臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

　　股東提案是推行股東行動主義的重要手段，過去文獻有關該議題的實證研究主要集中在美國，至於美國以外地區則很少有相關研究。本文採1996年至 2011年台灣上市公司改變股利之股東提案為研究對象，並運用logistic 迴歸模型分析資訊不對稱程度與代理成本對改變股利提案之影響。此外，本文採用事件研究法探討市場對改變股利提案宣告之反應。實證結果顯示，在logistic 迴歸模型分析中，資訊不對稱、代理成本及公司績效對改變股利之提案分析結果並沒有顯著影響。事件研究結果顯示，在改變股利之提案宣告日前市場反應為正向，而在宣告日後反應為負向，董事會規模、經理人持股比例對改變股利之提案宣告，市場反應顯著為正，而電子產業股東的財富效果於改變股利之提案宣告日，產生顯著負向的變動。

Shareholder proposals, an important venue of shareholders activism, have been inspected mostly in the US and mentioned in other countries, Asian ones especially. This paper examines such issues in Taiwan on dividend changes from 1996 to 2011, regarding the impact of asymmetric information and agency cost on shareholder proposals of dividend changes. Logistic regression models are used and event study is utilized to explore the market response toward the announcements of shareholder proposals of dividend changes. The results show that the estimate of asymmetric information, agency cost and the firm performance on shareholder proposals of dividend changes is insignificant, while the stock price reaction is positive before the announcement of the shareholder proposals of dividend changes and negative thereafter. The scales of the corporate boards and the stock-holding percentage of the executives are significantly positive to the market’s response, but negative for the electronics industry.

中文提要　i
英文提要 ii
誌謝 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 v
圖目錄 vi
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 5
第三節 論文結構 6
第貳章 文獻探討 7
第一節 股東提案相關理論 7
第二節 股東提案之實證文獻 9
第三節 文獻評論 14
第參章 研究方法 15
第一節 研究假說 17
第二節 變數定義、模型設定與假說檢定方法 22
第三節 樣本與資料來源 31
第肆章 實證結果 33
第一節 敘述性統計分析及logistic迴歸分析 33
第二節 事件研究法結果 38
第三節 複迴歸分析 42
第伍章 結論與建議 55
第一節 研究結論 55
第二節 研究建議 57
參考文獻 59

