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研究生:吳歡哲
研究生(外文):wu huan je
論文名稱:集團家族企業對CEO薪酬制度的影響
論文名稱(外文):The Influence of Family-controlled Businesses on CEO's Compensation System
指導教授:陳俞如陳俞如引用關係
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立彰化師範大學
系所名稱:商業教育學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2013
畢業學年度:101
語文別:中文
論文頁數:81
中文關鍵詞:集團家族企業薪酬敏感度相對績效評估
外文關鍵詞:family-controlled businessescompensation sensitivityRelative Performance Evaluation
相關次數:
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  • 下載下載:27
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
摘要
集團家族企業在我國上市上櫃公司中佔有很高的比例,對我國經
濟發展影響甚鉅,因此我國集團家族企業對於CEO 薪酬制度的影響,
是一個非常重要的議題。
本研究旨在探討集團家族企業對CEO 薪酬制度的影響,比較集團
家族企業和非集團家族企業CEO 的薪酬揭露情形,集團家族企業CEO
薪酬和績效連結程度,以及集團家族企業在決定CEO 薪酬時是否會受
到同業CEO 薪酬的影響。
研究結果發現,集團家族企業相較於非集團家族企業,較不願意
揭露CEO的薪酬。而在績效和薪酬連結度方面,集團家族企業CEO的薪
酬敏感度較低的假設則不顯著,但卻可以發現集團家族企業相較於非
集團家族企業較不會使用相對績效評估。
Abstract
Family-controlled businesses have a higher proportion in the listed
companies in Taiwan, influencing the development of our economy a lot.
Therefore, the influence on CEO’s compensation system from
family-controlled businesses in Taiwan is a significant issue.
The main purpose of this study was to investigate the influence of
family-controlled businesses on CEO’s compensation system and
compare the situation of disclosure of compensation between
family-controlled businesses and non-family-controlled businesses. Also,
connation and relationship between CEO’s compensation and
performance of family-controlled businesses were examined. Further, it
explored whether other family-controlled businesses affect CEO’s
compensation when family-controlled businesses decide CEO’s
compensation.
The results showed that compared to non-family-controlled
businesses, family-controlled businesses were unwilling to disclose
CEO’s compensation. For connation and relationship between CEO’s
compensation and performance, the hypothesis of lower CEO’s
compensation sensitivity of family-controlled businesses was
insignificant; however, it found out that family-controlled businesses
would use Relative Performance Evaluation less than
non-family-controlled businesses.
目錄
謝誌……………………………………………………………………I
摘要……………………………………………………………………II
Abstract………………………………………………………………III
目錄……………………………………………………………………IV
表次……………………………………………………………………VI
第一章 緒論…………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究背景與動機…………………………………1
第二節 研究目的…………………………………………3
第二章 文獻探討與假說發展……………………………………5
第一節 集團家族企業之相關文獻………………………5
第二節 薪酬制度…………………………………………16
第三節 研究發展與假說建立……………………………30
第三章 研究方法…………………………………………………42
第一節 樣本選取與資料來源……………………………42
第二節 研究方法…………………………………………44
第四章 實證結果…………………………………………………52
第一節 敘述性統計與相關分析…………………………52
第二節 實證結果分析……………………………………61
第三節 敏感性分析………………………………………68
第五章 結論及建議………………………………………………71
參考文獻……………………………………………………………73
表次
表3-1 樣本產業年度分配……………………………………………43
表4-1 敘述性統計量表………………………………………………56
表4-2 經理人薪酬揭露與集團家族企業相關係數之研究…………58
表4-3 經理人薪酬與集團家族企業相關係數之研究………………59
表4-4 經理人薪酬與同產業經理人薪酬相關係數之研究…………60
表4-5 集團家族企業經理人薪酬揭露之實證結果…………………66
表4-6 集團家族企業經理人薪酬敏感度、相對績效評估之實證結
果………………………………………………………………67
表4-7 敏感性分析……………………………………………………69
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