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研究生:呂貞宜
研究生(外文):Chen-Yi Lu
論文名稱:資訊揭露評等、現金持有與企業價值之關聯性研究
論文名稱(外文):The Degree of Information Disclosure, Cash Holding and Firm Value
指導教授:廖珮真廖珮真引用關係
指導教授(外文):Pei-Cheng Liao
口試委員:劉心才羅光達
口試日期:2013-07-15
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:會計學研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2013
畢業學年度:101
語文別:中文
論文頁數:65
中文關鍵詞:資訊揭露評鑑制度現金持有企業價值
外文關鍵詞:Information Disclosure and Transparency Ranking SystemCash HoldingFirm Value
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近年來國內各產業之現金持有比率大增。公司可能基於交易動機或預防性動機而持有現金。但持有過多卻可能引發代理理論,使得公司價值降低。過去文獻顯示,透過好的公司治理能提升公司價值。因此本研究以資訊揭露做為公司治理的衡量方法,研究樣本利用證券發展基金會所公布的第四屆至第九屆資訊揭露評鑑結果為對象,探討資訊揭露評等、現金持有與公司價值之關係。
實證結果發現,電子業與化學業之公司,資訊揭露越佳,邊際現金之公司價值越低,非電子業與化學業之公司,資訊揭露越佳,邊際現金之公司價值越高。 本研究認為產業特性和現金來源不同是造成不同產業有不同結果的原因。




Over the recent years, the average cash-to-net-asset ratio for Taiwanese firms in many industries has risen dramatically. Firms may choose to hold cash for either transactional or precautionary motives. However, excessive cash holding may cause agency problems, leading to lower market value for the firm. The literature has shown that corporate governance would mitigate the value destruction associated with excessive cash holding.
In this paper, we use the firms’ degree of information disclosure as our main measure of corporate governance and use “The Ranking Result of the Public Companies Information Disclosure and Transparency Ranking System” issued by Securities and Futures Institute as a proxy for the degree of information disclosure. Using these sample data, this paper attempts to investigate how the interaction between the degree of information disclosure and cash holding is related to firm value.
The results from this paper show that, for firms in the Electronic and Biotechnology & Medicine Industries, the higher a firm’s degree of information disclosure, the lower its market value derived from a marginal dollar of cash. However, for firms in the other industries, the higher a firm’s degree of information disclosure, the higher its market value derived from a marginal dollar. Conclusively, we suggest that industrial characteristics and sources of cash may lead to different results for different industries.


目錄
致謝 i
目錄 ii
表目錄 iv
摘要 v
ABSTRACT vi
第一章 緒論 1
1.1研究背景與動機 1
1.2研究目的與貢獻 3
1.3研究架構與流程 4
第二章 文獻探討 5
2.1現金持有動機 5
2.1.1權衡理論 5
2.1.2代理理論 8
2.2公司治理、現金持有與公司價值之相關實證研究 10
2.2.1現金持有與公司價值之文獻 10
2.2.2公司治理、現金持有與公司價值: 11
2.3資訊揭露與公司治理 12
2.4資訊揭露評鑑系統 12
一、評鑑適用對象及評鑑範圍 13
二、評鑑方法 13
三、評鑑性質與限制 13
四、評鑑指標 14
2.5資訊揭露水準之相關實證研究 14
2.5.1資訊揭露與公司治理相關文獻 14
2.5.2資訊揭露效益之相關文獻 15
2.6文獻小結 16
第三章 研究方法 18
3.1研究假說 18
3.2研究樣本與資料來源 20
3.2.1樣本選取 20
3.2.2資料來源 22
3.3研究模型與變數定義 22
第四章實證結果分析 30
4.1敘述性統計分析 30
4.1.1台灣產業現金持有比率趨勢 30
4.1.2樣本之敘述性統計模型 34
4.1.3相關性分析 38
4.2迴歸分析結果 42
4.2.1以市價帳面值比衡量公司價值之模型回歸結果 42
4.2.2以股票報酬率衡量公司價值之模型迴歸結果 48
4.3敏感性分析 52
第五章研究結論與建議 58
5.1研究結論 58
5.2研究限制與未來建議 60
參考文獻 61


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三.參考網站
智庫百科網站:http://wiki.mbalib.com/wiki/


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