本研究藉由將公司經理人對於支付供應商貨款的裁量權，納入現有的裁決性應計項目估計模型考量中，試圖改善原本模型在公司面對盈餘門檻時的盈餘管理偵測能力。文中以裁決性應計項目（discretionary accruals）作為盈餘管理衡量基準，再用迴歸與T檢定等方法檢驗修正後的模型在公司面對不同盈餘管理誘因時的偵測能力是否獲得改善。

研究貢獻是（1）提出考量支付供應商貨款裁量權的裁決性應計項目的修改模型，（2）探討模型修改前後對盈餘門檻的偵測能力（3）檢測公司在面對何種盈餘管理誘因時，會傾向利用對存貨及應付帳款的裁量權來做盈餘管理。

實證結果發現：經由本研究的模型修改，可改善對於公司在面對負債比率以及「避免損失」盈餘門檻的盈餘管理偵測能力，但在公司面對「避免盈餘減少」的盈餘門檻時，未有顯著提升，此結果符合Degeorge, Patel and, Zeckhauser (1999)的公司經理人在面對下限壓力時，首重報導獲利。

This study aims to improve discretionary accrual (DA) models by taking managers’ discretionary power over the firm’s payment to suppliers into consideration. Specifically, we make changes on cross-sectional version of Modified Jones model and Modified Jones Model with ROA (Kothari et al. 2005) in order to enhance the power of identifying earning management of these models. The regression analysis and t-tests are used to examine whether our revisions for discretionary accrual models help improving its detecting power for companies that may face different earning management incentives.

This study adds to the literature in that (1) it proposes adjustment for discretionary accrual estimation model to capture the effect of managers’ discretionary power over payment to the suppliers, and (2) it explores the difference between my proposed modified models and the original ones in detecting earnings increasing schemes of the companies with high debt ratio or near earnings thresholds.

Empirical results are consistent with the notion that company managers, facing earnings thresholds, are concerned about the of avoiding losses instead of avoiding earning decreases. First, our revisions for discretionary accrual models appear to improve the effectiveness of the DA models when companies face high debt ratio or earning threshold of avoiding losses. Second, our proposed modifications appear to add insignificant power to the DA models for the companies that face the threshold of avoiding earnings per share decreases.

口試委員審定書……………………………………… I
謝辭……………….……………………………………II
摘要……………………………………………………III
Abstract………………………………………………IV
第一章 緒論…………………………………………..1
第二章 文獻探討與回顧…………………………… 4
第一節 盈餘管理的方法與裁決性應計項目衡量.4
第二節 企業盈餘門檻………………………………..8
一、避免損失的盈餘門檻…………………………....8
二、避免盈餘減少的盈餘門檻..............................9
第三章 研究設計................................................9
第一節 研究模型與實證變數定義及衡量…….......11
一、裁量性應計項目模型與改善設計……………...11
二、裁量性應計項目列聯表檢定..........................16
三、實證變數定義與衡量…………………………...17
第二節 樣本選取及資料來源……………………....21
第四章 實證結果與分析…………………………….22
一、 各裁量性應計項估計模型修正前後實證結果..23
二、 模型修正前後實證比較結果.........................30
三、 裁決性應計項目列聯表檢定結果……............31
第五章 結論與建議……......................................33
第一節 研究結論…….........................................34
第二節 研究限制…….........................................35
第二節 未來研究方向與建議…….........................36
參考文獻…….....................................................37
中文參考文獻……...............................................37
英文參考文獻……...............................................37

中文文獻:
1. 金成隆、林修葳、張永芳，1999，強制性財務預測誤差與盈餘管理關係：20%門檻限制影響之研究，財務金融學刊，第七卷第一期：59-96。
2. 張文瀞，民89，盈餘管理之特性與審計品質之影響，國立政治大學會計學系博士班博士論文。
3. 陳錦村與葉雅薰，2002，公司改組、監督機制與盈餘管理之研究，會計評論，第34期：1-28。
4. 孫秀惠 (民 91)，「近五成民眾不相信上市公司財報─『台灣企業誠信度』調查」，商業週刊，第七百六十五期：88-89。
5. 楊朝旭和吳幸蓁，2003，總經理薪酬績效敏感性、績效門檻與盈餘管理關聯性之研究，會計評論，第36期：55-87。

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