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研究生:林品萱
研究生(外文):Lin, Pinshiuan
論文名稱:投保董監事責任險對於過度投資行為之影響
論文名稱(外文):Dose The Purchasing Of Directors’ And Officers’ Liability Insurance Enhance Or Mitigate A Firm’s Overinvestment
指導教授:陳家偉陳家偉引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chen, Chiawei
口試委員:曾耀鋒蕭慧玲陳家偉
口試委員(外文):Tseng, YaofengShiau, HueilingChen, Chiawei
口試日期:2012-06-27
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:東海大學
系所名稱:財務金融學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2012
畢業學年度:100
語文別:英文
論文頁數:33
中文關鍵詞:董監事責任險過度投資
外文關鍵詞:Directors’ and officers’ liability insuranceOverinvestment
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:2
  • 點閱點閱:445
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:46
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
近年來有鑑於財務危機的發生,政府、企業甚至是投資人更應關注於經理人之管理行為,致使公司治理層面的相關性議題逐漸受到重視。在企業訴訟案件日漸頻繁以及投資人求償意識抬頭的趨勢下,董監事責任險的推動主要在於保障投資人的權益和股東財富。透過國內於 2008 年起上市櫃企業投保訊息之揭露,本研究遂以台灣相對較完整的樣本資料進行研究,藉由此尚未被觸及的議題,探討董監事責任險對於公司治理所扮演的角色:企業的投資行為是否因投保董事責任險與否而有所差異;藉由此保險之另一個新的角度來檢驗董事責任險之投保對於企業投資決策的影響。本研究經實證結果顯示,企業購置董監事責任險下,確實能顯著地降低公司過度投資的情形;因此,本文除了對於董監事責任險之購置提供了一個新的利基點之外,亦有利於政府對於強制企業公佈投保情形政策之推動。
Since financial crisis has become a critical issue,no matter government or firms and even investors should be pay more attention on managerial behavior.Therefore,directors and officers should be liable for the corporation misconducts.Directors’and officers’liability insurance is designed to protect directors and shareholder wealth. With publicly available and relatively complete dataset of listed firms in Taiwan in which the information of directors’liability insurance is disclosed since 2008,in this paper,we attempt to revisit the role ofdirectors’ and officers’ liability insurance through a topic that has not been explored.In particular,we suspect the firms’investment decision-making process could be differential in firms with and without the adoption of this insurance.We examine the effect of directors’and officers’liability insurance on firms’ overinvestment decision.The empirical evidence indicates that firms have adoption of directors’and officers’liability insurance experience significantly lower the firms’overinvestment.Therefore,this paper could provide new evidence to appreciate the adoption of the directors’ and officers’ liability insurance and help to evaluate the policy of mandatorily disclose the information of directors’ liability insurance as well.
Contents

1. Introduction...............................................1
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development ..............5
3. Methodology ...............................................9
3.1 Variables .............................................9
3.2 Sample and Data .....................................12
4.Empirical Result ..........................................13
4.1 Univariate Analysis .....................................13
4.2 Multivariate Analyse.....................................16
4.3 Robustness Tests ........................................18
5. Summary and Conclusion ...................................22
References ..................................................24
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