|
參考文獻
[1]Aaken, A., International Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract Theory Analysis, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 16(2), pp483-512, 2009.
[2]Abhinay Muthoo., Bargaining Theory with Applications, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999,
[3]Alexander, J. McKenzie., Evolutionary Explanations of Distributive Justice, Philosophy of Science, 67, pp490-516, 2000.
[4]Alvin, E. R.and Ido, E., Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term, Games and Economic Behavior ,8, pp164—212, 1993.
[5]Aneta, K, and Ewa, S., Public Private Partnership and Game Theory, Journal on Agricultural Economics, 2(51), issue 19, 2008
[6]Antoine Augustin Cournot., Researches on the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth, 1838.
[7]Ashuri, B., Kashani, H., Molenaar, K. R., and Lee, S., A Valuation Model for Choosing the Optimal Minimum Revenue Guarantee (MRG) in a Highway Project: A Real-Option Approach, Construction Research Congress, Banff, Canada: Alberta, pp1244-1253, 2010.
[8]Athias, L. and Nunez, A., The More the Merrier? Number of Bidders, Information Dispersion, Renegotiation and Winner''s Curse in Toll Road Concessions, MPRA Working Paper Series, 2009.
[9]Aumann, R., Acceptable Points in General Cooperative N-Person Games, Princeton University Press, 1959.
[10]Aumann, R., Values of Non-Atomic Games, Princeton University Press, 1968.
[11]Bahry, D. L. and Wilson, R. K., Confusion or Fairness in The Field? Rejections in The Ultimatum Game Under the Strategy Method, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 60 , pp37–54, 2006.
[12]Barraclough, D.J., Conroy, M.L. and Lee, D., Prefrontal Cortex and Decision making in A Mixed-Strategy Game, Nat Neurosci, 7, pp404-414, 2004.
[13]Barry, B., The Tactical Use of Emotion in Negotiation, In R. J. Bies, R. J.Lewicki, and B. H. Sheppard (eds.), Research on Negotiation in Organizations.Vol. 7. Stamford, Conn.: JAI Press, 1999.
[14]Barney, J., Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage, Journal of Management, 17, pp99-120, 1991.
[15]Bengtsson, M. and Kock, S., Coopetition in Business Networks to Cooperate and Compete Simultaneously, Industrial Marketing Management, 29(5), pp411-426, 2000.
[16]Bent, F. in association with COWI., Procedures for Dealing with Optimism Bias in Transport Planninh: Guidance Document, London: UK Department for Transport Press. 2004.
[17]Blaise Pasca,MacTutor History of Mathematics archive, University of St Andrews, http://www-history.mcs.st-andrews.ac.uk/Biographies/Pascal.html.
[18]Brandenburger, A. M. and Nalebuff, B., The Right Game: Use Game Theory to Shape Strategy, Harvard Business Review, 1995.
[19]Brandenburger, A. M. and Nalebuff, B.., Co-opetition: A Revolution Mindset That Combines Competition and Cooperation: The Game Theory Strategy That''s Changing the Game of Business, ISBN 0-385-47950-6,1996.
[20]Butt A.N., Choi J.N. and Jaeger A., The Effects of Self-Emotion, Counterpart Emotion, and Counterpart Behavior on Negotiator Behavior: A Comparison of Individual-Level and Dyad-Level Dynamics, Journal of Organizational Behavior, 26(6), pp681 – 704, 2005.
[21]Butt, A. N., Negative Emotions, Perceptions, Behaviour, and Outcomes: An Emotions Based Negotiation Model, International Association of Conflict Management (IACM) 2001st Proceedings, Paris, France, on June 24-27, 2001.
[22]Camerer, C. F., and Thaler, R. H., Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners, Journal of
Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, 9(2), 1995.
[23]Capen, E.C., R.V. Clapp, and W.M. Campbell., Competitive Bidding in High-Risk Situations, Journal of Petroleum Technology, 23, pp641-53, 1971.
[24]Charles, W. L. H., Cooperation, Opportunism, and the Invisible Hand: Implications for Transaction Cost Theory, Academy of Management Review, 15(3), pp500-513, 1990.
[25]Cheung, E., Chan, A. P. C.and Kajewski, S., The Public Sector’s Perspective on Procuring Public Works Projects - Comparing the Views of Practitioners in Hong Kong and Australia, Journal of Civil Engineering and Management, 16(1), pp19-32, 2010.
[26]Child, J. and Faulkner, D., Strategies of Cooperation: Managing Alliances, Networks, and Joint Ventures, Oxford University Press, 1998.
[27]Claus, S. and Joachim, W., Unions and innovative activity in Germany, Journal of Labor Research, 13(4), pp393-406, 1992.
