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研究生:王吉崇
研究生(外文):Wang,Ji-Chong
論文名稱:公司風險承受度與經理人固守職位關係之研究
論文名稱(外文):The Relation Between Corporate Risk Taking And Managerial Entrenchment
指導教授:詹家昌詹家昌引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chan,Chia-Chung
口試委員:詹家昌李春安林丙輝張永和
口試委員(外文):Chan,Chia-ChungLi,Chun-AnLin, Bing-HueiChang,Yung-Ho
口試日期:2012-06-28
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:東海大學
系所名稱:財務金融學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2012
畢業學年度:100
語文別:中文
論文頁數:35
中文關鍵詞:風險承受度固守職位銀行往來關係
外文關鍵詞:Risk takingManagerial EntrenchmentBank Relationships
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:5
  • 點閱點閱:303
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:8
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
本文研究目的是透過經理人異動的觀點,觀察經理人是否會採用銀行往來關係的策略,以固守本身的職位。由於過去文獻強調風險是經理人固守職位考慮下相當重要的因素,因此本文將透過公司風險承受度來檢視經理人固守職位與銀行往來關係是否有關。實證結果發現經理人是否能夠固守職位與公司的風險程度有顯著的關係,經理人為了本身利益將採取降低公司的風險承受度。在固守職位與公司風險承受度關連的研究方面,本文發現年資愈長,經理人承受風險的程度愈小;而當經理人兼任董事長或持股比率愈高,其愈能承受較高的公司風險,且隨著公司風險增加,經理人異動率也會隨之提高。因多重銀行往來關係的企業與銀行間存在較高的資訊不對稱問題,公司面臨財務困境的危機較低,經理人較易鞏固本身職位。本文除了發現在多重銀行下,公司有較高的風險承受度外,亦發現經理人異動後的公司風險承受度下降幅度,比無多重銀行關係的企業小,此結果顯示經理人有採取多重銀行往來關係策略以鞏固自身職位安全的可能性。
The purpose of our research is to review whether managers will adopt a strategy which called bank relationships to do entrenchment via the aspect of changing the manager. Owing to the past literatures emphasize that corporate risk is an important factor when managers consider entrenchment. Therefore, our research will investigate the relationship between managerial entrenchment and bank relationships through the perspective of corporate risk taking. Empirical evidences proved that there is a significant relationship between managerial entrenchment and risk taking of firms. Managers have incentives to lower risk taking of firms for their own benefit. In the empirical investigation about the relation between managerial entrenchment and risk taking, we have found out that the more serving years at one firm, the less risk taking of managers. When the managers are also as the board of directors or they have higher holding stock ratio in company, then they can take higher risks. Due to the increasing risks for firms, the turnover rate of mangers will increase. In addition, because the firms which have multiple bank relations will exist higher asymmetric information, firms will face lower financial risks, and managers will become more easier to do entrenchment. Our research not only discovered that firms will have higher risk taking under multiple bank relations, but also discovered the decline range of risk taking after change managers will smaller than the firms which didn’t have multiple bank relations. The result shows the possibilities that managers will use the strategy of multiple bank relations to do managerial entrenchment.
壹、緒論                1
貳、相關文獻回顧            6
 一、固守職位相關文獻         6
 二、風險承擔相關文獻         8
 三、銀行往來相關文獻         9
參、研究方法              11
 一、樣本選取             11
 二、銀行往來關係之定義        11
 三、風險承受度之衡量         11
 四、經理人固守職位之衡量       12
 五、建立公司風險承受度與固守職位關係 13
 六、控制變數的說明          13
肆、實證結果與分析           15
伍、結論                29

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