臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

過去研究顯示董事會特性會影響公司承擔風險的程度，但多數研究皆將銀行業視為特殊產業而將其排除在研究樣本之外。然而，正因為銀行業性質特殊，風險管理為其核心要務，更值得深入了解其風險承擔能力與董事會特性間的關係。本研究以代理理論與資源依賴理論的觀點探討董事會特性與銀行風險承擔之關聯性。以2006年至2010年共23家上市銀行為研究樣本，使用銀行業整體適足性指標—資本適足率，做為整體風險承擔能力之衡量標準，並以董事會任期、教育程度、兼任程度、董事會開會次數、董事會持股及董事會規模作為公司治理之代理變數。本研究發現，董事會成員之教育程度愈高、董事會規模愈大、董事兼任程度愈高、董事會任期愈長皆有助於提高銀行資本適足率，降低銀行的風險承擔。

The purpose of this paper is to examine how board characteristics affect the Taiwan banking industry’s risk-taking ability. Based on agency theory and resource dependent theory, we focus on board’s monitoring and resource linking ability, and collect the data sets of 23 banks listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange during 2006-2010. Also, employs the capital adequacy ratio as bank risk-taking ability agency variable. As a result, our study shows the relationship between bank adequacy ratio and board education, board members with multiple appointments, board size and board tenure are positively significantly. These findings provide the evidence that board characteristics can increase banks’ capital adequacy, thus, also help banks enhance their risk-taking ability in some degrees.

目錄
中文摘要 i
ABSTRACT ii
誌謝 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 vi
圖目錄 vii
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景和動機 1
第二節 研究目的 2
第三節 研究流程 2
第貳章 文獻探討 4
第一節 銀行公司治理與董事會功能 4
第二節 資本適足率與銀行風險 8
第三節 董事會特性與銀行風險 10
第參章 研究方法 18
第一節 研究期間與資料來源 18
第二節 變數定義與衡量方式 19
第三節 研究方法與實證模型 24
第肆章 實證結果與分析 26
第一節 敘述性統計分析 26
第二節 相關性分析與共線性檢定 28
第三節 實證結果分析 31
第伍章 結論 33
第一節 研究結論 33
第二節 研究貢獻 35
第三節 管理意涵 36
第四節 研究限制與建議 37
參考文獻 38
附錄 43

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