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研究生:蕭詠仁
論文名稱:雙邊獨佔面臨潛在零售商之定價模型
論文名稱(外文):Pricing Model of Bilateral Monopoly Market when Potential Retailers Exist
指導教授:溫于平溫于平引用關係
指導教授(外文):Wen, Ue-Pyng
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立清華大學
系所名稱:工業工程與工程管理學系
學門:工程學門
學類:工業工程學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2012
畢業學年度:100
論文頁數:59
中文關鍵詞:雙邊獨佔定價策略價格競爭
外文關鍵詞:Bilateral MonopolyPricing StrategiesPricing Competition
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  • 被引用被引用:0
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雙邊獨占的產生可能有許多種原因,其中大多數都跟某些特定關係下的大量投資有關。舉例而言,若有一家供應商的產品是專門為某家特定買主所製造,並且已投入了巨額且不可逆的費用,那麼這兩家上下游廠商的關係就可謂是一種雙邊獨占。然而,這種特定關係在如今激烈競爭的市場中受到了強大的挑戰,技術劇烈的進步以及全球化的浪潮都很可能破壞此種關係的穩定,使得潛在競爭者得以進入該市場以獲取利潤。因此,我們提出了以賽局理論為基礎的模式來處理此種環境下的問題,目的是要替市場中的成員找出最佳的定價策略,藉以極大化各自的利潤。另外,潛在競爭者也可利用本模式作為其決定進入該市場與否的依據。

本研究利用斯塔克柏格價格競爭策略來分析雙邊獨占市場下供應鏈中成員面對潛在下游廠商的定價策略。一開始我們建構了雙邊獨占市場下的供應鏈,其中包括上游的製造商與下游的零售商,接著我們假設潛在下游廠商發現該市場有利可圖後,試圖進入該供應鏈中競爭。利用邊際利益的概念分析,我們可導出在此環境下供應鏈中各成員最佳的定價策略。最後,我們以數據範例來說明本模式的進行步驟,並且藉由該範例的結果對本模式的特性進行討論。

Bilateral monopoly may result from many reasons which usually involve relationship specific investment. For example, one supplier’s product is specially made for one specific buyer with irreversible expenditure. This investment might be established by money, efforts, or time, and have almost no value outside the relationship. However, when market competition becomes more intense due to globalization and technical advances, the relationship might be broken. Potential entrants will attempt to enter the market because there is above-normal profit. Hence, we propose a game-theoretic model to describe this circumstance. The objective is to find optimal pricing policies maximize their profit of all the members in the market in this environment. Also, potential retailers can determine their entry strategies by this thesis.

In this thesis, we analyze the problem by Stackelburg price competition model, which includes one supply chain system in the bilateral monopoly market in the beginning, and then several potential retailers will decide to enter the market because they estimate that there is enough return of investment to achieve their target. The optimal pricing policies of all the members in the supply chain system will be derived base on the marginal revenue function. Furthermore, we also introduce numerical examples of the problem and discuss some features of this thesis.

Abstract 1
Table of Content iii
List of Figures v
List of Tables vi
Chapter 1. Introduction 1
1.1 Background 1
1.2 Motivation 2
Chapter 2. Literature Review 5
2.1 Competitive Market in Two-level Channels 6
2.2 Bilateral Monopoly 7
2.3 Entry Barrier 8
2.4 Overage and Shortage Cost 9
Chapter 3. Model Construction 11
3.1 Problem Statement 11
3.2 Problem Assumptions and Restrictions 11
3.3 Bilateral Monopoly 13
3.3.1 Notation 13
3.3.2 Model Description 13
3.3.3 Model Formulation 14
3.4 One Manufacturer vs. Two Retailers 15
3.4.1 Notation 16
3.4.2 Model Description 16
3.4.3 Model Formulation 17
3.5 One Manufacturer vs. Multiple Retailers 18
3.5.1 Model Description 19
3.5.2 Model Formulation 19
3.6 Bilateral Monopoly Market with Uncertain Demand 20
3.6.1 Notation 21
3.6.2 Model Description 22
3.6.3 Model Formulation 22
3.7 One Manufacturer vs. Two Retailers under Uncertain Demand 24
3.7.1 Notation 24
3.7.2 Model Formulation 25
3.8 One Manufacturer vs. n Retailers under Uncertain Demand 27
3.8.1 Model Formulation 28
Chapter 4. Numerical Analysis 35
4.1 Bilateral Monopoly 35
4.2 One Manufacturer vs. Two Retailers 37
4.3 One Manufacturer vs. Multiple Retailers 40
4.4 Market under Uncertain Demand 43
4.5 Parameters Analysis under Uncertain Demand 47
Chapter 5. Conclusion 54
References 56

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