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研究生:李函叡
研究生(外文):Lee, Hanjui
論文名稱:台灣銀行業公司治理與股利政策關係之研究
論文名稱(外文):The Relationship Between Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy in Taiwanese Banking Industry
指導教授:劉永欽劉永欽引用關係
指導教授(外文):Liu, Yongchin
口試委員:劉永欽陳香如歐仁和
口試委員(外文):Liu, YongchinChen, XiangruOu, Renhe
口試日期:2012-07-23
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:亞洲大學
系所名稱:財務金融學系碩士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2012
畢業學年度:100
語文別:中文
論文頁數:60
中文關鍵詞:公司治理股利政策成長機會資本適足性
外文關鍵詞:corporate governancedividend policygrowth opportunitycapital adequacy
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本研究旨在探討台灣銀行業在資本適足性之要求下,公司治理與股利政策的關係,並考量成長機會與股利政策之關係是否受到治理機制強弱之影響。實證結果顯示,股利政策若就金額大小言,當董事會規模愈小、內部人持股愈高,則股利金額愈大,但內部人持股水準偏高時,股利反而減少。其餘治理機制,即獨立董監、機構法人持股及股份盈餘權偏離差,都不會顯著影響股利金額。再者,董事會規模愈小、內部人持股和獨立董監事比例越高 (表示治理較佳),則成長機會與股利之正相關程度會降低,意味對高成長公司,這三種治理機制會替代股利本身具有的部份治理效果。故治理機制與股利金額之關係,在成長機會不同的公司間具有差異。
股利政策若就是否發放股利言,內部人持股之影響仍與對股利金額的影響相同,即當內部人持股愈高,發放股利可能性愈高,但持股率高到一定水準,股利發放可能性會降低。機構法人持股與股份盈餘偏離差所表示的治理機制愈佳,反而股利發放可能性愈低。故不同治理機制對於股利發放可能性之影響並不相同。再者,只有內部人持股會顯著影響股利與公司成長機會之正相關,但為正向影響;換言之,成長機會較高的公司,內部人持股未達到偏高水準時,持股增加則股利發放可能性也提高,但發放金額會減少。

This study aims to examine the relationship between corporate governance and dividend policy for Taiwanese banks under capital adequacy requirements. Also, this study considers the effect of corporate governance on the relationship between firm growth opportunities and dividend policies. The empirical results indicate that in terms of dividend amount as a policy, when there is a decrease in director board size and increase in insider’s ownership, dividend amount will boost, but if insider’s ownership is at a higher level, the dividend amount will decrease. The other governance mechanisms, that is, independent director fraction, institutional investor ownership, and share-earnings bias, do not significantly affect dividend amount. Moreover, a lower director board size, higher insider ownership and higher independent director fraction can reduce the positive relationship between growth opportunities and dividend amount. This situation indicates that for banks with high growth opportunities, the three governance mechanisms can replace part of the governance effects of the dividend policy. Thus, there is a difference in the governance-dividend relation between firms with different growth opportunities.
In terms of whether paying dividends as a policy, the effect of insider’s ownership is still the same as that on the dividend amount policy. That is, a higher insider ownership will increase the probability of paying dividends.
However, when the insider ownership reaches a certain (high) level, there is a decrease in the probability of the dividend payout. Additionally, the better the governances measured as the institutional investor ownership and share-earnings bias, the lower the possibility of the dividend paying. Therefore, there is a gap in the effects of different governance mechanisms on the possibility of the dividend payout. Moreover, only the insider ownership significantly affects the positive relationship between the dividend payout possibility and bank growth opportunities, but the effect is positive. Namely, for banks with higher growth opportunities, when their insider ownerships are not at the high levels, the larger the ownerships, the higher the probability of paying dividends, but the less the dividend amounts.
誌謝..............................................I
中文摘要..........................................II
英文摘要......................................... III
表目錄.......................................... VII
圖目錄..........................................VIII
第一章 緒論........................................1
第一節 研究動機與目的................................1
第二節 研究限制.....................................3
第三節 研究流程.....................................3
第二章 文獻回顧.....................................6
第一節 銀行公司治理與股利政策的重要性...................6
第二節 銀行公司治理對股利政策的影響.....................8
第三節 銀行公司治理對成長機會與股利政策關係的影響.........11
第三章 研究設計.....................................13
第一節 樣本資料.....................................13
第二節 實證方法.....................................16
第四章 實證結果.....................................23
第一節 敘述統計分析..................................23
第二節 迴歸變數之相關係數矩陣..........................29
第三節 單變量迴歸分析結果.............................31
第四節 複迴歸分析結果................................38
第五章 結論........................................43
參考文獻...........................................45
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二、英文部分
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