[28]Colin, Camerer. and Teck-Hua, Ho.,Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games, Econometrica, 67(4), pp827-874, 1999.
[29]Cournot, A. A., Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth 1838, With an essay, Cournot and mathematical economics and a Bibliography of mathematical economics, Book from the collections of : Harvard University, 1971.
[30]Dahlstrom, R. and Nygaard, A., Ownership decisions in plural contractual systems: Twelve networks from the quick service restaurant industry, European Journal of Marketing, 33(1/2), pp59-87, 1999a.
[31]Dahlstrom, R. and Nygaard, A., An Empirical Investigation of Ex Post Transaction Costs in Franchised Distribution Channel, Journal of Marketing Research, 36(2), pp 160-170, 1999b.
[32]Dewatripont, M., Commitment through Renegotiation-Proof Contracts with Third Parties, Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, 55(3), pp377-89, 1988.
[33]Drucker, P. F., The Practice of Management, Harper & Row, pp iii, 1954
[34]Dorris, M.C. and Glimcher, P.W., Activity in Posterior Parietal Cortex is Correlated with the Subjective Desireability of an Action, Neuron, 44, pp365-378, 2004.
[35]Dyer Jeffrey H. and Singh Harbir.,The Relational View: Cooperative Strategy and Sources of Interorganizational Competitive Advantage, The Academy of Management Review, 23(4), pp660-679, 1998.
[36]Ellingsen, T. and Johannesson, M., Promises, Threats and Fairness, Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, 114(495), pp397-420, 2004.
[37]Erev, I. and Barron, G., On adaptation, maximization, and reinforcement learning cognitive strategies, Psychological Review,112(4), pp912-931, 2005.
[38]Fares, M., Renegotiation Design and Contract Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem, Journal of Economic Surveys, 20(5), pp731-756, 2006.
[39]Fisher, R., Ury, W. and Patton, B., Getting to Yes: negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, Second Edition. New York: Penguin Books. 1991.
[40]Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J. L., N.E. Savin, N.E.and Martin, S., , Fairness in simple bargaining experiments, Games and Economic Behavior, 6, pp347-369,1994.
[41]Ginevičius, R. and Čirba, S., Competitive strategy of choosing parameters of building contracts, Journal of Civil Engineering and Management, 9(1), pp40-44, 2003.
[42]Gnyawali, D. R. and Madhavan, R., Cooperative Networks and Competitive Dynamics: A Structural Embeddedness Perspective, Academy of Management Review, 26, pp431-445, 2001.
[43]Grossman, S. J and Hart, O. D., The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, Journal of Political Economy, 94(4), pp 691,1986.
[44]Guasch, J. L. and Stphane, S., Corruption and concession Renegotiations : Evidence from the water and transport sectors in Latin America, Journal of Utilities Policy,17(2), pp185-190, 2009.
[45]Güth, W., Schmittberger, R. and Schwarze, B., An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3(4), pp367–388, 1982.
[46]Hamel, G., Doz Y.L.and Prahalad, C.K., Collaborate with your competitors – and win, Harward Business Review, January-February 1989.
[47]Harrison, G.. W. & Hirshleifer, J.,. An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods, Journal of Political Economy,University of Chicago Press, 97(1), pp 201-25, 1989.
[48]Hart, O. and Moore, J., Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, 98(6), pp1119-1158, 1990.
[49]Hausken, K., Gametheoretic and Behavioral Negotiation Theory, Group Decision and Negotiation, 6(6), pp 511-528, 1997.
[50]Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., E., F., and Gintis, H., Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies, Oxford University Press, 2004.
[51]Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, R., Alvard, Ml., Barr, Al., Ensminger, J., Hill, K., Francisco Gil-White, Gurven, M.., Marlowe, F.., P., J. Q. , Smith, N and David T, Economic Man'' in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-scale Societies, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(6), pp795-815, 2005.
[52]Hausken, K., Gametheoretic and Behavioral Negotiation Theory, Group Decision and Negotiation, 6(6), pp509-527, 1997.
[53]Ho, S. P., Model for Financial Renegotiation in Public-Private Partnership Projects and its Policy Implications: Game Theoretic View, Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 132(7), pp678-688, 2006.
[54]Ho, S. P. Government Policy on PPP Financial Issues: Bid Compensation and Financial Renegotiation, Chapter in Policy, Finance and Management for Public-Private Partnerships, by Akintola Akintoye and Matthias Beck, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, pp 267-300, 2009.
[55]Hotchkiss, E. S., Qian, J. and Song , W., Holdups, Renegotiation and Termination Fees in Mergers, Financial Institutions Center Working Paper Series, 2005.
[56]Howard, Ronald A., Decision Analysis: Applied Decision Theory, Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Operational Research, pp.55–77. 1966.
