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研究生:黃舜新
研究生(外文):Shun-Sin Huang
論文名稱:台灣半導體產業公司治理對經營績效之影響-公司治理指數之應用
論文名稱(外文):The Effect of Corporate Governance on Operating Performance in Taiwan Semiconductor Industry:Application of Corporate Governance Index
指導教授:王健聰王健聰引用關係
指導教授(外文):Jan-chung Wang
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立高雄第一科技大學
系所名稱:金融研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2013
畢業學年度:101
語文別:中文
論文頁數:52
中文關鍵詞:公司治理公司治理指數Mann-whitney檢定半導體產業經營績效
外文關鍵詞:corporate governancesemiconductor industryoperating performancecorporate governance indexMann-Whitney test.
相關次數:
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本文首先運用Chen et al. (2007)所提出的公司治理指數將半導體產業公司區分出公司治理佳與不佳的兩組子樣本。其次,運用兩樣本平均數差異t檢定以及無母數Mann-Whitney檢定以檢視公司治理佳與不佳的企業之財務結構、償債能力、經營能力、獲利能力與成長率等五項經營績效指標是否具顯著差異。依此,以探討良好的公司治理是否有助於提升半導體產業之整體經營績效。實證結果顯示,公司治理佳的企業在經營能力、獲利能力與成長率平均而言顯著優於公司治理不佳的企業。整體而言,良好的公司治理對於半導體產業經營績效應有正向的影響。


關鍵字:公司治理、公司治理指數、經營績效、半導體產業、Mann-whitney檢定。
First, sample of semiconductor firms will be divided into two groups: good and bad corporate governance firms based on the corporate governance index proposed by Chen et al. (2007). Next, this thesis uses the two sample t-test and nonparametric Mann-Whitney test to investigate whether there are significant differences in the financial structure, solvency, coperating capacity, profitability, and growth rate between companies with good and bad corporate governance. Based on these tests, this thesis examines whether good corporate governance mechanism helps improve the overall operating performance of semiconductor industry. Empirical results indicate that Compared to companies with bad corporate governance, companies with good corporate governance have significantly better coperating capacity, profitability and growth rate. Thus, overall good corporate governance mechanism has positive impact on operating performance of semiconductor industry.



Keywords: corporate governance, corporate governance index, operating performance, semiconductor industry, Mann-Whitney test.
目錄
中文摘要 i
Abstract ii
誌謝 iii
目錄 iv
第壹章 緒論 - 1 -
第一節 研究動機與背景 - 1 -
第二節 研究目的 - 3 -
第三節 研究限制 - 4 -
第四節 研究架構與步驟 - 4 -
第貳章 文獻探討 - 6 -
第一節 公司治理之定義 - 6 -
第二節 公司治理相關文獻 - 11 -
第參章 研究設計與方法 - 15 -
第一節 研究樣本與資料來源 - 15 -
第二節 運用公司治理指數以區分公司治理佳與公司治理不佳之企業 - 16 -
第三節 公司經營績效指標 - 18 -
第四節 兩樣本平均數差異t檢定與Mann-Whitney檢定 - 23 -
第肆章 實證結果分析 - 26 -
第一節 運用公司治理指數區分公司治理佳與不佳企業 - 26 -
第二節 公司治理佳與不佳企業之各項經營績效指標比較 - 29 -
第三節 公司治理佳與不佳企業各項經營績效指標差異檢定 - 34 -
第伍章 結論 - 38 -
第陸章 參考文獻 - 40 -
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