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研究生:林子皓
研究生(外文):Tzu-Hao Lin
論文名稱:分析師跟隨人數與內部控制缺失之關聯性
論文名稱(外文):The Association between Analyst Coverage and Internal Control Weaknesses
指導教授:呂倩如呂倩如引用關係
口試委員:蘇淑慧陳昭蓉
口試日期:2012-7-18
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:元智大學
系所名稱:商學碩士班(會計學程)
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
畢業學年度:100
語文別:中文
論文頁數:27
中文關鍵詞:分析師跟隨人數內部控制缺失
外文關鍵詞:Analyst coverageInternal control weakness
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:2
  • 點閱點閱:303
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
美國於2002年7月通過沙氏法案(Sarbanes-Oxley Act)要求公司對財務報表作出真實揭露,其中沙氏法案第404條款要求公開發行公司要在財務報表上評估公司內部控制架構,並揭露其重大缺失項目,此舉不但提升了公司的透明度,也能讓投資人更瞭解公司內部之情形。再者,分析師是為公司與投資人之間的重要信息傳遞者,近年來分析師不僅僅要衡量財報的真實性和預測公司未來價值,還要評估其公司的內部控制制度有效性,這對公司無形造成了一股壓力,也讓分析師對公司的內部控制管理有了外部的監督效果。而分析師跟隨人數是指每一年一家公司有多少分析師分析之人數,因此分析師的跟隨人數越多,給予公司的壓力也會相對增加,公司就會更加注重內部控制的有效性,而導致內控缺失的情形越低。
本研究主旨在探討企業內部控制與分析師跟隨人數之關聯,實證結果顯示公司內部控制重大缺失與分析師跟隨人數呈現顯著負向關係,亦即表示分析師對於公司的內部控制的確有監督作用。本文發現公司的分析師跟隨人數越多,公司內部控制缺失的情形就越少。另一方面,依據Moody’s (2004)的分類,本研究發現分析師跟隨人數對於公司層級內控缺失之影響大於對於會計內部控制之影響,亦即表示分析師對於公司內部控制與管理等層面之監督影響力較大。
After the Enron and Worldcom scandals, investors have been concerning about the credibility of companies’ financial reports. Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), promulgated by the U.S. government in 2002, requires public firms to ensure their financial reports are fairly presented and with adequate disclosure. SOX 404 further enforces managements to access internal control framework and reveal relative material weakness in internal control system. This legislation improves corporate transparency and thus provides more information about companies’ internal conditions for investors. In recent years, analysts acting as information transmitters between companies and investors have also put more emphasis on the companies’ internal control and management. Therefore, we investigate the relation between internal control and analyst coverage. Our empirical results suggest that internal control deficiency is negatively associated with analyst coverage, which means that analysts play an important role in firm-level control of supervision.
第一章 緒論.......................1
第二章 文獻探討與假說發展.........4
第三章 研究方法...................8
第一節 樣本及資料來源.............8
第二節 研究模型...................8
第四章 實證結果與分析.............12
第一節 敘述性統計及相關係數.......12
第二節 研究結果...................13
第五章 結論與建議.................14
參考文獻..........................24
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