[57]Hwang, P., Asset specificity and the fear of exploitation, Journal of Economics Behavior and Organization, 60(3), pp423-438, 2006.
[58]John McMillan., Games, Strategies, and Managers, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
[59]Joseph Louis François Bertrand.,Mémoire sur le nombre de valeurs que peut prendre une fonction quand on y permute les lettres qu’elle renferme, Journal de l’École polytechique, 30, pp123–140, 1845.
[60]Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A.,Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, Econometrica, 47(2), pp263-291,1979.
[61]Klein, B. C., Alchian, R. G. and Armen, A., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, Journal of Law and Economics, 2(2), pp 297-326, 1978.
[62]Knoch, D., Gianotti, L.R., Pascual-Leone, A., Treyer, V., Regard, M., Hohmann, M. and Brugger, P., Disruption of right prefrontal cortex by lowfrequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation induces risktaking behavior,J Neurosci ,26, pp6469–6472, 2006a.
[63]Knoch, D., Pascual-Leone, A., Meyer, K., Treyer, V.and Fehr E., Diminishing reciprocal fairness by disrupting the right prefrontal cortex, Science, 314, pp829–832, 2006b.
[64]Koenigs, M. and Daniel T., Irrational Economic Decision-Making after Ventromedial Prefrontal Damage: Evidence from the Ultimatum Game, Journal of Neuroscience, 24, 27(4), pp951–956, 2007.
[65]Kopelman, S. and Rosette, A.S., Cultural variation in response to strategic display of emotions in negotiations, Special Issue on Emotion and Negotiation in Group Decision and Negotiation (GDN), 17 (1) 65-77, 2008.
[66]Kreps, D., Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in J. Alt and K. Shepsle, Eds. Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
[67]Lado, A. A., Boyd, N, G., and Hanlon, S. C., Competition, cooperation, and the search for economic rent: A syncretic model, Academy of Management Review, 22, pp110-141, 1997.
[68]Laibson, D., Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting, Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, 112(2), pp443-77, 1997.
[69]Laibson, D.,Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2),pp 443-477, 1997.
[70]Levy, S. M., Build, Operate, Transfer: Paving the Way for Tomorrow''s Infrastructure, British Chartered Institute of Building Silver Medal Press. 1996.
[71]Makoto, H., Holdup with Subsidized Investment, Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings, No 640, 2004.
[72]Medda, F., Risk Renegotiation in Transport Concessions, Centre for Transport Studies Working Paper ,02, pp01-25, 2006.
[73]Medda, F., A Game Theory Approach for the Allocation of Risks in Transport Public Private Partnerships, International Journal of Project Management, 25(3), pp213-218, 2007.
[74]Muhammad, Z. Y., Antecedents, Consequences And Control Of Opportunistic Behavior In Strategic Networks, Journal of Business and Economics Research, 7(2), pp15-32, 2009.
[75]Myerson, R. B., Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict, Harvard University Press, 1991.
[76]Nash, J. F. Jr., The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica, 18(2), pp155–162, 1950.
[77]Nash, J. F. Jr., Non-cooperative Games, Annals of Mathematics, 54(2), pp286–295, 1951.
[78]Neumann, J. Von, and Morgenstern, O., Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press, 1944.
[79]Nierenberg G. I., The Art of Negotiating: Psychological Strategies for Gaining Advantageous Bargains, Barnes and Noble Press, 1995.
[80]Noorda, R.,Pioneer of ''co-opetition'' ,Raymond Noorda to characterize Novell''s business strategy, 1992.
[81]North, D., Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
[82]Osterbeek, H., Sloof, R. and Kuilen, G. van de., Cultural differences in ultimatum game experiments: Evidence from a meta-analysis. Experimental Economics, 7, pp171–88, 2004.
[83]Ostrom, E., Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge University Press, 1990..
[84]Ostrom, E., Schroeder, L. and Wynne, S., Institutional incentives and sustainable development : infrastructure policies in perspective, Oxford: Westview Press, 1993.
[85]Paul, M. and John, R., Economics, Organization and Management, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1992.
[86]Porter, M. E., Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors, New York, NY: The Free Press, 1980.
[87]Porter, M. E., The Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance. The Free Press: New York, 1985.
[88]Rasmusen, E. B., Explaining Incomplete Contracts as the Result of Contract-Reading Costs, Journal of Advances in Economic Analysis Policy, 1(1), Article2, 2001.
[89]Rasmusen, E. B and Lyon, T. P., Buyer-Option Contracts, Renegotiation, and the Hold-Up Problem, The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 20(1), pp 148-169, 2004.
[90]Roth, A., Vesna P., Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Shmuel Z., “Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: An Experimental Study, Amer. Econ. Rev., 81, pp1068—1095, 1991.
