臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究以樣本期間2000年8月9日至2011年9月30日止，國內宣告購回庫藏股之上市公司為研究對象，探討股權結構、董事會組成相關變數對於公司宣告購回庫藏股後不同期間的平均累計異常報酬之影響。實證結果發現：
一、與股權結構有關變數中，可發現內部人持股比例、外國機構投資人持股與公司宣告購回庫藏股後二、五、十個交易日內之平均異常報酬率的均呈正向關係。
二、董事會組成相關變數中，除董事會規模於與平均累計異常報酬在宣告後兩日有顯著正向關係，獨立董事人數宣告日後二十、四十個交易日對於平均累計異常報酬有顯著負向關係，其餘各事件窗期中董事會組成相關變數均不顯著。
三、無論是股權結構或董事會組成相關變數對於公司宣告購回庫藏股後不同期間的平均累計異常報酬之影響，發現除宣告後二、五個交易日有較為顯著之影響，其他事件窗期影響程度並顯著分別。

This study examines the impact of ownership structure and board composition on the market reaction to the share repurchase announcement from 2000 to 2011 in Taiwan. There are five terms of the cumulative abnormal return to the market reaction: 2 days, 5 day, 10 days, 20 days, and 40 days after the share repurchase announcement. The results are as following:
1.The firms with higher insider shareholding or foreign institutional investor shareholding have a significant positive impact on the share repurchase announcement. The impact last about 20 days after the share repurchase announcement.
2.The board size of the firms is significant positive to the market reaction and the impact only persists 2 days after the share repurchase announcement. However, independent directors are negative to the market reaction.
3.Ownership structure and board composition only affect the terms of 2 days or 5 days. There is no impact on the other terms of cumulative abnormal return to the market reaction.

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 2
第三節 研究架構 2
第二章 文獻探討 3
第一節 股權結構與公司經營績效 3
第二節 董事會結構與公司經營績效 4
第三節 外國機構投資人與公司經營績效 5
第三章 研究設計與方法 8
第一節 事件研究法 8
第二節 研究方法 10
第三節 樣本選取與資料來源 12
第四節 變數定義 13
第四章 實證結果與分析 16
第一節 敘述統計量 16
第二節 庫藏股宣告效果 17
第三節 迴歸分析 19
第五章 結論 21
參考文獻 23
附錄 26

一、中文部分
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二、英文部分
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