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研究生:林世斌
研究生(外文):Shih-Pin Lin
論文名稱:設置薪酬委員會對董監薪酬與公司績效關聯之影響
論文名稱(外文):The Impact of Compensation Committee on the Relationship between Director Compensation and Firm Performance
指導教授:林世銘林世銘引用關係
口試委員:陳國泰黃美祝
口試日期:2013-06-13
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:會計學研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2013
畢業學年度:101
語文別:中文
論文頁數:51
中文關鍵詞:薪酬委員會董監薪酬公司績效
外文關鍵詞:compensation committeedirectorssupervisorsfirm performance
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:13
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本文以2010及2011年台灣資本額100億元以上之上市公司財務資料為樣本,探討董監薪酬與公司績效之關聯性。2011年台灣正式實施薪酬委員會制度,要求上市、上櫃與興櫃公司於該年度設置薪酬委員會,故本文亦探討薪酬委員會之設置是否確實能達到當初之立法目的,強化董監薪酬與公司績效之關聯性。實證結果發現:(1)董監薪酬與公司績效呈顯著正向關係 (2)公司規模、外資持股比例與董事會結構亦為董監薪酬之影響因素 (3)設置薪酬委員會對董監薪酬與公司績效之關聯性無顯著影響,公司對於薪酬委員會之設置僅為適法性之遵循。
本文進一步將樣本分為稅後淨利為正之公司與稅後淨利為負之公司,稅後淨利為正之公司其董監薪酬影響因素大致上與以全樣本進行分析之結果一致;對於稅後淨利為負之公司而言,董監薪酬之影響因素僅剩公司規模與董事會結構,其董監薪酬與公司績效無顯著關聯性,且要求其設置薪酬委員會亦無法使其董監薪酬與公司績效呈正相關。


We investigate the relationship between director compensation and firm performance over 2010-2011 by using Taiwan listed companies whose capital are more than 10 billion Taiwan dollars as the sample for this study. In 2011, Financial Supervisory Commission asked all public companies to establish compensation committee, so we also investigate whether setting compensation committee could enhance the relationship between director compensation and firm performance. The empirical results show that compensation of directors is positively and significantly associated with firm performance. Firm size, the percentage of shares held by foreign institutional investors and board structure are also the factors of determining director compensation. The setting of compensation committee has no effect on the relationship of director compensation and firm performance. We also use net income to split the sample into two sub-samples. Using the companies whose net income is positive as the sample, the outcome is the same with the result mentioned above. But for the companies whose net income is negative, we found that the factors which influence director compensation only include firm size and board structure. These firms’ director compensations are not affected by firm performance, and setting compensation committee also doesn’t make director compensation and firm performance related with each other.

口試委員審定書……………………………………………………………………...I
謝辭……………………………………………………………………………........ II
摘要……………………………………………………………………………........ III
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………......IV
目錄…………………………………………………………………………….........V
圖目錄…………...…………………………………………………………………..VI
表目錄…………...…………………………………………………………………..VI
壹 緒論……………………………………………………………………………......1
 第一節 研究動機與目的………………………………………………………......1
 第二節 研究架構………………………………………………………………......3
貳 文獻回顧………………………………………………………………………......5
 第一節 代理理論………………………………………………………………......5
 第二節 薪酬制度與公司績效之實證研究……………………………………......7
 第三節 薪酬委員會……………………………………………………………….12
參 研究方法………………………………………………………………………….19
 第一節 研究假說………………………………………………………………….19
 第二節 實證模型與變數衡量…………………………………………………….21
 第三節 資料來源與樣本選取…………………………………………………….25
肆 實證結果分析…………………………………………………………………….28
 第一節 敘述性統計……………………………………………………………….28
 第二節 相關性分析……………………………………………………………….32
 第三節 迴歸分析………………………………………………………………….34
伍 結論與建議……………………………………………………………………….41
 第一節 研究結論………………………………………………………………….41
 第二節 研究限制………………………………………………………………….42
 第三節 研究建議………………………………………………………………….43
參考文獻……………………………………………………………………………….45
附錄…………………………………………………………………………………….48



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