臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

學者陸續證明市場競爭是一種公司治理機制，能減緩股東與投資人間的代理問題，且可使經理人發放公司多餘的現金。然而過去研究的重心大多在經理人與少數股權間，但對股權結構高度集中的東亞國家來說，代理問題主要在控制股權及少數股權間，故為本研究的重心。本研究並檢驗高度市場競爭與股權集中程度之交互作用對股利支付的影響，進而分析市場競爭是否減緩控制股權及少數股權間之代理問題。研究結果顯示：處在較競爭的產業之公司傾向支付較多的股利。此外，控制股東與少數股東的代理問題與現金股利呈負相關，而高度市場競爭減緩此種代理問題。總言之，本研究提供市場競爭對股利支付影響的直接證據，支持"市場競爭為有效公司治理機制"的論點，市場競爭為降低投資人利益被侵害的解決方法之一。

Researchers have shown that product market competition is an effective governance mechanism that can mitigate agency problems and force managers to distribute excess cash to investors. However, prior studies largely emphasize on the agency problems between managers and shareholders. In Eastern Asia, the agency problems spawn between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders because of the highly concentrated ownership. Thus, I focus on such agency problems and test the effect of the interaction between product market competition and ownership structure to investigate whether product market competition curbs the agency problems. I find that firms in more competitive industries pay out more dividends. Additionally, this study shows a negative association between agency problems and dividends payouts. The impact of agency problems on dividends payouts is weaker in highly competitive industries. My study provides direct evidence on the impact of product market competition on dividends payouts. It supports the argument of "effective governance mechanism" from product market competition, and suggests that product market competition is a way to protect minority investors from expropriation by controlling shareholders.

目錄
中文摘要 I
英文摘要 II
目錄 III
圖目錄 IV
表目錄 IV
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景及動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究架構 4
第二章 文獻探討 6
第一節 代理理論 6
第二節 現金股利與代理問題 8
第三節 產品市場競爭與股利 12
第三章 研究方法 16
第一節 假說建立 16
第二節 樣本選取與資料來源 18
第三節 模型建立 19
第四節 變數衡量 22
第四章 實證結果分析 29
第一節 敘述性統計分析 29
第二節 相關性分析 32
第三節 迴歸分析 34
第五章 結論與建議 38
參考文獻 40

 
圖目錄
圖《1.1》研究流程圖 5

表目錄
表《3. 1》樣本選取過程表 18
表《3. 2》民國90年至民國99年間各產業觀測值 19
表《3. 3》Shepherd (1990)對市場類型的分類 23
表《3. 4》變數定義表 28
表《4. 1》全部樣本各變數之敘述性統計分析 30
表《4. 2》HHI值敘述性統計量表 31
表《4. 3》皮爾森相關係數分析 33
表《4. 4》市場競爭對股利支付率的影響 36
表《4. 5》高度市場競爭與股權集中度交互作用後對股利支付率之影響 37

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