一、中文部分
林怡秀，2007，從公司治理與代理理論論股東提案權制度，中原大學財經法律研究所碩士論文。
二、英文部分
Ahn, H.J., Cai, J., Hamao, Y., and Ho, R.Y.K., 2002. The components of the bid-ask spread in a limit-order market: evidence from the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Journal of Empirical Finance 9, 399-430.
Amihud, Y., 2002. Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series effects. Journal of Financial Markets 5, 31-56.
Ang, J., Cole, R., Lin, J., 1999. Agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Finance 55, 81-106.
Bainbridge, S.M. 2006. Director primacy and shareholder disempowerment. Harvard Law Review 119, 1735-58.
Baliga, B.R., Myer, R.C., and Rao, R.S., 1996. CEO duality and firm performance: what’s the fuss? Strategic Management Journal 17, 41-53.
Bauer, R., Moers, F., and Viehs, M.,2011. The determinants of withdrawn shareholder proposals. SSRN working paper, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1885392.
Bebchuk, L.A., 2005. The case for increasing shareholder power. Harvard Law Review 118, 835-914.
Black, B., 1998. Shareholder activism and corporate governance in the United States. In: Newman, Peter (Ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law.
Boehmer, E., Musumeci, J., and Poulsen, A.B., 1991. Event-study methodology under conditions of event-induced variance. Journal of Financial Economics 30, 253–272.
Brockman, P., and Chung, D.Y., 1999. Bid-ask spread components in an order-driven environment. Journal of Financial Research 22, 227-246.
Buchanan, B., Netter, J.M., and Yang, T., 2010. Are shareholder proposals an important corporate governance device? evidence from US and UK shareholder proposals. SSRN working paper, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1572016.
Cai, J., and Walkling, R.A., 2011. Shareholders'' say on pay: Does it create value? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 46, 299-339.
Campbell, C., Gillian, S., and Niden, C., 1999. Current perspectives of shareholder proposals: lessons from the 1997 proxy season. Financial Management 28, 89-98.
Chan, Y.C., 2000. The price impact of trading on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. Journal of Financial Markets 3, 1-16.
Clifford, C.P., 2008. Value creation or destruction? hedge funds as shareholder activists. Journal of Corporate Finance 14, 323-336.
Cowan, A.R., 1992. Nonparametric event study tests. Review Quantitative Finance Account. 2, 343-358.
Cremers, K.J.M., and Romano, R., 2007. Institutional investors and proxy voting: The impact of the 2003 mutual fund voting disclosure regulation. ECGI Law Working Paper No. 83.
Cziraki, P., Renneboog, L. and Szilagyi, P.G., 2010. Shareholder activism through proxy proposals: the European perspective. European Financial Management 16, 738-777.
De Jong, F., Nijman, T., and Roell, A., 1996. Price effects of trading and components of the bid-ask spread on the Paris Bourse, Journal of Empirical Finance 3, 193-213.
Del Guercio, D., and Hawkins, J., 1999. The motivation and impact of pension fund activism. Journal of Financial Economics 52, 293-340.
Del Guercio, D., Seery, L. and Woidtke ,T., 2008. Do boards pay attention when institutional investor activists ‘‘just vote no’’? Journal of Financial Economics 90, 84-103.
Denis, D., and McConnell, J.J., 2003. International corporate governance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38, 1-36.
Djankov, S. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A., 2008. The law and economics of self-dealing. Journal of Financial Economics 88, 430-454.
Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., and Wells, M., 1997. Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms. Journal of Financial Economics 48, pp.35-54.
Ertimur, Y., Ferri, F., and Stubben, S.R., 2010. Board of directors'' responsiveness to shareholders: evidence from shareholder proposals. Journal of Corporate Finance 16, 53-72.
Ertimur, Y., Ferri, F., and Muslu, V., 2011. Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay. Review of Financial Studies 24,535-592.
Fama, E.F., and JenseFerrin, M., 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics 26, 301-325.
Ferri, F., and Sandino, T., 2009. The impact of shareholder activism on financial reporting and compensation: The case of employee stock option expensing. The Accounting Review 84, 433-466.
Gillan, S., and Starks, L., 2000. Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism: the role of institutional investors. Journal of Financial Economics 57, 275-305.
Gillan, S., and Starks, L., 2007. The evolution of shareholder activism in the United States. Working Paper, University of Texas-Austin.
Gordon, L., and Pound, J., 1993. Information, ownership structure and shareholder voting: evidence from shareholder sponsored corporate governance proposals. Journal of Financial Economics 48, 697-718.
Goyal, V.K., and Park, C.W., 2002. Board leadership structure and CEO turnover. Journal of Corporate Finance 8, 49-66.
Guercio, D.D., and Hawkins, J., 1999. The motivation and impact of pension fund activism. Journal of Financial Economics 52, 293-340.
Harris, L., 2003. Trading and exchange, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, Inc.
Harris, M., and Raviv, A., 2010. Control of corporate decisions: Shareholders vs. management. Review of Financial Studies 23,4115-4147.
Hermalin, B., and Weisbach, M., 1988. The determinants of board composition. RAND Journal of Economics, 19: 589-605.
Hermalin, B.E., and Weisbach, M.S., 2003. Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: A survey of the economic literature. Economic Policy Review, 9, 7-26.
Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H., 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360.
Jensen, M.C., 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance 48, 831-880.
Karpoff, J.M., Malatesta, P., and Walking, R., 1996. Corporate governance and shareholder initiatives: empirical evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 42, 365-395.
Karpoff, J.M., 2001. The impact of shareholder activism on target companies: a survey of empirical findings. University of Washington Working Paper.
Kyle, A., 1985. Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica 53, 1315-1335.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishy, R., 1997. Legal determinants of external finance. Journal of Finance 52, 1131-1150.
Lopez-de-Foronda, O, Lopez-Iturriaga, F.J., and Santamaria-Mariscal, M., 2007. Ownership structure, sharing of control and legal framework: international evidence. Corporate Governance: an International Review 15, 1130-1145.
Martin, K.J., and Thomas, R.S., 1999. The effect of shareholder proposals on executive compensation. University of Cincinnati Law Review 67, 1021-1081.
McConnell, J.J., and Servaes, H., 1990. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. Journal of Financial Economics 27, 595-612.
McConnell, J.J., Servaes, H., 1995. Equity ownership and the two faces of debt. Journal of Financial Economics 39, 131-157.
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R., 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: an empirical analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 293-315.
Nesbitt, S.L., 1994. Long-term rewards from shareholder activism: a study of the ‘CalPERS effect’. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 6, 75-80.
Peng, M.W., Buck, T., and Filatotchev, I., 2003, Do outside directors and new managers help improve firm performance? An exploratory study in Russian privatization Original Research Article, Journal of World Business 38, 348-360.
Peterson, P.P., 1989. Event studies: A review of issues and methodology. Quarterly Journal of business and Economics 28, 36-66.
Pi, L., and Timme, S.G., 1993. Corporate control and bank efficiency. Journal of Banking and Finance 17, 515-530.
Prevost, A.K., and Rao, R.P., 2000. Of what value are shareholder proposals sponsored by public pension funds? Journal of Business 73, 177-204.
Prevost, A.K., Rao, R.P., and Williams, M.A., 2008. Labor unions as shareholder activists: champions or detractors? Working paper, Ohio University.
Renneboog, L., and Szilagyi, P.G., 2011. The role of shareholder proposals in corporate governance. Journal of Corporate Finance. forthcoming.
Romano, R, 2001. Less is more: Making institutional investor activism a valuable mechanism of corporate governance. Yale Journal on Regulation 18, 174-251.
Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R.W., 1986. Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 94, 461-488.
Sjostrom, E., 2008. Shareholder activism for corporate social responsibility: what do we know? Sustainable development 16, 141-154.
Smith, M.P., 1996. Shareholder activism by institutional investors: evidence from CalPERS. Journal of Finance 51, 227-252.
Stout, L.A. 2007. The mythical benefits of shareholder control. Virginia Law Review 93, 789-809.
Strickland, D., Wiles,K. W. and Zenner , M., 1996. A requiem for the USA: Is small shareholder monitoring effective? Journal of Financial Economics 40, 319-338.
Thomas, R.S., and Cotter, J.F., 2007. Shareholder proposals in the new millennium: shareholder support, board response, and market reaction. Journal of Corporate Finance 13, 368-391.
Wang, J., 1999. Asymmetric information and the bid-ask spread: an empirical comparison between automated order execution and open outcry auction. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institution and Money 9, 115-128.
Weisbach, M.S., 1988. Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economics 20, 431-460.
White, H., 1980. A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica 48, 817-838.
Woidtke, T., 2002. Agents watching agents? evidence from pension fund ownership and firm value. Journal of Financial Economics 63, 99-131.
Yermack, D., 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics 40, 185-211.
Zattoni, A., and Cuomo, F., 2008. Why adopt codes of good governance? a comparison of institutional and efficiency perspectives. Corporate Governance: An International Review 16, 1-21.