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研究生:陳佳函
研究生(外文):Chan Chia Han
論文名稱:政商關係與機構法人持股之研究-以台灣上市公司為例
論文名稱(外文):The relationship between political connection and institutional ownership in Taiwanese firms
指導教授:郭逸真郭逸真引用關係
口試委員:林翠蓉楊麗香
口試日期:101/7/17
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:聖約翰科技大學
系所名稱:企業管理系碩士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2012
畢業學年度:100
語文別:中文
論文頁數:54
中文關鍵詞:政商關係機構法人公司治理
外文關鍵詞:corporate governancepolitical connectionsinstitutional ownership
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:1
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  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:19
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
企業因政商關係緊密,可穩定企業成長,但亦有企業因政商關係緊密,致使公司面對較高的政治風險,進而影響機構法人投資意願。因此,如何建立政商關係並吸引機構法人投資,儼然成為企業須深思的課題。
本研究以1988年至2008年底為研究期間,台灣811家上市上櫃公司為研究對象,分析各公司是否具有政商關係,再使用迴歸分析法驗證政商關係的良好程度是否影響機構法人投資意願,以及公司財務特性與公司治理機制是否影響政商關係與機構法人持股之關聯性。
研究結果發現,政商關係越緊密,則機構法人持股越高。且營收成長率愈高,將增強政商關係與機構法人持股之關係。負債比率愈高,則減低政商關係與機構法人持股之關係。在公司治理變數方面,則顯示董事會規模越大的公司會促使機構法人較願進行投資活動。然而,董事會規模越大且政商關係越強之企業,則導致機構法人較不願從事投資。此外,董事長兼任總經理之公司會減低機構法人投資意願,同時,政商關係良好且董事長兼任總經理之企業,機構法人之持股較低。因此,本研究發現政商關係與機構法人之持股之關係,極具公司治理意涵。

Firms with political connections usually increase firm value. Political connection frequently cause higher political risk, thereby affecting the investment behavior of institutional portfolio managers.
In this study, the sample period is 1988 to 2008. I collect 811 listed companies in Taiwan as the sample. I analyze companies with political connection, and then using regression analysis to investigate whether the level of institutional stockholdings is an increasing function of the intension of political connections. I also explore both financial characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms how to affect the relevance of political connection with institutional ownership.
The results show a positive relationship between political connection and institutional ownership. The high revenue growth rate strengthens the relationship between political connection and institutional ownership; however, the high debt ratio reduces the relationship between political connection and institutional ownership. The large board size leads to the high institutional ownership. However, firms with both larger board size and stronger political connection are usually reluctant to engage in institutional investment. In addition, the company with CEO duality reduces the investment willingness of institutions. Therefore, this study finds that the relationship between political connection and institutional ownership implies corporate governance.

論 文 摘 要 I
ABSTRACT II
表次 V
圖次 VI
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 章節安排 3
第二章 文獻探討與研究假說 4
第一節 公司治理 4
第二節 政商關係 9
第三節 政商關係與公司治理 12
第四節 機構法人持股 14
第五節 政商關係與機構法人持股關係之研究假說 17
第參章 研究設計與方法 21
第一節 研究對象與期間 21
第二節 變數定義與衡量 22
第三節 統計方法 26
第四節 研究架構圖 27
第肆章 實證分析 29
第一節 政商關係之法人持股比率平均值的變動 29
第二節 政商關係與產業分析 31
第三節 敘述性統計 34
第四節 t檢定 36
第五節 皮爾森相關係數 40
第六節 迴歸分析 43
第伍章 結論與建議 47
參考文獻 49
中文 49
英文 51

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