臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

美國證券交易委員會於2002年通過NASD Rule 2711法規的施行，此法規要求每家證券經紀公司必須在其所發佈的分析報告中，公佈股票推薦評等的比例分配。本研究以分析師的角度，探討其股票買進推薦評等比例與調降股票推薦評等或停止發佈評等報告的可能性之關係。
研究結果發現分析師其所發佈買進推薦評等的比例愈高，則愈有可能提高其調降股票推薦評等與停止發佈評等報告的可能性。更進一步的研究顯示，分析師傾向將公司的推薦評等調降至持有的等級，而較不傾向將公司的評等調降至賣出的等級。本研究更發現市場傾向相信有較高買進推薦評等比例的分析師，其所發佈的調降股票推薦評等訊息。

With the implementation of NASD Rule 2711 in 2002, it requires each brokerage firm to publicly disseminate the distribution of stock ratings in each research report. Hence, we want to investigate the relationship between the percentage of buy recommendations and probability of deciding to downgrade or drop coverage of stocks.
Our findings suggest that the percentage of buy recommendations can enhance the probability of deciding to downgrade stock ratings and drop coverage of stocks. Furthermore, we find that analysts tend to revise the recommendations downward to hold instead of an unfavorable level. In addition, we find market tend to believe downgrade decisions of analysts with a higher percentage of buy ratings.

Table of Contents
Inside Cover i
Chinese Abstract ii
English Abstract iii
Acknowledgement iv
Table of Contents v
List of Tables vi
List of Figures vi
I.Introduction 1
II.Related Literature and Research Hypotheses 4
III.Data, Sample Selection and Related Descriptive Statistics 7
IV.Research Design 10
IV.1 A Logit Analysis of Analysts’ Recommendation Revisions 10
IV.2 A Logit Analysis of Analysts’ Recommendation Revisions with an Interaction Item 12
IV.3 Detailed Explanation of the Variables 12
IV.4 The Stock Market Reaction to Analysts’Stock Recommendation Revisions 14
V.Empirical Results 15
V.1 Results for Analysts’ Recommendation Revisions 15
V.2 Regression Results of Analysts’ Recommendation Revisions with an Interaction Item 16
V.3 Results for Market Reaction 16
VI.Robust Test 17
VI.1 Results for analysts’ recommendation revisions in different sub-periods 17
VI.2 Results for analysts’ recommendation revisions with an interaction item in different sub-periods 18
VI.3 Results for Fama-MacBeth-style logit regressions of stock recommendation revisions 18
VI.4 Results for Fama-MacBeth-style logit regressions of stock recommendation revisions with an interaction item 18
VI.5 Results for Fama-MacBeth regressions of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 19
VII.Conclusion 19
Reference 21

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