[91]Roy, B.,Classement et choix en présence de points de vue multiples (la méthode ELECTRE), La Revue d''Informatique et de Recherche Opérationelle (RIRO) (8),pp 57–75, 1968.
[92]Rozen, V and Zhitomirski, G., A category theory approach to derived preference relations in some decision making problems, Mathematical Social Sciences, 51(3), pp 257-273, 2006.
[93]Rubinstein, A., Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model, Econometrica, 50(1), pp97–109, 1982.
[94]Rubinstein, A., Economics and Psychology? The Case of Hyperbolic Discounting, International Economic Review, 44(4), pp1207–1216, 2003.
[95]Sacks, R and Harel, M., An Economic Game Theory Model of Subcontractor Resource Allocation Behavior, Construction Management and Economics, 24(8), pp869-881, 2006.
[96]Samuelson, P. A., Where Ricardo and Mill Rebut and Confirm Arguments of Mainstream Economists Supporting Globalization: Response, Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, 19(3), pp242-244, 2005.
[97]Sanfey, A. G.., Rilling, J. K.and Aronson, J. A., Leigh E. Nystrom., and Jonathan D. Cohen.,The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game, Science 13 June, 300(5626), pp1755-1758, 2003.
[98]Schelling, T. C., The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, 1960.
[99]Schweizer, U., An Elementary Approach to the Hold-Up Problem with Renegotiation, Bonn Econ Discussion Papers from University of Bonn, Germany, 2000.
[100]Shen, L. Y., Bao, H. J., Wu, Y. Z. and Lu, W. S., Using Bargaining-Game Theory for Negotiating Concession Period for BOT-Type Contract, Journal Construction Engineering and Management, 133(5), pp385-392, 2007.
[101]Simon, H.A.,Theories of Bounded Rationality, Chapter 8 in C. B. McGuire and R. Radner, eds., Decision and Organization, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1972.
[102]Simon, H.A., Models of Thought, His papers on human information-processing and problem-solving. Yale University Press. Vols. 1 and 2.1979.
[103]Simon, H.A., Models of Bounded Rationality, Volume 1, Economic Analysis and Public Policy, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, pp235-244, 1982.
[104]Smith,V. L., Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory , American Economic Review, 66(2), pp 274-79,1976.
[105]Smith, V. L., experimental methods in economics ii, The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, vol.2, pp241–49, 1987.
[106]Tiong, L. K. R. and Alum, J., Distinctive winning elements in BOT tender Journal of Engineering Construction and Architectural Management, 4(2), pp83-94, 1997
[107]Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D., Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, 5(4), pp297-323, 1992
[108]Vickrey, William., Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, Journal of Finance, 16(1), pp 8-37, 1961.
[109]Volberda, H.W., Building the Flexible Firm, Oxford University Press, 1999.
[110]Walker, C. and Smith, A. J., Privatised Infrastructure, the BOT approach. Thomas Telford,London, 1995.
[111]Williamson, O. E.,Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, ISBN 0029353602, 1975.
[112]Williamson, O. E., Transactions-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, Journal of Law and Economics, 22(2), pp233-62, 1979.
[113]Williamson, O. E., The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(3), pp171–195, 2002.
[114]Yang, Y., Effect of Diversification of Operation Cost on Infrastructure BOT Project Investment Decision and Analysis of Option Game, China Population, Resources and Environment, 17(2), pp32-35, 2007.
[115]Yuan, J. F., Skibniewski, M. J., Li, Q., and Shan, J., The Driving Factors of China’s Public-Private Partnership Projects in Metropolitian Transportation Systems: Public Sector’s Viewpoint, Journal of Civil Engineering and Management, 16(1), pp5-18, 2010.
[116]Zak, P.J., Stanton, A.A.and Ahmadi, S., Oxytocin Increases Generosity in Humans, Public Library of Science, Published in: PloS ONE 11 e1128 , pp1-5. 2007.
[117]Zartman, I.W., Negotiation Process: Theories and Applications London: Sage Publications,1978.
[118]張維迎,賽局理論與信息經濟學, 1996.
[119]林能白等,從高速鐵路及國際金融大樓兩案之經驗檢討我國BOT 制度之設計,行政院研究發展考核委員會, 2000.
[120]促進民間參與公共建設法,行政院公共工程委員會, 2000.
[121]行政院公共工程委員會,如何防止公共工程綁標 ,2001.
[122]行政院公共工程委員會,政府採購申訴案例彙編(二) ,2002.
[123]荷世平,不對稱資訊下之政府 BOT 政策,行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫, 2003.
[124]廖偉智,台大土木所營管組,碩士論文,2008.
[125]樊沁萍教授,賽局理論與應用,上課講義,2008.
|