隨著資訊科技不斷進步，網際網路時代的來臨，使得企業透過電子商務的應用，可以將產品與服務資訊傳遞給全世界的網路使用者，並縮短以往繁複的交易流程；其中，零售機制在網際網路上的應用可說是當下重要的管理議題之一，在部分零售與旅遊相關行業中，網路共同零售商如Priceline的使用更是備受業界與學界的矚目與討論；這種銷售「不透明資訊產品」(opaque product)的全新通路策略，其最主要特色為所銷售產品具有不確定性且價格較低廉，主要目標客群則為價格敏感度高的消費者。而服務提供廠商如航空公司為了提升其本身的競爭優勢，則是試圖透過店內廣告的設置，迎合消費者的偏好並建立企業本身正面的品牌形象，本研究主要是以賽局理論模型探討網路共同零售機制背後的價格歧視功能，並加入服務提供廠商投資店內廣告對於消費者願付價格的衝擊效應，藉由分析模型，本研究發現在大多數行銷情境中，店內展示廣告的出現可以提升消費者願付價格的情況下，廠商會更有誘因去執行網路共同零售商機制；而僅有少數行銷環境中，廠商會選擇投資店內展示廣告並放棄使用網路共同零售商機制。另外，本研究亦發現店內展示廣告的出現會改變廠商現有之通路結構，進而影響廠商之定價策略，並能夠有效減緩服務提供廠商之間的價格競爭。我們希望透過此研究可以提供給予對網路共同零售商與店內廣告有興趣之學者與行銷人士管理實務上可用之建言。

In the tourism and some retail industries, the online common agency such as Priceline has attracted much attention from both marketers and researchers. This kind of new channel sells opaque products which contains limited product information and may intend to serve only those price-sensitive segments. In order to compete with the others in the industry, service providers (i.e., airlines) tend to redesign their in-store display advertising to fit consumer’s preference much better and to create the image differentiation. In this paper, we try to not only capture the price discrimination effect behind the online common agency but also consider the impact of in-store display advertising invested by service providers. We build a game-theoretic model where service providers can decide to invest on either the online common agency or their own websites and consider whether to launch in-store display advertising. By analyzing this model, we find that in the most marketing circumstance, the presence of the in-store display advertising which could enhance the valuation of consumers, service providers would have more incentives to use the online common agency mechanism. Besides, only in few marketing circumstance, service providers would invest in in-store display advertising without using the OCA mechanism. We find that the emergence of in-store display advertising would change service provider’s channel structure and thereby affect their pricing strategy. Moreover, we show that in-store display advertising could mitigate the price competition among service providers. We hope this study can provide some suggestions for marketers who are interested in the impact of the online common agency and in-store display advertising.

Abstract in Chinese …………………………………….………I
Abstract …..……………………………………………………II
Contents ………………………………………………………III
1 Introduction …………………………………………………1
2 Literature Review …………………………………………7
2.1 The Opaque Selling …………………………………7
2.2 The Name-Your-Own-Price Mechanism ……………9
2.3 The In-Store Display Advertising ……………………11
3 The Base Model …………………………………………13
4 Results…………..…………………………………………16
4.1 Case 1 ………………….……………….……………20
4.2 Case 2 ………………………….……….……………37
4.3 The Comparison of Case 1 &; Case 2 …………………56
4.4 Case 3 ………………………………….……………59
4.5 Case 4 ……………………………………………….86
5 Conclusion ………………………………………………104
5.1 Concluding Remarks ………………………………104
5.2 Contributions and Managerial Implications ………107
5.3 Research Limits &; Future Directions ………………110
Reference ……………………………………………………111
Appendix ……………………………………………………115

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