隨著時代的快速更替，市面上越來越多的產品充斥，相對來說廢棄的舊品也隨之更多，若不做好妥善處理，更會造成環境汙染；而近年來環保意識的抬頭、永續經營的理念提倡，在自然資源有限的情況下，越來越多的企業開始往再製造產業發展，因此在逆物流中產業的再製造已是不可或缺的項目之一。
本篇研究主要是以Hong and Ke(2011)為延伸，旨在探討在一逆物流供應鏈當中，當回收處理商回收產品時，會給予一回收鼓勵金來增加回收量，回收後的產品便交於最終產品製造商進行再製造，當新產品與再製品於市場上銷售會產生競爭關係；除了單一市場關係外，還探討政府在使用政策因素介入(徵收環境污染稅、補貼)，與最終產品製造商之新品與再製品的生產數量、回收處理商間的行為對逆物流所造成的影響與比較。

With the rapid change of world technologies, many products have been manufactured and thus much more disposals have produced. Our environment will be polluted if there are no appropriate measures. With this background, the awareness of environmental protection has arisen; however, in the circumstance of limited natural resources, more and more enterprises have moved there steps to remanufacturing industry. Hence, remanufacturing is the indispensable business item in reverse logistic industry.

In order to discuss the issues of giving incentive payments for increasing recycling amounts when in the situation of recycle processor recycled products and the competitive relationship between new products and remanufactured products, we made extensions of Hong and Ke’s research (2011). In addition, this research discussed the point of government adopting different policies to the intervention of relationship between finished product manufacturer and recycle processor.

中文摘要................................................. i
Abstract.................................................ii
目錄.....................................................iii
圖目錄.....................................................v
表目錄.....................................................vi
第一章 緒論................................................1
1-1 研究動機...............................................1
1-2 研究背景...............................................2
1-3 研究目的...............................................3
1-4 研究流程與架構..........................................4
第二章 文獻探討.............................................6
2-1 國內外資源回收現況.......................................6
2-1-1 我國資源回收現況........................................6
2-1-2 廢物清理法 ..........................................10
2-1-3 國際相關制度 ..........................................11
2-2 相關理論與名詞解釋......................................12
2-2-1 賽局理論.............................................12
2-2-2 逆物流與再製造........................................13
2-2-3 收稅與補貼機制........................................14
2-2-4 回收努力值...........................................15
第三章 模型建構............................................16
3-1 情境描述..............................................16
3-2 模型基本假設...........................................18
3-3 模型建構..............................................19
3-4 情境(一)之求解順序......................................22
3-4-1 回收處理商的決策過程...................................22
3-4-2 最終產品製造商的決策過程................................22
3-5 情境(二)之求解順序......................................27
3-5-1 回收處理商的決策過程...................................27
3-5-2 最終產品製造商的決策過程................................27
3-5-3 政府的決策過程........................................32
3-6 小結 ..................................................37
第四章 數值分析.............................................44
4-1 決策變數與參數間的關係...................................44
4-2 參數設定..............................................47
4-3 數值敏感度分析.........................................49
4-4 各情境之社會利潤對各參數變動之比較.........................52
第五章 結論與未來研究方向.....................................61
5-1 結論.................................................61
5-2 研究貢獻..............................................63
5-3 未來研究方向...........................................63
附錄A 產品需求函數...........................................65
附錄B 消費者剩餘............................................68
附錄C 消費者剩餘與生產者剩餘之計算..............................69
附錄D 情境(一)與情境(二)之極值判斷.............................74
參考資料與文獻..............................................80
中文文獻...................................................80
英文文獻...................................................81

