臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文旨在探討當政府面對自身的利益與民意考量下，如何決定其最適的政務官類型。
不同於以往公共選擇的分析假設，本文以另一角度詮釋政策循環，亦即政策循環不一定都發生在政黨競爭之中，即使在單一政黨內，也可能會發生。
另外我們發現當民意的支持度低於某相對的水準時，政府基於選票的壓力會傾向於走清廉理想型路線。

This work discusses how the optimal decision on the administrative officers is formed when a government has to balance the benefit of itself and the public opinion.
In contrary to previous public choice hypotheses, this work tries to delineate the cycle in a different perspective; that is, the cycle is possible to happen within a political party as well as in the competition between different parties.
In addition, we have also found that when the level of public support is decreased below a given standard, the government will be forced to take the ideal, virtuous position under the electoral pressure.

第一章 緒論.................................................................................1
第一節 研究動機與目的..........................................................................................................1
第二節 本文架構........................................................................................................................2

第二章 文獻回顧.........................................................................3

第三章 理論模型.........................................................................6
第一節 模型設定........................................................................................................................6
第二節 廠商決定最適產量.....................................................................................................8
第三節 政府監督及廠商的預期利潤..................................................................................9
第四節 政府獲得廠商的總淨租支出................................................................................11
第五節 政府決定回繳金額...................................................................................................13
第六節 政府與民眾的混合賽局.........................................................................................16

第四章 結論與建議....................................................................23

參考文獻.....................................................................................25

中文部分：
1.符芳碩（民102年3月15日）。「張曉風辭立委 環團批親民黨騙選票」。新頭殼newtalk。
2.林玉玫(2012)，「中央政府的委託決策及地方政府競爭」，國立政治大學財政研究所碩士論文。
3.張翔一（民102年5月2日）。「劉憶如請辭！「租稅正義」為何這麼難？」。天下雜誌496期。
4.曹逸雯（民101年5月29日）。「不滿國民黨版證所稅，財政部長劉憶如請辭」。今日新聞Now news。
5.宋小海（民102年3月28日）。「親民黨為選舉「逼退」張曉風？」。新新聞【政治事】。

英文部分：
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3.Jones, D. (1973,October 28).“The sayings of Secretary Henry (Kissger),” The New York Times,p.95.
4.Grossman, G. M. and Helpman, E. (1994). “Protection for Sale,” American Economie Review, 84(4), 833-850.
5.Krueger, A. O. (1974). “The political economy of the rent-seeking society,” American Economic Review, 64(3), 291-303.
6.Moe, T. M. (2006), “Political Control and the Power of the Agent,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 22(1), 1-29.
7.Peltzman, S. (1976), “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,” Journal of Law and Economics, 19(2), 211-240.
8.Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. E. (2000), “Political economics: explaining economic policy,” The MIT press.
9.Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. and Trebbi, F. (2003),“ Electoral rules and corruption,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(4), 958-989.
10.Priks, M. (2012), “Competition among officials and the abuse of power,” Public Choice, 150(3-4), 425-438.
11.Shapiro, S. P. (2005), “Agency theory,” Annual review of sociology, Vol.31, 263-284.
12.Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1993), “Corruption,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3), 599-617.
13.Stigler, G. J. (1971), “The theory of economic regulation,” The Bell journal of economics and management science, 2(1), 3-21.
14.Tullock, G. (1967), “The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft,” Economic Inquiry, 5(3), 224-232.