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研究生:陳天健
研究生(外文):Tien-chien Chen
論文名稱:賽局理論應用於台灣高鐵BOT案之策略研究
論文名稱(外文):A Study on Game Theory Apply to THSR BOT Project Strategy
指導教授:王隆昌王隆昌引用關係林佑正
指導教授(外文):Lung-Chuang WangYu-Cheng Lin
口試委員:曾惠斌林國顯王明德吳澤成徐淵靜林志棟
口試委員(外文):H. Ping TserngKuo-Shian LinMing-Teh WangTse-Cheng WuYuan-Ching HsuJyh-Dong Lin
口試日期:2012-01-14
學位類別:博士
校院名稱:國立臺北科技大學
系所名稱:工程科技研究所
學門:工程學門
學類:材料工程學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2012
畢業學年度:100
語文別:中文
論文頁數:94
中文關鍵詞:BOT重新談判挾持問題賽局理論
外文關鍵詞:BOTrenegotiationhold-up problemGame TheoryRubinstein bargaining model.
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:8
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  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:2
BOT專案常因契約的不確定性,機會主義(opportunism)開發商會利用資訊非對稱因素,以“投機行為”的行動和“有限理性” 的認知下出高價贏得標案,事後又藉著長期外部的變動,以代理困境(agency dilemma)優勢立場要求重新談判(renegotiation)變更契約條件,此舉讓政府陷入挾持問題(hold- up problem),因而有參加投資、收購、貸款保證及利息補貼---等付出,這些引起人民對此結果巨大的不滿。本研究根據賽局理論(Game Theory)模型以台灣高速鐵路BOT專案為案例,分析該案在進行各階段,開發商如何在投標、變更契約條件時,運用不同策略創造持續競爭優勢;2007年該專案面臨嚴重的財務困境,本研究先以台灣高速鐵路開始營運後的財務資料,用現金流量折現(Discounted Cash Flow, DCF)法模擬計算出專案淨現值(Net Present Value, NPV)為-421,741,890 仟元,其專案價值已跌至「深度價外」(profound out-the-money),經政府與開發商以「競合」(Co-opetition)關係重新談判,發現需採取「合作」(cooperation)策略且需在2011年前必須解決問題,雙方才能獲得最適當的報酬;繼以魯賓斯坦討價還價模型(Rubinstein bargaining model)為原則,實驗修正其壓力因子,建構出有限理性(bounded rationality)最佳討價還價區域(best bargaining area)為依據,評估後認為需在2009~2010年二年內以(即27,203,236.~10,881,294.仟元)之間談妥價格,由TH放棄專案由G保證收購HR資產,為解決財務困境的最佳方案。

Uncertainty in a contract for some BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) projects may allow an opportunistic developer to take advantage of information asymmetrical factors, long-term external changes, and agency dilemma to request renegotiation and to alter the contract after it has been awarded. Such requests often entrap the government in hold-up problems and result in improper payments to the developers and may even create general public dissatisfaction with a project. In this paper, the Game Theory model is used to analyze the Taiwan High Speed Railroad project to examine how developers implement different strategies at the various stages of a project as well as alter the conditions of the contract in order to continually create competitive advantage after they have been awarded the contract. In 2007, this project developer was facing serious financial difficulties. In this study, the financial information on the Taiwan High Speed Railroad operations was used as the foundation for conducting a simulation to calculate the project’s value by means of Discounted Cash Flow(DCF) after this project began operation. It turned out to be -NT$421,741,890 of Net Present Value (NPV). In a word, the value of this project fell in profound out-the-money. The government, thereby, could not but renegotiate with the developer through coopetition, finding that all the problems should be solved through cooperation by the end of 2011. The results will serve as reference to the best decision-making strategy for renegotiating costs in competition or cooperation. Also, this study will go on to alter the pressure factor in Rubinstein bargaining model to form the best bargaining area of bounded rationality. After this evaluation, the final price should be settled (NT$27,203,236,000 ~ NT$10,881,294,000)in two years (2009 ~ 2010). In the long run, TH is supposed to abandon this project and G has no choice but to purchase the estate of HR, which is the most appropriate solution of the finance dilemma.

目錄

摘 要 I
ABSTRACT I
表目錄 V
圖目錄 VI
第一章 緒論 1
1.1 研究背景與動機 1
1.2 研究目的 2
1.3 研究範圍 3
1.4 研究方法 4
1.5 研究限制 4
1.6 研究流程 5
第二章 文獻回顧 9
2.1 BOT相關文獻 9
2.1.1 BOT基本介紹 9
2.1.2 BOT管理問題 11
2.1.3 HR-BOT案例說明 15
2.2競合策略介紹 19
2.3 賽局理論介紹 20
2.4 納許均衡 27
2.5賽局理論應用於BOT專案 29
第三章 投標策略 30
3.1競爭模型 30
3.2競爭賽局 31
3.3投標賽局 32
3.4 BOT投標機制 37
3.5 HR投標策略 38
3.5.1投標價值 39
3.5.2 投標競合 50
3.5.3 投標測試 51
3.6小結 52
第四章 談判策略 54
4.1談判的定義 54
4.2談判賽局 55
4.3 HR談判策略 56
4.3.1保證價值 57
4.3.2 保證競合 57
4.3.3保證談判測試 58
4.3.4 收購價值 59
4.3.5收購競合 61
4.3.6收購談判測試 64
4.4 小結 67
第五章 討價還價策略 69
5.1討價還價賽局 69
5.2 RUBINSTEIN修正模型建構 73
5.2.1理論與實驗 73
5.2.2 模型建構 77
5.3 HR討價還價策略 79
5.3.1討價還價價值 79
5.3.2討價還價競合 80
5.3.3討價還價測試 80
5.4 小結 82
第六章 結論與建議 83
6.1 結論 83
6.2 建議 84
參考文獻 86



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