the demands from different retailers. The supplier first decides a wholesale price for the retailers, and then each retailer determines his ordering lot size in order to maximize his own profits. Based on a fundamental pricing strategy with a unique price for all the retailers, this study adopts a Two/Three Part Tariffs for the supplier in a distribution channel.

In this study, the two-layer distribution channel consists of single supplier offering a single product to a set of heterogeneous retailers. The demand of the product in the channel occurs only at the retailers, but nowhere else. The retailers in this two-layer vertical channel are independent, and have exclusive territories, i.e., all the merchandise offered directly by the supplier, and no resale and competition among retailers. Each retailer faces a unique demand curve which is a function of the retailer’s selling price. The supplier is aim to satisfy all the orders from the retailers under a wholesale price. The costs considered by each retailer include product procurement, inventory ordering and holding costs; each retailer’s ordering policy is in a form of EOQ type. A retailer’s profit is equal to his selling price minus costs of product purchasing, ordering and inventory holding. On the other hand, the supplier follows a lot-for-lot policy to replenish his own inventory. Thus, the supplier’s expanse only consists of costs of processing and delivering all the orders to the retailers. The supplier profits then can be obtained by removing all the above costs from the supplier’s selling gains.

Based on a fundamental unique price for all the retailers, this study extends the supplier’s pricing strategy to a Two/Three Part Tariffs towards the distribution channel. Rather than only a unit price for all the retailers, a Two-Part Tariffs in this research incorporates a fixed cost on the top of the unit price. Then, the Three-Part Tariffs in this research is constructed by two Two-Part Tariffs, in which each Two-Part Tariffs is valid only for a range of sales volumes.

Based on numerical examples, we first analyze the effect of the Two-Part Tariffs with various fixed costs, and then conduct a set of Three-Part Tariffs to exam the distribution channel. According to the numerical studies for the supplier’s profit, the Three-Part Tariffs gets the best performance and the Two-Part Tariffs is the next to the best. Similarly, all the retailers’ profits are improved if a Three-Part Tariffs is adopted instead of a Two-Part Tariffs since every retailer gets more freedom choosing Three-Part against Two-Part Tariffs. However, it may not be always true while comparing Two-Part Tariffs to a unit price since the fixed cost may force a retailer to change his ordering lot size due to different economic scales. As a result from the analysis and numerical examples in this thesis, adopting Two/Three-Part Tariffs can always make more profits for the supplier in the distribution channel.

摘要 II
Abstract IV
致謝 VI
目錄 VII
圖目錄 IX
表目錄 X
附錄目錄 XI
第一章 緒論 1
1.1 研究背景與動機 1
1.2 研究架構 2
第二章 文獻探討 5
2.1 配銷通路 5
2.2 定價的基本概念 6
2.3 數量折扣 10
2.4 兩段定價法 11
2.5 三段定價法 13
2.6 Stackelberg game 13
第三章 模式建構與分析 15
3.1 問題描述 15
3.2 基本假設與符號定義 19
3.3 模型建構與分析 21
3.3.1 單一價格制模型 21
3.3.2 兩段定價法模型 24
3.3.3 三段定價法模型 26
3.3.4 各參數對供應商的影響 34
3.4 小結 37
第四章 案例分析 43
4.1 參數設定 43
4.2 單一價格制 44
4.3 兩段定價法 46
4.3.1 供應商分析 46
4.3.2 零售商分析 55
4.4 三段定價法 65
第五章 結論與建議 75
5.1 結論 75
5.2 未來研究與建議 76
參考文獻 77
附錄A 80
附錄B 81

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