中文文獻
〔1〕環保署綠色生活資訊網，http://greenliving.epa.gov.tw/GreenLife/info/consume/green-consume-1.aspx。
〔2〕行政院環保署資源回收管理基金委員會，http://recycle.epa.gov.tw/Recycle/index2.aspx。
〔3〕行政院環保署3R資源循環永續利用網，http://www.ttv.com.tw/3r/default.aspx。
〔4〕丹麥城市固體廢物管理與處理分析，2009年5月4日，環境科技網，http://www.cn-hw.net/html/sort054/200905/10217.html。
〔5〕張維迎，劉楚俊，賽局理論與信息經濟學，第一版，茂昌圖書有限公司，1999年。
〔6〕楊智強，回收與補貼之理論與實證─以台灣廢電子電器物品為例，國立台灣大學，2001。
〔7〕鄭啟璞，資源回收的問題與解析-廢機動車輛，永續產業發展雙月刊，p.67~72，2002。
〔8〕郭文俊，台灣地區資源回收與制度誘因機制探討，國立台北大學，2002。
〔9〕胡均立，賽局論的智慧-分析策略與權勢的學問，國立交通大學經營管理研究所推廣教材，2006年。
〔10〕沈靜悅，民間建築合建行為之研究-以賽局理論分析，朝揚科技大學，2006年。
〔11〕李宗胤，我國應回收廢物品回收評量指標－回收量的探討，屏東科技大學，2007。
〔12〕李陳國，綠色稅制的實施對我國環保政策之影響，臺灣銀行季刊，第61卷第4期，2010。
〔13〕李勇建與許參，租賃返回產品的回收再製造活動協調機制研究，系統工程學報，第27卷第3期，2012。

英文文獻
〔1〕Atasu, A., Guide Jr., V. D. R., & Van Wassenhove, L. N. (2010). So what if remanufacturing cannibalizes my new product sales? California Management Review, 52(2), 56-76.
〔2〕Ana, E. A., & Zhao, H.(2012). Environmental policy in a linear city model of product differentiation. Environment and Development Economic, 17, 461-477.
〔3〕Atasu, A., Sarvary, M., & Wassenhove, L. N. V. (2008). Remanufacturing as a marketing strategy. Management Science, 54(10), 1731-1746.
〔4〕Benchekroun, H., & Van Long, N. (2002). On the multiplicity of efficiency-inducing tax rules. Economics Letters, 76(3), 331-336.
〔5〕Carlsson, F. (2000). Environmental taxation and strategic commitment in duopoly models. Environmental and Resource Economics, 15(3), 243-256.
〔6〕Ferrer, G., & Swaminathan, J. M. (2010). Managing new and differentiated remanufactured products. European Journal of Operational Research, 203(2), 370-379.
〔7〕Dobbs I. M.(1991). Litter and waste management: disposal taxes versus user charges. Canadian Journal of Economics 24, 221-227.
〔8〕Ferrer, G., & Swaminathan, J. M. (2006). Managing new and remanufactured products. Management Science, 52(1), 15-26.
〔9〕Hong, I. H., & Ke, J. S. (2011). Determining advanced recycling fees and subsidies in "E-scrap" reverse supply chains. Journal of Environmental Management,92(6), 1495-1502.
〔10〕Law, K. M. Y. (2009). Relationships with supply chain partners affecting internal operation of high-tech manufacturers in Taiwan. Journal of High Technology Management Research, 20(1), 31-39.
〔11〕Savaskan, R. C., & Van Wassenhove, L. N. (2006). Reverse channel design: The case of competing retailers. Management Science, 52(1), 1-14.
〔12〕Sheu, J. B. (2011). Bargaining framework for competitive green supply chains under governmental financial intervention. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 47(5), 573-592.
〔13〕Souza, G. C. (2013). Closed-loop supply chains: A critical review, and future research*. Decision Sciences, 44(1), 7-38.
〔14〕Sheu, J. B., & Chen, Y. J. (2012). Impact of government financial intervention on competition among green supply chains. International Journal of Production Economics, 138(1), 201-213.
〔15〕Sheu,, J. B., Chou, Y. H., & Hu, C. C. (2005). An integrated logistics operational model for green-supply chain management. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 41(4), 287-313.
〔16〕Walls, M., & Palmer, K. (2001). Upstream pollution, downstream waste disposal, and the design of comprehensive environmental policies. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 41(1), 94-108.